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 Abstract 
This thesis presents the findings and conclusions of research that was undertaken 
with the purpose of exploring the issues (or factors) that typically influence the 
successful, or unsuccessful, implementation of public policy initiatives in Malta.   
The research, which followed an inductive enquiry and a case study approach, was 
undertaken in three sequential and progressive steps (or ‘projects’).  The objective 
of Projects 1 and 2 was to elicit the factors that are typically considered to influence 
failure and success in the implementation of policy initiatives in Malta.  While Project 
1 focused on a case study of failure, Project 2 considered a case study of successful 
policy implementation1.  Both studies were based upon data collected through 
documentary research (172 records)2 and in-depth interviews (17)3 that were held 
with the key persons involved in the implementation of the policies under review.  
Twenty-six (26) factors of failure and twenty-one (21) factors of success were 
identified through the application of cognitive (causal) mapping techniques (Eden, 
Ackermann et al., 1992) and the general principles of data codification proposed by 
Strauss and Corbin (1998).  Using a survey of 136 persons4, Project 3 then 
established which of the factors elicited from the first two projects were generally 
considered to be critical for policy implementation in Malta.  Focusing on these 
results, a number of propositions were then drawn with the objective of 
recommending measures that would improve the likelihood of successful policy 
implementation.   
The research concludes that the decisive factors influencing the successful or 
unsuccessful outcome of policy implementation in Malta are a function of the type 
and degree of commitment and leadership that are shown to a policy initiative.  The 
research further suggests that success can be improved if the approach to the 
management of policies is based on the application of the principles of project 
management.  The research makes a number of contributions to both theory and 
practice.  Most notably, it proposes two conceptual models for framing and 
representing success and failure in policy implementation; it ascribes meaning to a 
number of clichéd concepts, particularly that of ‘(policy) commitment’; it identifies 
eight dimensions or requisites for effective (public sector) leadership; and it 
suggests a tool for guiding the selection of policy implementation leaders. 
 
                                            
1 The policies selected for the case studies were chosen through an interview process. 
2 Several other documents were examined.  The 172 records were short-listed as key documents (69 in Project 
1 and 103 in Project 2) and included reports, minutes of meetings, Parliamentary debates and questions, 
legislation, internal memoranda, letters and circulars, correspondence files, and newspaper articles. 
3  Nine (9) interviews in Project 1 and eight (8) interviews in Project 2. 
4 This represents a 62% response rate from a census of 219 Politicians, senior Civil Servants and Consultants 
with the Government of Malta. 
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 Preface 
The DBA 
Like the Ph.D, the DBA is a research degree.  Unlike the Ph.D, it is driven by the 
desire to address a specific management issue, rather than an academic research 
question arising from the identification of a ‘gap’ in current management theory.  In 
this respect, it is the management issue that constitutes the research question.   
Furthermore, the DBA research follows a more structured and modular approach.  It 
is focused around three thematically linked ‘projects’ that explore and answer the 
management issue in successive ‘steps’, each one building on the findings of the 
previous, until all aspects of the research question (management issue) have been 
addressed.  Each project concludes with a report that details the objective of the 
research undertaken, the methodology followed, and the findings and conclusions 
derived.  In a final step, the work undertaken in the three projects is returned to and 
reflected upon, so that general conclusions and recommendations can be drawn.  
These are presented in a report referred to as the ‘Linking Document’, which also 
details the research contributions to both theory and practice. 
Structure of this Thesis 
This thesis brings together the research undertaken throughout the DBA programme.  
It is structured in five parts to reflect the research process described above. 
Part 1 starts with a discussion of the management issue, the research aims and 
justification, and the research question addressed by the study.  It then outlines the 
general literature guiding the study, presenting this as a precursor to the indicative 
and detailed literature reviews that were undertaken in Projects 1 and 3.  The 
paradigm defining the research design is presented next, followed by a summary of 
the methodologies adopted in each of the three projects.   
Parts 2, 3 and 4 of the thesis reproduce the research undertaken in Projects 1, 2 and 
3 respectively.  Projects 1 and 2 address the first aspect of the research question by 
(respectively) considering a representative example of failure and success in policy 
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 implementation.  Project 3 then focuses on the results obtained from these projects 
to address the second aspect of the research question. 
Parts 2 and 3 of the thesis follow the same structure:  after introducing the research 
objective for the project in question, each part describes the data subject of the 
research, it outlines the research methodology, and presents the data findings and 
observations. 
Part 4 focuses on the work undertaken in Project 3.  In this case, the emphasis of the 
discussion is on the methodology and choice of methods used (which differ from 
those adopted in Projects 1 and 2) and the development of propositions that 
consider both the findings of the first two projects and those arising from a detailed 
review of the relevant literature. 
The last element of this thesis – Part 5 – then focuses on a holistic discussion of the 
research findings and propositions, the limitations of the study, and the contributions 
to knowledge and practice.   
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 Overview of Part 1 
This Part of the thesis introduces the management problem and research issue 
guiding the entire study, and is divided into three chapters.   
Chapter 1 states the purpose of the research study, the background or context to the 
research, its perceived justification and rationale, and the objectives it sets to 
achieve.  After a discussion of the aforesaid, the research question is defined as 
follows: 
What issues (or factors) curtail the effective implementation of a given 
public policy, and how can these issues be overcome? 
Chapter 2 grounds the research question in the literature and theoretical principles 
that inform the research issue.  While the review cuts across a number of academic 
research domains, it is predominantly anchored in the strategy literature, drawing on 
aspects of this body of knowledge that pertains to both the private and public 
sectors.  The Chapter presents and discusses those works considered to be the 
most relevant for this research and ends by drawing four conclusions to guide the 
study. 
Finally, Chapter 3 provides an overview of the research methodology, structure and 
methods defining this study.  The purpose of this Chapter is to provide the reader 
with a ‘preview’ of how the research unfolded and an insight into the logic, rationale 
and objective guiding each step of the study. 
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 1.0 Introduction 
1.1 Statement of Purpose 
This research is concerned with exploring the issues influencing the strategic 
implementation of public policy in the Republic of Malta5.  In particular, it seeks to 
understand why policy that is established by the Executive of Government is not 
always successfully implemented by the Public Service. 
1.2 Background 
On the 27th May 1988, the Prime Minister of Malta appointed a Public Service 
Reform Commission “to examine the organisation of the Public Service, and to 
recommend means by which the Service can efficiently respond to the changing 
needs for effective government” (Public Service Reform Commission, 1989).  Since 
then, Public Service reform has occupied a central position on the political and 
administrative agenda of the Government, and a number of change programmes 
were launched to address the strategic orientation of the Public Service.  The aim of 
these initiatives was to explore new opportunities for improving the operations of the 
Administration and, in so doing, to ensure that the policies formulated by the 
Executive can be effectively and efficiently implemented for the benefit of the 
intended recipients and the nation at large. 
A number of, at least partial, success stories emerged.  Yet, in other instances, the 
momentum of change was not sustained.  In some cases, the drive for change may 
have only partially succeeded, or may have altogether failed, because the reform 
was perceived to be an imposition and was therefore not supported by the people 
who ultimately were responsible for its implementation (Polidano, 1992).  In others, it 
may not have been sustained because the organisations did not have the skills or 
                                            
5  See Appendix 1 for a profile of Malta and its Government. 
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 appropriate capacity to do so6.  Drawing parallels with similar situations in other 
jurisdictions, some organisations may also not have felt the need to change and/or 
were otherwise not faced with a crisis or the right pressure for change (Nutt and 
Backoff, 1987; Bowman, 1999).  In these instances, the inability to drive change 
stifled the development of new or improved strategic management frameworks and, 
hence, the ability to effectively implement intended policies. 
1.3 Research Issue 
Figure 1 below is a STEP-BY-STEP representation of a typical cycle guiding the 
formulation and implementation of public policy.   
Figure 1 – A Generic Model of the Public Policy Cycle 
5 4
1 
2 
3 
UNINTENDED INTENDED 
Re-adjust 
Re-orient 
Replace 
Reinforce 
Definition of Policy 
Political Vision 
Social Needs 
Outcomes 
Strategic Action 
Source: Complied by Author 
 
                                            
6  Quoted from a discussion held on May 11, 2000 between the author and Dr Godfrey Pirotta, then Senior 
Lecturer at the Department of Public Policy of the University of Malta. 
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 At a macro-level, the public policy cycle can be thought of as consisting of five 
possible STEPS (marked 1-2-3-4-5 in Figure 1).  In general, the public policy cycle is 
triggered by citizens’ claims for action or inaction on some public issue made upon 
government officials and agencies (Anderson, 1990: 6).  In response to these issues, 
described in Figure 1 as ‘social needs’, different political visions that have the 
potential to address and satisfy these needs are offered as alternative courses of 
action (STEP 1, Figure 1).  On the basis of this, a Party is elected to Office.  In turn, 
policy statements are defined (STEP 2).  These statements are the formal 
expressions of the ‘chosen’ vision which, when acted upon (STEP 3), produce a set 
of outcomes that are expected to address the policy demands of citizens in a way 
that at best maximises, and at least satisfies, the anticipated return per unit of cost.  
Outcomes that positively address policy demands will act to reinforce the original 
vision and policy statements, so that more of the same benefits are produced (STEP 
4), thereby sustaining the formulation of policy and the implementation of strategic 
action through successive, incremental cycles.  On the other hand, outcomes that 
produce undesired results or unintended benefits are likely to cause the political 
vision, the policy statement, and/or the action taken earlier to be re-adjusted, re-
oriented or replaced (STEP 5), so that Steps 1-2-3-4 are achieved instead. 
While policy makers would ideally expect the policy cycle to evolve as depicted 
through Steps 1-2-3-4, occasionally (and maybe more often), public policies are not 
implemented as intended and/or fail to produce the outcomes anticipated to address 
the targeted social needs in the intended way, the first-time round.  This failure may 
be caused by various ‘breakdowns’ in one or more of STEPS 1 to 3 of the policy 
cycle (Figure 1).  The reasons for this are discussed next.  Figure 2 on the following 
page expands on the general model presented in Figure 1, to support this 
discussion. 
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 Figure 2 – The Public Policy Gap 
Management Problem 
and Research Issue 
3a 3b  /  3c 
Intended policy Emergent strategies
Ministers Permanent Secretaries
2 Departments/Agencies
Cabinet 
? ?Parliament Manifestation of 
Management / 
Research Issue 
strategic action ?Political Parties 
? ?1 
Social Needs Outcomes (Benefits ?) 
 4 / 5 
CITIZENS 
Source: Compiled by Author 
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 Firstly, citizens’ felt deprivation of their social needs may be wrongly identified and 
interpreted by political parties, such that when fed into the policy development 
framework in the form of manifesto promises prior to election time, they do not 
adequately reflect citizens’ needs (STEP 1, Figure 2).  Two outcomes are possible at 
this stage.  On the one hand, the political vision as expressed in the Party’s 
manifesto fails to capture public interest and support and, consequently, the Party is 
not elected to Office.  In such an event, STEPs 2 to 4 would be obviated.  On the 
other hand, the Party may still be elected to Office, but the policy statements that are 
developed (STEP 2) are nonetheless ineffective because they are based on the 
expression of social needs that have been incorrectly diagnosed.  If the problems 
(i.e., social needs) have been wrongly defined and the treatments (policies) are 
inadequate, it is almost certain that the delivered action and outcomes will fall short 
of expectations.  This will create distrust among the electorate, causing the political 
vision expressed in the next manifesto to be less credible in the eyes of the public, 
and the chances for re-election more remote.  
Secondly, the political vision (STEP 1) may correctly express citizens’ needs, but 
Cabinet, as the policymaking body of Government, is ineffective in translating these 
needs into broad policy statements (STEP 2) that clearly establish the required 
scope and direction upon which the Administration can take effective strategic 
action. 
However, assuming that; 
1. a Party in Office is motivated to prolong its state of privilege as far into the future 
as possible; and that 
2. a politically mature and democratic society will always tend to support the political 
vision that it feels will best serve its interests;  
then, it can be held that considerable time, effort and attention will be spent by 
politicians to ensure that both the political vision and the formulated policy go straight 
to the heart of addressing citizens’ needs.  Therefore, while certainly possible, it is 
assumed that in the normal course of events, the probability of failing to produce an 
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 outcome that satisfies citizens’ needs in the intended way, is less than likely to be 
the result of a deficiency in STEPs 1 and 2 of the policy cycle.   
This leads us to consider three other reasons why unintended outcomes may arise.   
1. Cabinet is effective in establishing the required direction but, individually, 
Ministers of Government are ineffective in ‘orchestrating’ the required strategic 
administrative action (STEP 3 ‘part a’, Figure 2); and/or  
2. both Cabinet and individual Ministers are effective, but the established policy 
framework is incorrectly interpreted and acted upon by the administrative 
agencies of Government, and/or is otherwise not supported by them because of 
conflicting interests, resistance to change etc. (STEP 3 ‘part b’); and/or 
3. both reasons ‘1’ and ‘2’ above are not an issue, but the management framework 
of Government lacks the skills, competence, and know-how to translate policy 
into effective strategies and concrete tactical action, or is otherwise limited to do 
so due to organisational, operational, procedural and structural impediments  
(STEP 3 ‘part c’). 
Considering the above, the core problem and management issue can therefore be 
defined as the inability to TRANSLATE a given policy into effective strategic 
action.  The policy cycle is interrupted, and a ‘gap’ – the ‘politico-administrative 
divide’ – arises between the policymaking and strategy implementation arms of 
Government; i.e., the Executive and the Administration respectively.  Because of 
this, Government policy fails to be implemented successfully. 
1.4 Research Justification 
From a management perspective, the need to bridge the policy formulation and 
implementation sides of government and, at least partially, overcome the issues 
curtailing the effective implementation of public policy is a necessity, not a choice.  
The inability to address the break-down in the politico-administrative framework of 
Government is likely to lead to, and sustain, a cascade of ineffective and undesired 
results, where the strategies developed by the Administration bear little relevance to 
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 the policy formulated by the Executive; where the defined goals or objectives 
become obscure and immeasurable; where the plan becomes unachievable; and 
where the action taken in support of the planned goals becomes virtually pointless.  
Unless effectively addressed, the Public Service will continue to be beset with 
criticisms of resource wastage and under-utilisation, while the Government’s efforts 
to contain the alarmingly high public deficit will be futile. 
That something is wrong has long been perceived, and change management 
initiatives aimed at improving the situation continue to be the order of the day.  
However, the fact that results have been, at best, only partially successful, may 
indicate a failure to address the core problem.  This research attempts to address 
this.  It is believed that successful, sustainable change to the strategic management 
framework of government can only be achieved after the factors contributing to 
success and failure in policy implementation are examined and better understood.  
Political and administrative leaders may use the results obtained from this study so 
that future decisions do not replicate the mistakes of the past, while also ensuring 
that continued investment in change and strategic initiatives is effectively spent. 
The difficulties of achieving and maintaining an effective and sustainable strategic 
management framework are by no means limited to the Maltese public sector.  
Indeed, when it comes to success stories, the record [in general] is not too 
impressive (Halachmi, 1993: 125).  More to the point of this research, Halachmi 
(1993: 125) notes that: 
 “there are also very few accounts that chronicle what went wrong and why, [suggesting that] 
we need to be moving from theory to applications, [and that] what needs improvement is not 
the conceptual basis of strategic planning but the process of moving from abstract models to 
concrete considerations and instrumental steps”.   
It is believed that a concrete step in this direction is the ability to understand the 
factors contributing to success and/or failure in policy implementation.  By exploring 
these issues, academics and practitioners alike are a step closer to improving their 
ability to consider and implement effective strategic management frameworks for the 
public sector.   
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 1.5 Research Aims and Objectives 
It is probably fair to state that, in Malta, the majority of politicians and senior public 
officers would agree on the need for Government to change its paradigm so that the 
strategic action adopted by the Administration is a natural and effective reaction to 
the policies formulated by the Executive.  Agreement on what needs to change to 
enable this to happen, and how such change should occur, however, is a different 
matter.   
As the country continues on an ambitious restructuring effort to achieve compliance 
for European Union membership, the need for change and a strong strategic 
management framework for the Maltese Public Service are more critical than ever 
before.  Determining what issues, or factors, influence success or failure in policy 
implementation would significantly contribute to further the Government’s strategy 
and to overcome the politico-administrative divide.   
Therefore, it was felt that searching for answers, or at least insights, to the following 
question, could make a contribution to this goal; 
What issues (or factors) curtail the effective implementation of a 
given public policy, and how can these issues be overcome? 
In addressing the above research question, the study sought to: 
o identify and examine the issues, or factors, that influence success and failure in 
the implementation of policy; and to 
o propose suitable recommendations for change, so that policy is implemented by 
the Public Service in a manner that is more likely to produce the outcomes 
intended by the Executive of Government and expected by beneficiaries. 
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 2.0 Theoretical Positioning 
 “I went into IBM believing that its problems were primarily strategy…I realised the problems 
weren’t strategy.  They were: How do I execute that strategy?” (Sager, 2002: 88).  
Lou Gerstner, IBM Chairman and CEO, in an interview 
with BusinessWeek Associate Editor, Ira Sager. 
 
“Managers keep forgetting that it is what they do, not what they plan, that explains success. 
They keep giving credit to the wrong thing – namely, the plan – and having made this error, 
they then spend more time planning and less time acting.  They are astonished when more 
planning improves nothing”  (Weick, 1987: 222).  
 
2.1 Locating the Literature 
Implementation is about the execution of decisions and underscores the practice of 
management.  It spans both public and private sectors, it influences every person in 
an organisation irrespective of title and position, and it is a topic of concern to 
leaders and managers in any and all spheres of organisational activity.   
As a topic of academic study it is likewise without boundaries in that rather than 
being represented as a distinct body of knowledge, it is dispersed throughout the 
management literature.  This does not mean that it is treated in depth.  In fact, quite 
the opposite.  Compared to other ‘topics’, the dimension of management that relates 
to implementation is only sporadically addressed by the various disciplines.  For 
example, it is addressed in the marketing literature in relation to aspects such as the 
execution of product strategies or marketing plans (see Bonoma, 1989; Aaker, 
1995); in the OD literature relating to aspects such as knowledge management and 
the implementation of performance appraisals (see Kiel, 1982; Brown, 1982); in the 
operations literature, particularly relating to project management (see Bowman and 
Pellegrinelli, 1994; Turner, Grude et al., 1996; Turner, 1999); and in the literature on 
change management and administrative reform, particularly in relation to ‘post-
mortem’ studies of change initiatives (see Caiden, 1976; Sabatier and Mazmanian, 
1980; Brooks and Bate, 1994; Kotter, 1996; Nash, Childe et al., 2001).  In 
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 comparison, the discussion on implementation is probably best considered in the 
strategy literature, where it seems to be addressed at a more holistic, integrated and 
cross-functional level.  Even here, however, the literature tends to disappoint.   
Alexander (1985: 91) notes that: 
“although strategy implementation is viewed as an integral part of the strategic management 
process, little has been written or researched on it.  The overwhelming majority of the 
literature so far has been on the long-range planning process itself or the actual content of the 
strategy being formulated”.   
The review of the strategy literature conducted for the purpose of this research 
supports this claim.  Besides a handful of books directly focused on strategy 
implementation (for example, Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1984; Galbraith and Kazanjian, 
1986), nothing substantial seems to exist on this subject beyond the treatise that the 
topic receives in manuscripts that are commonly used as text-books (for example, 
Steiner and Miner, 1982; Asch and Bowman, 1989; Johnson and Scholes, 1999).   
Although Alexander’s (1985) reference was directed to the generic strategy 
literature, which by tradition has been oriented to the private sector, his comment 
applies equally well to the strategy literature directed to the public sector.  The two 
streams have evolved in similar ways and, although the bulk of strategic 
management research is found in the private sector (Wiseman, 1993: 146), both 
streams seem to focus more on a treatise of the process, content and context of 
strategy, rather than its actual implementation.   
For example, like its private sector counterpart, the discussion of strategic 
management in the public administration literature traces the origins and evolution of 
strategic planning and strategic management (Kaufman and Jacobs, 1987; Skok, 
1989; Smith, 1994); it discusses different types, techniques and models of strategic 
planning and strategic management (Lindblom, 1959; Lindblom, 1979; Nutt and 
Backoff, 1987; Bryson, 1988; Poister and Streib, 1999); and it considers the stimuli 
that entice the adoption and initiation of such practice in public administration 
(Steiner and Miner, 1982; Bryson and Roering, 1988; Bowman, 1999).   
A considerable element of the discussion also considers how differences between 
private and public organisations influence the utility of strategic management in a 
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 public sector setting.  Both the usefulness and uselessness of such practice are 
adequately presented.  However, even though the application of generic models of 
strategic management is generally considered to be problematic in the public sector 
(Smith Ring and Perry, 1985: 276), primarily because of the difficulty in achieving 
some sort of consensus of goals except at high levels of abstraction (Steiner and 
Miner, 1982: 292), in the final analysis, many authors seem to agree that the benefits 
outweigh the costs and therefore argue in favour of its application (Cartwright, 1975; 
Eadie, 1983; Wechsler and Backoff, 1986; Bryson, 1988).    
A further important ‘conversation’ in the literature, and one that is closer to the 
subject of this research, is the distinction between strategic planning and strategic 
management.  Various definitions and arguments are presented (Nutt and Backoff, 
1987; Bryson, 1988; Poister and Streib, 1999) but essentially, the difference between 
the two lies in the recognition that strategic management exists when organisations 
move beyond planning to developing mechanisms for the implementation of 
strategies (Vinzant and Vinzant, 1996; Smith, 1994).   
Despite acknowledging this fundamental distinction, and the fact that organisations 
move into the future by decisions and actions, not by plans (Poister and Streib, 1999: 
311), strategic management has by no means been as extensively addressed in the 
public administration literature as has the topic of strategic planning (Poister and 
Streib, 1999: 308).  Consequently, the treatment of implementation itself has equally 
suffered and, in over a decade, nothing much in the literature seems to have 
changed since Alexander’s observation in 1985.  In fact, with implementation often 
being a neglected part of the study of policy (Hill, 1993: 9), the dominant references 
in the literature continue to pertain to just a handful of researchers, most of whom 
have already been cited in the preceding discussion.   
Because of this lack of information, the literature review pertaining to this study was 
not limited to any specific domain of the management literature.  Although anchored 
in the strategy literature, particularly that related to public administration, the 
implementation of policy was explored by considering research in different fields of 
discipline, and work conducted in both public and private sector settings.  An 
overview of this is presented next (Section 2.2).  It should be noted that while the 
preferred literature would have been that related to the application of strategic 
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 management in a Westminister model of Government, particularly in small island 
states, the available literature is heavily based on studies originating in the United 
States of America, where the application of strategic management in public 
administration seems to have been most widely practised.   
Furthermore, it should be noted that although this research is concerned with the 
implementation of policy, it is the issues that influence success or failure in 
implementation that specifically occupy the foreground of the study.  As such, the 
emphasis of the literature review was oriented in this direction.  This was examined 
in two steps – an indicative review of the literature that was carried out before 
initiating the research (i.e., beginning of Project 1), followed by a much more detailed 
evaluation of the specific literature relating to those factors that emerged from the 
research to be critical for the implementation of policy in Malta (i.e., beginning of 
Project 3). 
2.2 Policy Implementation – An Exploration 
The origin of the study of policy implementation is often attributed to the work 
conducted by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) regarding the failed implementation 
of a federal employment program in Oakland, California (Anderson, 1990; Hill, 1993; 
Vinzant and Crothers, 1996).   
Vinzant & Crothers (1996) label this work as representative of the thinking of early 
writers who supported a bureaucratic and linear view of policy implementation that 
consisted solely of the efficient administrative execution of politically determined 
goals.  Also referred to as the top-down model, this approach was predicated on the 
assumption that policy directives ought to be translated into program activities with 
as little deviation as possible (Vinzant and Crothers, 1996: 461).   
In contrast, later research portrayed policy implementation as much more complex 
and multifaceted.  Typically referred to as the bottom-up models, and exemplified 
through the work of Lipsky (1980) and Linder & Peters (1987), this work suggested 
that program design must consider the needs and values of the implementers of 
policy and the influence that their ‘street-level’ decisions are likely to have on the 
outcome(s) of a policy (Vinzant and Crothers, 1996: 461).  Viewed through this lens, 
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 policy implementation was more dynamic in process and less predictable in 
outcome, as it was susceptible to a greater number of influences and stimuli. 
A third type of policy implementation model (Nakamura, 1988) integrates the top-
down and bottom-up models.  It considers implementation as a circular policy 
process that is based on continuous adaptation (of the policy) and discretionary 
decision-making (by implementers) (Vinzant and Crothers, 1996: 462), rather than 
just a linear process characterised by no or little interaction between the political and 
administrative branches of Government (i.e., the top-down and bottom-up models 
respectively).  This philosophy is akin to the view of ‘logical incrementalism’ 
espoused by Quinn (1978).  According to this perspective, strategies are most 
effective when they are developed and implemented in an ‘emergent’ way.  In 
contrast to the process followed in rational (top-down) models, where the act of 
formulation precedes all other activity, this view suggests that strategies and 
implementation evolve from the activities taking place throughout the organisation 
and according to a pattern of trial-and-error learning.  As such, successful action 
develops through experience and experimentation.  In this respect, Weick (1987) 
further suggests that action produces strategy and the act of formulation, as 
traditionally conceived, never really occurs.  Instead “execution is analysis and 
implementation is formulation” (Weick, 1987: 230). 
The top-down model reflects the dichotomy between politics and administration in 
classical political theory where, as typified in the thinking of Frank Goodnow (1900), 
policies, by necessity, are developed and moulded by the political branches of 
government and then automatically implemented by the Administration, without 
question.  While policy development and implementation, more or less, do follow this 
responsibility path, in reality, the process is more complex and ‘messy’.  The strict 
delineation between politics and administration that is based on mindless conformist 
implementation is rare (Hill, 1993: 87).  Instead, it is recognised that, like most 
organisational decision-making processes, the policy process is fraught with 
irrational behaviour (Cyert and March, 1963), is laden with value judgements (Boxx, 
Odom et al., 1991), and is affected by shifting power relations, by changes in 
leadership and operating policies, and by modifications in constituencies and the 
environment (Paul-Shaheen, 1990: 834).   
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 Because of this, implementation is today typically viewed through the lens of bottom-
up models and, possibly more frequently, from the viewpoint that considers the 
policy process as a continuous, adaptive cycle.  In the former case, policy 
implementation (and development) emerges from an interaction of both the political 
and administrative branches of Government – a close example of this thinking is the 
conclusion of an assessment of reform implementation initiatives in Malta that, inter 
alia, recommended to: 
“Let the government indicate what direction it wants reform to go: better policy advice, cost 
savings, higher standards of service?  Let the top civil servants then get together and produce 
a framework for reform to operationalise that direction.  Let the government take a critical look 
at that framework and remould it into a set of guidelines for action that it is genuinely willing to 
support.  Let it then hold ministries and departments accountable for developing and 
implementing change initiatives in accordance with the framework” (Polidano, 1999: 13). 
On the other hand, viewing the policy implementation process as a continuous cycle 
builds more heavily on open systems theory.  Implementation is regarded as both a 
means to an end (the process output), as well as a feedback loop to the means (a 
process input), on the basis of which existing policy is either reinforced, is modified, 
or is replaced with the development of new and improved policies.  The illustrations 
presented earlier in Figures 1 and 2 are an example of this thinking and form the 
basis of this research.  By adopting this viewpoint of implementation, it was felt that 
the search for factors influencing success or failure would be broader in scope, more 
sensitive to various contextual elements and, more importantly, would consider the 
totality of the features and characteristics that affect implementation. 
Unfortunately, the discussion in the literature does not seem to move much beyond 
such philosophical considerations of the process of policy implementation.  No 
empirical studies that test the basis of the espoused theories have been encountered 
in the implementation literature.  Furthermore, reference to these theories as 
‘models’ of implementation is also misleading, given that detailed representations of 
the implementation element of the policy cycle do not seem to have been developed.  
In fact, rather than proposing frameworks that elaborate the make-up of 
implementation, the literature typically presents implementation as just one step in 
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 the policy cycle7.  What remains in the literature are a number of rather disparate 
studies that consider various dimensions of implementation from different 
philosophical perspectives (albeit predominantly related to organisation theory) and 
for different ends.  For example, implementation is examined from the viewpoint of:  
o organisational design – in relation to the contingency relationship between the 
strategy followed by an organisation and its social structure (Chandler, 1962; 
Burgelman, 1983; Fredrickson, 1986; Amburgey and Dacin, 1994),  and the 
issues relating to the structural forms, systems and processes to choose from 
when implementing particular strategies (Galbraith and Kazanjian, 1986; de Wit 
and Meyer, 1998); 
o political systems – in relation to the influences that issues such as organisational 
coalitions, control over resources etc. may have on shaping the direction and 
outcome of an implementation process, or vice-versa (Morgan, 1997); and 
o decision-making – in relation to how different approaches to managing problems 
or opportunities can condition or shape an organisation, and its 
approach/adaptation to the implementation of strategic decisions (Child, 1972; 
Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1985; Hitt and Tyler, 1991; Noorderhaven, 1994). 
Undoubtedly, some of these studies can be very informative to this research and 
these have been accounted for whenever encountered in the literature review.  
However, of more direct relevance to the object of this research are those studies 
that place direct or greater consideration on examining the reasons behind the 
success or failure of policy implementation initiatives. 
                                            
7 As shall be outlined later (Part 5), this research makes a contribution in this regard by proposing two 
conceptual models that provide a framework for explaining what elements affect failure and success in policy 
implementation, and how. 
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 2.3 The Factors Influencing Success and Failure in Policy Implementation 
2.3.1 Introduction 
The literature on strategy implementation does not carry a specific ‘conversation’ on 
the issues or factors perceived to influence success and failure.  While some studies 
do, more or less, address implementation from this specific perspective, they are 
insignificant in number, are generally unrelated to one another, and are tackled in 
different ways.  As such, there are no structured debates or positions, agreements or 
disagreements, on what contributes to success and failure, how and why.  Instead, 
this discussion (if it can be described as such) seems to arise more as a by-product 
of studies whose foci lie on other interests or aspects of the management of 
policy/strategy.  It is therefore difficult to present the literature along some 
argumentative or methodological axis.   
An alternative could be to present the studies in the literature according to the factors 
that they identify as directly or indirectly influencing implementation in the various 
policy contexts in which they are explored.  However, this is impractical and also 
pointless.  The objective of the literature review was not to produce an exhaustive 
checklist of factors that influence success or failure.  Rather, it was to support the 
researcher in developing an understanding of what is already known, so that the 
inductive search for factors and the development of proposals to address these in a 
Maltese policy context, could be better guided. 
Consequently, what follows is a brief description of the main studies that were 
considered to be the most relevant to this research.  These are presented 
individually.  Comparisons between the findings of these studies and the DBA 
research are not drawn here, but are presented where necessary in the ‘Discussion’ 
and ‘Contribution’ sections of this report. 
2.3.2 Outline of Relevant Studies 
The earliest study encountered in the literature review that drew very close parallels 
to the objectives of this research, was a survey by Alexander (1985) of 93 private 
sector firms, of medium to large size, operating in the US.  This survey sought to 
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 determine which implementation problems occurred most frequently as companies 
tried to put strategic decisions into effect (p.91).    The presidents of the companies 
surveyed were required to select a recent strategic decision that they were very 
familiar with, and then to evaluate the extent to which some 22 possible 
implementation problems (derived by Alexander from his literature review) actually 
were a problem in the implementation of that decision.  These were rank-ordered by 
frequency count and the ten most frequent strategy implementation problems 
identified (p.92).   
Alexander’s work provides a useful introduction to anyone interested in 
understanding some factors that may influence implementation.  Of particular 
interest are two observations: (i) that some of the more traditional issues that had 
been encountered by Alexander in his literature review (such as rewards and 
incentives, support and backing by top management, and availability of financial 
resources) were not short listed among the ten most important factors by the 
practitioners interviewed in the survey, and (ii) that successful implementation also 
involves doing the things that help promote success rather than just preventing 
problems from occurring (p.97).  Unfortunately, Alexander falls short of discussing 
these observations, thereby leaving the reader unable to draw any significantly 
meaningful conclusions.  In particular, he fails to explain his latter observation.  
Although his statement would suggest that the factors influencing success could be 
different from those influencing failure, Alexander does not distinguish between the 
two and groups all factors together.  Contrary to his own observation, this would 
imply that if a factor is ill-managed, it would contribute to failure, while if the same 
factor is managed properly, it would contribute to success.   
Another piece of work worthy of particular mention, and probably the most relevant 
to this research, is that carried out by Morris and Hough (1987).  Addressing their 
study from the perspective of project management, Morris and Hough (1987) 
examined the available literature for studies of projects that pointed to the factors 
leading to their success and failure.  They then undertook a study of eight very large 
projects that had either succeeded or failed, with the objective of analysing the 
factors leading to their success or failure.  Morris and Hough (1987) produced a very 
comprehensive list of factors influencing project success (p.265-266), classifying 
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 these in various categories (project definition; planning, design and technology; 
politics/social factors; schedule duration; schedule urgency; finance; legal 
agreements; contracting; project implementation; human factors).  They defined 22 
hypotheses (p.283-285), which they concluded summarised the questions that 
should be examined in determining the likely success of a project, and they also 
drew a model identifying their perceived preconditions of project success (p.268).  
This model reflects the six major areas that they considered critical for the good 
management of projects.  ‘Project implementation’ was one of these areas. 
In contrast to other studies, Morris and Hough (1987) place significant emphasis on 
both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ factors that are perceived to influence the outcome of a project.  
This is important to achieve a balanced approach to the management of projects; a 
consideration that is also reached by the DBA research in relation to the 
management of policies (addressed in Section 5 of this report).  The data they 
collected and its presentation is also outstanding.  However, a possible criticism that 
can be levied against this study is the narrow view that the authors seem to take on 
project implementation.  Rather than viewing the management of a project as a 
function of implementation, they present implementation as just one discrete step of 
project management.  This seems to imply that the authors perceive implementation 
to be separate from problem definition, planning and management.  While it is true 
that the management of projects (like management in general) is composed of 
various stages8, project management is about fractal management, i.e., 
“each stage of the project is a little mini-project in its own right, and each part of each stage 
likewise.  Hence, the initiation stage has to be planned, organised, implemented, controlled 
and conducted, and the planning of that stage is undertaken by applying the ten-step problem-
solving cycle9“ (Turner, 1999: 14).     
By isolating ‘implementation’ from the project life cycle, and by treating 
implementation factors as separate from other factors, the relationship of the 
                                            
8 Typically ‘proposal and initiation’, ‘design and appraisal’, ‘execution and control’ and ‘finalization and close-out’ 
(Turner, 1999: 14). 
9 Typically, ‘perceive problem’, ‘gather data’, ‘define problem’, ‘generate solutions’, ‘evaluate solutions’, ‘select 
solution’, ‘communicate’, ‘plan execution’, ‘implement’, ‘monitor’ (Turner, 1999: 13). 
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 preconditions influencing project success as depicted in the authors’ suggested 
model might take on a different meaning and lose their significance. 
Also of particular relevance to the DBA research are aspects of the work by Bryson 
(1988).  Bryson argues that, to be effective, the implementation of strategic 
management and change in the public sector must address four key barriers: the 
human problem of attention and commitment, the process problem of turning 
strategic ideas into good currency, the structural problem of linking internal and 
external environments in ways that are advantageous to the implementation process, 
and the institutional problem of appropriately exercising transformative leadership 
(1988: 197).  Although these barriers (factors) are not directly applied to the 
implementation of public policy, it could be argued that, in so far as new or revised 
policies demand modifications to the status quo and act as an impetus for change, 
the four challenges of strategic management and change apply equally well to the 
discussion on policy implementation.   
Looking at policy implementation also through the perspective of strategic change, 
Pettigrew et al. (1992) studied strategic service change in the British National 
Health Service and inductively identified eight factors that they claim underpin a 
receptive context and environment for successful change and implementation.  While 
some are specific to the context examined, others are possibly more generic in 
nature and include: 
1. the quality and coherence of the policy, arising from (i) thorough analysis and 
participative vision setting that encourages take-up by interest-groups and 
stimulates their commitment, and (ii) effective process planning that breaks policy 
and strategy into manageable pieces; 
2. the availability of key people leading change, emphasising leadership as a subtle, 
pluralist function rather than an individualistic activity; 
3. the intensity and scale of long-term environmental pressure, that generates a 
demand for implementation and encourages change; 
4. a supportive organisational culture, that challenges beliefs about success and 
how to achieve it, with a view to combat inertia; and 
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 5. the simplicity and clarity of goals and priorities to focus implementation efforts. 
While it cannot be claimed that the above-mentioned studies provide an exhaustive 
list of all possible factors that can potentially influence the implementation of policy, 
they do provide a rather comprehensive picture.  Other relevant studies include: from 
the policy implementation literature, Douglas (2000), Myers (2000), Traut (1999), 
Crews (1998), Eadie (1983), and Brown (1982); from the strategy and change 
management literature, Nash et al. (2001), Kotter (1996b), Quinn (1989), Guth and 
MacMillan (1989), Kotter and Schlesinger (1979), Quinn (1977);  from the public 
service/administrative reform literature, Moshe (1999), Brooks and Bates (1994), 
Caiden (1999), Caiden (1976), Drucker (1973); and from the public service / 
administrative reform literature specific to Malta, Polidano (1999), Schick (1999), 
Polidano (1996), Spiteri Gingell (1992), Polidano (1992), Warrington (1987).  
2.4 Policy Implementation in Context 
In addition to the specific literature on policy implementation, it is also pertinent to 
consider some aspects of the sociological and political science literature on the 
Maltese policy environment that may suggest a number of contextual issues, or 
factors, that could have a bearing on the implementation of policy in Malta. 
2.4.1 Size 
When trying to explain to friends or visitors from overseas why things in Malta 
happen the way they do, the Maltese people will invariably direct their attention to 
the issue of size.  The country’s small size, they argue, is a determining factor that 
shapes the distinctive socio-economic, cultural and political life of its people.  Indeed, 
the issue of size has also been presented in the scholarly literature as a main 
consideration conditioning the history and life of the Maltese (Pirotta, 1996: 19), 
although it has also been recognised that “most researchers have failed to question 
whether the smallness condition engenders its own dynamics” (Sultana and 
Baldacchino, 1994: 15). 
Maybe in response to such observation, Warrington (1997) examined whether the 
size of a micro-state is, in fact, of any consequence for government.  Following a 
comparative assessment of the three island states of Malta, Barbados and Fiji (each 
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 of which was a former British Colony), the author concluded that “a micro-state’s 
small size, and the acute vulnerability to external contingencies associated with this, 
creates a distinctive policy environment or setting for government” (Warrington, 
1997: 427).  However, rather than observing a direct cause and effect link between 
the countries’ small size and government, Warrington (1997: 431) identified size as 
“a conditioning factor [that] modifies the policy environment…[and] encourages 
certain behaviour patterns among politicians, civil servants and citizens”, such as 
political patronage (p.431) and paternal administration (p.427).  Thus, one is led to 
believe to it is these consequential factors, rather than size itself, that have the 
power to influence government and policy implementation. 
2.4.2 Trust, Patronage and Clientelism 
Trust between politicians and civil servants, or the lack of it, is a factor that has 
considerable power in influencing the relationship between the political and 
administrative arms of government and, consequently, the ability to effectively 
implement its policies. 
Christensen and Laegreid (1999) define the Norwegian experience as an example 
where mutual trust and cooperation between the political and administrative arms of 
government have a long tradition of coexistence.  This, they argue, not only 
facilitates the daily effective administration of government, but also favours 
successful incremental administrative changes and reforms – events that, in a public 
sector setting, are normally resisted and tend to disappoint Caiden, 1999). 
In contrast to the Norwegian example, the Maltese experience is riddled with a 
history, or tradition, of mistrust, probably dating back (most notably) to the late 
1970s, when the then Labour Government, suspicious of the Public Service because 
of its past as handmaiden to colonial rule, asserted its control over the machinery of 
government in a direct and forceful way Portelli, 1992).   
This situation was officially recognised in no uncertain terms by the Public Service 
Reform Commission in the opening pages of its 1989 report: 
“Politicians, who are subjected to diverse pressures, have succumbed to the temptation to 
factor the Service into the strategies of power politics.  Willingly, or unwillingly, the Public 
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 Service came to be associated with the use of public resources for partisan or private gain.  
As a result, the trust between the political authorities and public officers on the one hand, and 
between the Service and its customers on the other, has been seriously eroded “ Public 
Service Reform Commission, 1989: 1). 
Defining the relation of the Public Service with politicians as “marred by mutual 
mistrust and misunderstanding” Public Service Reform Commission, 1989: 2), the 
PSRC identified this as one of the major issues affecting the government and 
administration in Malta. 
The issue of trust and its concomitant effect on the management of Government and 
the implementation of policy, is tightly linked to a consideration of the highly 
personalised and politicised nature of social relations in Malta, of which clientelism 
and patronage feature prominently (Boswell, 1994: 29).  Indeed, claims of patronage 
and clientelism in Maltese politics and policy management have been made in both 
populist publications and the scholarly literature for decades.  Although documented 
to have featured rampantly in the 1970s and 1980s (Public Service Reform 
Commission, 1989, 1990), this phenomenon is said to persist in contemporary 
government and policy management (Mangion, 2003) albeit, arguably, less 
prominently.   
Political influence and partisan loyalties in the civil service have played, and continue 
to play, a role on the effectiveness and efficiency of the machinery of government.  
From the author’s own experience, working as a consultant with the civil service over 
the past eleven years, it has not been uncommon to come across situations wherein 
highly competent and motivated (even fairly senior) civil servants had a change of 
heart and turned their backs on an assignment or task, not because of a change in 
opinion or because the policy was not bearing results, but simply because of a 
change in “their” Government.  Likewise, there have been situations in which new 
political leaders are diffident of competent civil servants because, prior to their 
election to Office, these civil servants were spearheading the implementation of a 
policy initiated under the previous Government.  It is not uncommon to see these 
persons relegated to ‘second division’ tasks and non-priority assignments, to be 
replaced by others who share a common orthodoxy and who, they believe, can be 
trusted to steer the required administrative action.  Invariably, such engagements are 
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 seen as political appointments and, hence, explicit examples of patronage and 
clientelism. 
2.4.3 Interference and Role Ambiguity 
Another factor influencing policy management and implementation in Malta is an 
orientation to paternalistic administration, primarily based on interventionist practices 
by “politicians [who] seem incapable of refraining from interfering, even in the day-to-
day routine of administration [of the Public Service]” (Pirotta, G. as quoted in 
Mangion, 2003).   
In part, such behaviour and practice can be linked and attributed to the effects of 
(lack of) trust, patronage and clientelism, mentioned above.  On the other hand, it is 
also reflective of a situation of ambiguity between the roles and responsibilities of the 
political and administrative arms of Government. 
In sharp contrast to the private sector, where a direct link between policy formulation 
and implementation is the norm for effective strategic management, the separation of 
functional responsibility in the public sector frequently contributes to vagueness and / 
or ambiguity as to who commands the right to initiate and control the formulation of 
policy and its implementation Smith Ring and Perry, 1985: 277).  In fact, the tasks 
and responsibilities of politicians and administrators are at times so indistinct that 
“scholars of public administration have debated whether political decision making 
and the administration should be seen as two different realms of government or as 
de facto integrated processes” Moshe, 1999: 16).   
The Constitution of Malta (1964), at Article 79 Subarticle (2), states that; 
“The Cabinet shall have the general direction and control of the Government 
of Malta and shall be collectively responsible therefore to Parliament”   
and, at Article 92 Subarticle (1), further states that; 
“Where any Minister has been charged with responsibility for any department 
of government, he shall exercise general direction and control over that 
department; and, subject to such direction and control, the department may be 
under the supervision of a Permanent Secretary“. 
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 It should be clear from the above that the Minister, both as a member and 
representative of Cabinet, is the policy formulator and is responsible to Parliament 
for the implementation of policy.  In this context, the Permanent Secretary’s role is to 
supervise the operations of the administrative arm of government and, as such, has 
more to do with the implementation of policy than with its formulation.   
But are these roles clearly understood in practice?  And does the use of the phrase 
‘general direction and control’ in the Constitution mean that the Minister is expected 
to manage at arms’ length, or should it be interpreted to mean full authority over the 
administrative arm of government?  To some people it is the latter, but to others, 
Ministerial intervention in the operations of the Departments within his / her portfolio 
is deemed to be interference Cachia Zammit, 1992).  This ambiguity weakens the 
strategic framework of Government and it may be in response to this that, on 
February 5th 1991, the Prime Minister of Malta, in a Letter Circular to all Ministers, 
Parliamentary Secretaries, Permanent Secretaries and Heads of Department, felt the 
need to clarify their respective roles and responsibilities Fenech Adami, 1991).  
Unfortunately, considerable overlaps in the roles and responsibilities between 
Ministers and Permanent Secretaries were still evident in the position descriptions 
attached to the letter circular, and the possibility of detachment between the political 
and administrative roles in government has been described as a ‘utopian concept’ 
(Portelli, 1992).  Despite efforts to address this issue, “the attempt to distinguish 
between the two sections…has been an exercise which by and large has remained 
only on paper” (Pirotta, G. as quoted in Mangion, 2003). 
2.5 Conclusions 
Four conclusions are drawn from the literature review: 
1. While a number of factors can be identified from the literature, there seems to be 
insufficient detail on, and explanation of, the meaning behind such factors.  It is 
therefore possible that although different studies refer to the same factors, the 
only thing in common between these factors is their descriptive name or title.  
Their value or significance in terms of how they are perceived to influence 
success or failure in the different studies, and why, may be different. 
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 2. Although the studies in the literature do a good job of uncovering a number of 
factors influencing implementation, they are less successful at explaining how 
these factors inter-relate to influence implementation.  The order or criticality with 
which such factors influence implementation remains inadequately explained.  
3. Although carrying different titles and presented in different ways, the nature of the 
factors derived from these studies can be classified into one of two basic 
categories – technical, or human.  The technical category would include those 
factors that are predominantly concerned with matters of ‘process’ or ‘approach’, 
while the human category would include those factors that are predominantly 
concerned with the management of ‘intangibles’ such as behaviour, relationships 
etc. 
4. No real distinction is made in the literature between the factors influencing failure 
and those influencing success.  This would imply that (i) the process leading to 
one outcome is considered to be the inverse (mirror image) of the other, and (ii) 
managing the factors influencing failure is a prescription for success.  This may 
not necessarily be the case. 
The DBA research was guided by these observations and perceived omissions. 
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 3.0 Research Design 
3.1 Definining the Research Paradigm 
In large measure, the choice and selection of a research methodology10 is based on 
the nature and content of the issue being investigated and on the objectives or 
outcomes that a study is seeking to achieve.  Equally important is the need to give 
due consideration to the preferred philosophical perspective (Strauss and Corbin, 
1998), the type and form of data that is available or that is being sought, and the 
scope of the study itself.  These elements can come together in a number of different 
ways, with each different combination prescribing a different and unique paradigm.  It 
is this paradigm, and not solely one of its constituent elements, that should guide 
decisions on the choice and selection of research methodologies. 
Appendix 2 discusses the application of these various elements to the current 
research, as well as the relative strengths and weaknesses of qualitative and 
quantitative research methods.  It concludes that a predominantly qualitative 
approach is more suitable for this research, and further discusses the relative merits 
of participant observation, action research and case studies as potential research 
methods.  In the final analysis, the case study approach was selected as the most 
appropriate method to guide this study, primarily for the following reasons. 
Firstly, case study research is applied in its approach and is practice-based.  Thus, 
the managers who may ultimately review the results of the research are likely to 
evaluate its methodology favourably or, at least, with less scepticism than if 
reviewing some of the more traditional research methods.  The probability of 
implementing one or more of the propositions that arise from the study is therefore 
higher.   
                                            
10  Defined as “the analysis of how research should or does proceed, as opposed to methods of research, which 
are the actual techniques or procedures used to gather and analyse data” (Blaikie, 1995: 7) [italics added for 
emphasis]. 
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 Secondly, it allows a flexible approach to data collection, meaning that different 
people could be approached to contribute to the research in different ways, 
depending upon their different organisational commitments and personal 
preferences.  This maximises feedback and enriches the study.   
Thirdly, it provides for the use of multiple sources of evidence, which enable 
convergent lines of inquiry and improve the construct validity of the study.   
Fourthly, involving different people in the organisation for data collection and 
analysis purposes, ensures that the results of the research have been correctly 
interpreted and reflect reality, thereby contributing to the study’s internal validity.  
This is further improved through the use of different research techniques to achieve 
methodological triangulation. 
3.2 Structure of the Research 
The research study was divided into three parts, each of which constituted one of the 
three projects forming the bases on which the DBA programme was structured.  The 
aim of each project was to address some aspect of the research question, 
progressively building data and knowledge on the issue under investigation and 
leading towards the development of an adequate response. 
Projects 1 and 2 were intended to address the first part of the research question.  
Their objective was to identify what issues (or factors) curtail the effective 
implementation of public policy in Malta.  To achieve this, Project 1 was designed to 
explore a case study of failed policy implementation, while Project 2 focused on 
exploring a case study of successful policy implementation. 
Building on the findings of Projects 1 and 2, Project 3 was then to consider the 
second part of the research question.  Its objective was to establish/develop 
adequate proposals that would address the elicited factors and improve the 
likelihood of successful policy implementation.   
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 3.3 Summary of Methodology Used 
3.3.1 Projects 1 and 2 
The methodology followed in Projects 1 and 2 was identical.  Both projects adopted 
a single case study approach; the collection of data in both instances was based on 
documentary and primary research; and the analysis and interpretation of the 
collected data was qualitatively driven.  The fundamental difference between the two 
projects was the subject content of the research.  Project 1 focused on examining an 
example of failed policy implementation, while Project 2 considered an example of 
successful implementation.   
An overview of the research procedure and the activities undertaken at each step of 
the process is presented in Figure 3 and summarised below.  A detailed explanation 
can be found in Parts 2 and 3 of this report, for Projects 1 and 2 respectively.  A 
discussion of the reliability and validity of the research is also presented in Project 1. 
Selecting the subject of the case studies 
The two policies chosen as the subjects for the case studies were determined 
following an interview process with two persons who for several years have occupied 
senior positions in Government.  This procedure was followed to eliminate the 
potential of researcher bias.   
Prior to these interviews and before initiating the actual research, it was necessary to 
define ‘success’ so that (i) the boundaries of the study could be clearly established, 
and (ii) guidelines could be presented to the interviewees selecting the examples of 
successful and unsuccessful policy implementation initiatives. 
In the context of this research, success (or a case of successful policy 
implementation) was defined to mean a policy implementation initiative in which the 
strategic action adopted by the administrative arm of Government was considered to 
have delivered the intended policy decision, and to have achieved the intended 
outcomes.  To qualify as an example of success, a policy decision must therefore 
have been delivered in a manner that addressed its terms of reference, as well as 
have achieved the expected functionality to the identified stakeholder(s).  
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 Project 2
Local Councils
Selection of
Case Study
Archival Search
for documentary
evidence
Interviews for
Primary Data
Data Analysis
Interpretation of
Findings
Data Collection
Research Procedure Project 1Financial Management Reform Programme
- Held interviews with 2 persons holding senior positions in Government.  -
  Interviewees requested to name examples  of failed policies according
  to criteria provided.
- Short-listed examples that were commonly cited.
- Selected example that provided most access to information and which
  subject was still current (relevant) to present day policy.
- Followed same protocol as Project 1; used same interview.
- Sources included (1) generic literature on policy implementation in Malta
  (2) specific case related documentation including: management reports;
  progress and status reports of the project; correspondence files;
  minutes of meetings; speeches and press releases; PQs and responses
- Developed documentary database.
- 69 documents short-listed for review and analysis.
- Same protocol as Project 1.
- 103 documents short-listed for review and analysis.
- Interviewees identified from documentation.
- Three interviewee categories (Politicians, Civil Servants & Consultants)
  selection to ensure inclusion of all stakeholders to implementation
  process.
- 9 interviews targeted (3 for each category); 1 unsuccessful.
- Same protocol as Project 1.
- 8 interviews targeted and held (all persons involved in
  implementation).
Documentary evidence:
- Treated in the same way as interview transcripts.
- Data codification as per principles proposed by Strauss & Corbin (1998)
- Issues (or factors) that were considered to have led to failure coded into
  discrete factor-categories, according to their properties and dimensions.
Interview data:
- Interviews taped and transcribed (replies in Maltese translated and
  checked for correctness by 2nd person).
- Data codification of transcripts followed principles and procedures
  produced by Wrightson (1996), as modified by Huff et al. (1990).
- Concepts graphically mapped (using Decision Explorer 3.1) and
  analysed following protocol of Cognitive (Causal) Mapping Techniques.
- Issues arising from analysis coded into discrete factor-categories,
  according to their properties and dimensions.
Same protocol as Project 1.
- Factors elicited from individual interviews compared and contrasted for
  similarities and differences.  Results amalgamated following process of
  data reduction.
- Amalgamated factors of interview data compared and contrasted to
  those elicited from documentary data.
- Results were amalgamated following process of data reduction.
- Causal relationships between factor-categories reviewed.
- Conceptual 'road-map' to policy failure mapped.
Same protocol as Project 1.
(Note:  description of process followed for data reduction was inadvertently
omitted in Project 1.  This was described in the Project 2 report).
Figure 3 - Summary of Research Methodology (Projects 1 and 2)
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 This definition may be criticised from the point of view that few policies ever manage 
to comprehensively achieve the original objectives and the intended outcomes.  
However, this is exactly why this definition was adopted.  The seemingly inflexible 
approach to defining success was considered important so as to focus the research 
on those few initiatives that can be considered to be truly representative of best 
practice in government.  These practices would be something worth aspiring to, 
while concurrently providing a baseline against which to plan, manage and measure 
future policy implementation initiatives. 
It was also important to define the meaning of ‘success factors’, a term which may 
be mistakenly confused with ‘success criteria’.  Given that the distinction between 
the two is widely described in the literature on project management, the terminology 
from this body of knowledge was borrowed and adapted for the purposes of this 
research.   
The APM11 Pathways Glossary of Terms defines ‘success criteria’ as: 
“[the] qualitative and quantitative measures by which the success of a project is judged.  If the 
value achieved for the measure during or after the project exceeds a predefined hurdle rate, 
the project can be judged to be a success against that criterion” (Turner, 2002). 
According to this definition, the criteria for the interpretation of successful policy 
implementation in this study were, therefore, (1) the degree by which the terms of 
reference defined for a policy initiative were satisfactorily addressed, and (2) the 
degree by which the policy initiative delivered the expected ‘functionality’ to the 
identified stakeholder(s).  Under both scenarios, a 100% compliance rate was 
required. 
On the other hand, Turner (2002) defines ‘success factors’ as: 
“[the] elements of the work of the project, or the management process, that can be 
controlled by the project manager or the project team so as to increase the chance of 
achieving a successful outcome.  They are the levers that the project manager can pull to 
increase the chance of achieving the hurdle rate of the success criteria (emphasis added)”. 
                                            
11  Acronym for ‘Association for Project Management’ 
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 While agreeing with the essence of this definition, I find it difficult to accept that 
success factors are solely limited to those elements that can be controlled by the 
project manager.  Believing that different contexts have the power to influence the 
same policy initiatives in different ways over time, this research reflects the 
viewpoint of population ecology theory which states that the environment wields 
considerable power over an organisation (Hatch, 1997: 81) and hence the 
outcome(s) of its efforts and endeavours.  The selected definition of success factors 
therefore includes both controllable and uncontrollable factors that have the power 
to influence a successful outcome.  The purpose for this was two-fold.  First, it 
widens the scope of the research thereby providing the opportunity for a more 
holistic interpretation of the phenomena influencing policy implementation.  
Secondly, it provides an opportunity to ‘bring out into the open’ those hidden 
elements that have the potential to influence success, or failure.  Once uncovered 
and made explicit, it is possible that managers can either influence/control their 
manifestation, or account for them when planning and managing the implementation 
of policy, or, at the very least, be cognizant of their existence and their potential to 
influence outcomes.   
Definitions of success and failure were provided to each of the two interviewees 
prior to the interview. 
Data Collection 
The documentary sources of information that were drawn upon included generic 
literature on policy implementation and reform initiatives in Malta, as well as specific 
documents that were directly related to the policy initiatives under review.  These 
included management reports produced by the Project Teams responsible for 
implementing the said policies, minutes of meetings, correspondence, progress and 
status reports of the two projects, speeches and press releases, newspaper articles, 
parliamentary debates and responses to parliamentary questions.  Sixty nine (69) 
documents were examined in Project 1 and one hundred and three (103) documents 
were reviewed in Project 2. 
Primary data was collected through the application of in-depth and semi-stuctured 
interviews with the key politicians, civil servants and consultants involved in the 
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 implementation of the policy initiatives.  These persons (nine in Project 1 and eight 
in Project 2) were identified from the documentary research.  Besides serving to 
obtain first-hand data of the cases under review, the interviews were also a medium 
for corroborating, and/or elaborating upon, the information obtained from the 
documentary evidence.   
Data Analysis and Interpretation 
The method of data collection and analysis adopted for the documentary research 
evolved in response to the content, quality and quantity of the documentation 
available.  Nonetheless, the procedures and techniques developed by well-
established qualitative research studies were rigorously followed.  The data 
collected from the project-related documentary sources of evidence were analysed 
using the general principles of data codification proposed by Strauss and Corbin 
(1998).   Each document was examined in detail and all references to factors that 
were considered to have contributed to the successful implementation of the policy 
were extracted and analysed.  These factors were then coded and organised into 
discrete categories according to their respective properties and dimensions (Strauss 
and Corbin, 1998: 19). Using the resultant list of categories, and their respective 
properties/dimensions, it was possible to identify what factors were documented as 
being critical to the successful outcome of this implementation initiative, and to 
understand how these factors could influence failure and success in policy 
implementation in general.  A total of 14 factors of failure and 13 success factors 
were identified from this process in Projects 1 and 2 respectively. 
The data obtained from the interviews was analysed through the application of 
cognitive (causal) mapping techniques.  Cognitive maps provide a frame within 
which experiences can be highlighted, understood, and appreciated in depth (Weick, 
1990: 5) and allow one to move back and forth between an understanding of the 
whole and its reduction and analysis by parts (Huff and Fletcher, 1990: 404).  Given 
that causality is the primary form of post hoc explanation of events (Huff, 1990: 28), 
and given also that causal mapping is concerned with representing cognition as a 
set of causal interactions (Jenkins, 1994: 2), it was considered appropriate and 
possible to apply this technique for examining the concepts that were perceived to 
lead to failure and success in policy implementation.  While cognitive mapping could 
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 also have been used for the analysis of the documentary sources of evidence, ‘the 
latter is considered a surrogate for cognition and one-to-one interviews are likely to 
be the best method (source) for eliciting cognitive maps’ (Eden, Ackermann et al., 
1993: 2).   
The actual process adopted for the collection and analysis of the primary data that 
was derived from the interviews followed the established techniques and 
mechanisms outlined by Wrightson (1976) as modified by Huff et al. (1990).  As 
such, every statement made by an interviewee that reflected his/her perception of 
what factors led to success and why, was isolated and broken into its subject and 
cause concepts.  Concepts were then labelled with a reference code and linked to 
one another according to pre-defined standard ‘relationships’ as produced by Huff et 
al. (1990: 315), and graphically ‘mapped’ using Decision Explorer 3.1.  With its in-
built macros and tools, the mapping software also proved to be valuable for 
exploring the make-up and structure of each map at different levels of analysis.  
Through a number of iterations, it was possible to identify the most dominant and 
central concepts, facilitating the conceptual ordering of various categories of factors 
influencing failure and success in the two examples of policy implementation.  
Where possible, the derived maps were shared with the interviewees so that their 
composition could be reviewed and validated by the ‘owner’.  A total of 26 factors of 
failure and 27 success factors were identified from the interviews relating to Projects 
1 and 2 respectively. 
As a final step in the data analysis stage, the results obtained from the sequential 
examination of the documentary sources of evidence, and those derived from the 
individual causal maps of interviewees, were compared to identify similar and 
contrasting conceptual relationships.  Following a process of further data reduction 
and consolidation, 26 factors of failure and 21 success factors were considered to 
be critical to influencing the outcome of the policy initiatives examined in Projects 1 
and 2 respectively.  Conceptual ‘road maps’ of failure and success in policy 
implementation were drawn.  These road maps illustrate the perceived ordering of 
the factors influencing failure and success and identify the stimuli (properties and 
dimensions) that explain their presence as derived by the documentary evidence 
and the interview data. 
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 3.3.2 Project 3 
Having elicited the factors influencing failure and success, the objective of Project 3 
was to develop proposals that would improve the likely success of future policy 
implementation initiatives.   
To ensure that the study was in keeping with the guiding philosophy of the research 
programme, Project 3 had to be properly grounded in both theory and practice.  This 
stage of the research therefore focused on: 
(i) an in-depth review of the relevant literature, so as to ensure that proposals are 
developed with due consideration to the richness of what is already known and 
tested, or what is unknown but hypothesised; and 
(ii) a second review of the data gathered from Projects 1 and 2, so that due 
consideration would be given to the practicalities of any recommendations or 
proposals identified in the documentation, or suggested by the interviewees.12 
Figure 4 illustrates the perceived interplay between theory and practice and its 
application to this research.  While Projects 1 and 2 focused on ‘extracting’ data 
from the ‘ground’, Project 3 considered how this data ‘fitted’ with current theories 
and their application to practice. 
Figure 4 – Application of Theory and Practice to Research 
Theory
Practice Data
Projects 1 and 2
THE PAST
THE PRESENTTH
E 
FU
TU
RE
Failure / Success in
Policy Implementation
Project 3
(Step 1)
Project 3
(Step 2)
 
                                            
12 It should also be noted that in drawing proposals, due consideration was also given to my own personal 
experience in public administration.   
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 The first step of Project 3 was therefore a detailed but guided exploration of the 
literature13.  Given that a large number of success and failure factors had been 
elicited, it was important to focus on those factors considered to be more critical in 
terms of their potential to curtail or improve the effective implementation of policy.  
This would ensure that the research would not be spread thinly, but would rather 
give weight to the most urgent and demanding issues. 
While it would have been possible to make a judgment call and identify the more 
salient of the elicited factors, preference was given to adopting a methodology that 
would foster participation by the persons likely to be affected by the research itself.  
Therefore, it was decided that the factors derived from Projects 1 and 2 should be 
examined and prioritised by representatives of the persons directly involved in the 
implementation of policy.   
The application of a survey was chosen for this purpose.  The objective of this 
survey, the methodology followed and the output achieved are summarised in 
Figure 5.  A full account of the research process can be found in pages 133 to 155.  
This includes a detailed explanation of the decisions taken with respect to the 
design, development and administration of the questionnaire; the composition and 
size of the data sample; the analysis of the findings and the statistical verification of 
the results obtained and conclusions reached. 
                                            
13 Although the literature on policy development and implementation was considered both before and during 
each of Projects 1 and 2, at that stage the review had been somewhat limited.  In part, this was because the 
relevant aspects of the literature could not be consulted in depth until the results of the two Projects were 
known.  Combing the literature before a proper identification of the causes of failure and success would be 
like searching for a needle in a haystack.  In part, however, the limited literature review was also a conscious 
decision.  During the very initial phases of Project 1, an attempt had been made to cross-reference data 
arising from the secondary and primary research with data available in the literature.  It must be admitted that 
the result was a sense of confusion, and a tendency to question whether the data being elicited from the 
research was true to its source, or a biased interpretation on the basis of knowledge derived from the 
literature.  This practice was therefore stopped. 
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 Figure 5 – Summary of Methodology for Project 3 (Step 1). 
Step 1
Identify critical success / failure
factors to focus the literature review.
Quantitative.
Application of Survey to prioritise the
    failure / success factors identified
    in Projects 1 and 2.
Census of 219 Politicians, Civil
    Servants and Consultants.
62% response rate.
'Goodness-of-Fit' Test to determine
     statistical validity of results.
Rank-ordered data (factors).
Identification of the critical success
     and failure factors.
Objective
Methodology
Results
 
Of all the failure and success factors derived from Projects 1 and 2, interviewees 
identified ‘Commitment’ and ‘Leadership’14 as the top two most critical factors that 
can potentially influence both failure and success.  These two factors were the only 
ones that were identified as critical by all three interviewee categories (i.e., 
politicians, civil servants and consultants). 
The second step of Project 3 then focused on a review of the literature on 
commitment and leadership, paying particular attention to those aspects that were 
directly related to the specific properties and characteristics defining the two factors.  
No specific method or technique was applied.   
Following a familiarisation process, the literature was explored in detail with the 
objective of identifying any measures taken by foreign jurisdictions, or any proposals 
developed by academics or practitioners, to address similar issues.  Particular effort 
was made to give specific attention to the literature directly relating to public 
                                            
14 These, and all other factors, were properly defined in the questionnaire to ensure that their meaning was 
properly understood and that they were interpreted in the same manner by all interviewees. 
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 administration and to Malta, and that drawing upon the experiences of small States.  
Unfortunately, the return on this investment proved to be insignificant.   
Having established a good understanding of the literature, cross-references were 
then made to the findings of Projects 1 and 2 with the objective of drawing any 
similarities and differences between the two sources of information.  Building on the 
knowledge imparted by the literature and the contributions made by the interviewees 
of Projects 1 and 2, it was possible to draw propositions for improved 
implementation practices.  
3.4 Factors Influencing the Research Study 
Given the inductive approach to the research, and the significant reliance on 
documentary evidence and in-depth interviews with persons in senior positions in 
Government, it may be important to highlight at least two factors that may have 
influenced the successful completion of this research study: 
1. Knowledge of the Maltese Public Service 
The author of this research has been in government service, as a consultant, for the 
past 11 years.  When this research study commenced, the author held the position 
of Managing Consultant at the Management Efficiency Unit (MEU) in the Office of 
the Prime Minister.  MEU is the Government’s in-house management consultancy 
firm and is responsible for facilitating the implementation of policy and, particularly, 
the Government’s agenda for reform.  Towards the end of the reseach programme 
(in December 2002), the author was appointed Chief Executive Officer of the MEU.  
Throughout his career with the Government of Malta, the author has worked in all 
the Government’s Ministries and in a large majority of its Departments.  This has 
given him the opportunity to directly observe the implementation of policy in a 
number of different settings and contexts.   
2. Accessibility 
The positions held by the author, as well as his assignments over the years, have 
also brought him in direct contact with most, if not all, of the politicians serving in 
government (both current and those in opposition) as well as the senior and middle 
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 managers in the civil service.  The good working relationship with these key 
individuals made it possible for the author to gain access to information, whether in 
the form of documentary evidence, or appointments for interviews. 
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 Summary of Part 1  
This part of the thesis introduced the management problem and research issue 
guiding the study; it discussed the literature and theory informing the research 
question; and it summarised the methodology followed by the entire study. 
The management problem was defined as the inability to translate a given policy 
into effective strategic action.  The strategy literature, particularly that related to the 
public sector, provided the backdrop to the research, while studies that specifically 
examined the issues influencing success or failure in policy implementation 
occupied the foreground.  After considering the literature, the objective of the study, 
the preferred philosophical perspective, the type and form of data available, and a 
variety of research methods, the chosen strategy was based on an inductive inquiry 
and the application of the case study technique.  The research was to be 
undertaken in three sequential and progressive steps, each one constituting a 
‘project’ aimed at addressing an aspect of the research question.  Projects 1 and 2 
were to focus on the selected case studies of policy implementation.  Their objective 
was to elicit the issues that were considered to have influenced their failure and 
success, thereby addressing the first part of the research question.   Project 3 was 
to achieve two objectives.  First, it was to determine which of the factors elicited 
from the previous two Projects were generally considered by stakeholders to be 
critical for policy implementation in Malta.  Then, it was to focus on developing 
propositions for addressing these critical factors, thereby answering the second 
aspect of the research question. 
The rest of the thesis is divided into a further four parts.  Parts 2, 3 and 4 present the 
research methodology, findings and conclusions arising from Projects 1, 2 and 3, 
respectively.  Part 5 completes the thesis by summarising the research conclusions 
and the contributions to theory and practice. 
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 Overview of Part 2 
Part 2 discusses the first project of the research, which focuses on a case of failed 
policy implementation.  The study is discussed in four Chapters.   
Chapter 1 introduces the purpose and objectives of the project, and defines the 
meaning of policy implementation ‘failure’ in the context of this research.   
Chapter 2 explains in detail the research procedure that was followed, the 
methodology adopted, the chosen data sources and the steps taken in data 
collection and analysis.  It discusses the merits of documentary research and 
cognitive (causal) mapping techniques for the purposes of this research, and 
concludes by discussing the reliability and validity of the study. 
Chapter 3 briefly discusses the policy that formed the subject of the case study (the 
Financial Management Reform Programme) and details the results of both the 
documentary and primary research. 
The findings of the study are discussed in Chapter 4, which highlights the factors 
perceived to influence the failed outcome of this policy initiative, as elicited from the 
documentary evidence and perceived by interviewees.  The Chapter concludes by 
presenting a consolidated ‘road map’ of failure that is intended to graphically 
illustrate what factors curtailed the effective implementation of this policy initiative 
(and how), thereby addressing (in part) the first aspect of the research question. 
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 1.0 Overall Purpose and Project Objectives 
This part of the thesis summarises the findings and conclusions of the first project of 
the research programme.  It explores the issues influencing the implementation of 
public policy in Malta by examining a case of failed policy implementation. 
The reason for choosing to start this research with a case of failure rather than 
success, is that the study of failure may sometimes be more revealing than the 
study of success and much more useful in stimulating the search for possible 
solutions and remedies (Caiden, 1976: 145). 
In the context of this research, a case of failed policy implementation was defined as 
one wherein government policy: 
o was not implemented as it had been intended; and/or 
o did not achieve the intended outcomes; or  
o was not implemented at all. 
The project was guided by two primary objectives:  to identify what issues or factors 
led to failure in the implementation of the policy under review, and to examine how 
the identified issues influence failure, so that a framework that gives context and 
meaning to these factors can eventually be developed. 
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 2.0 Methodology 
2.1 Research Paradigm 
The paradigm guiding this doctoral research is based upon an interpretivist 
philosophy that adopts an applied research approach and which is heavily reliant 
upon primary research investigation.   
The reasons for adopting this position are explained at length in Appendix 2, which 
also provides a detailed explanation for the reasons behind the choice of research 
methods followed.   
To summarise, this project has been based upon qualitative methods of research.  
As the objective is concerned with uncovering and explaining the issues that led to 
policy failure, it adopts an inductive approach for identifying the concepts that may 
potentially lead to the development of theoretical constructs, so that meaning can be 
given to the phenomenon under review.  
A grounded theory approach, based on the application of case study research, was 
therefore followed, with the aim of generating knowledge within a context of 
application.  This was found to be particularly apt for this study as, unlike other 
traditional research methodologies, case study research is flexible, typically 
combining different methods of data collection techniques such as archives, 
interviews, questionnaires and observation (Yin, 1994). 
2.2 Research Methods 
2.2.1 Data Collection 
Two methods of data collection were used in this phase of the study, with 
documentary research being the first one to be applied. 
“[Documents] can tell us a great deal about the way in which events were constructed at the 
time, the reasons employed, as well as providing materials upon which to base further research 
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 investigation…They can tell us about the aspiration and intentions of the period to which they 
refer and describe places and social relationships at [that] time” (May, 1993: 133). 
The documentary sources of information drawn upon can be divided into two 
categories: (a) generic literature on public policy implementation and reform in 
Malta, and (b) documentation that is directly related to the specific case of policy 
implementation identified for this part of the research. 
Reference to the generic literature on policy implementation was intended to provide 
a background to the research issue.  The documentation included; 
o the Reports on the Organisation of the Public Service prepared by the Public 
Service Reform Commission in July 1989, January 1990, and February 1990; 
o the Operations Review of the Public Service prepared by a Government-
appointed Consultant in December 1989; and  
o academic papers, and other reports, on public policy implementation and reform 
in Malta, prepared by local scholars and practitioners. 
The second category of documentation covered an array of records and reports15 
that specifically address the case of policy implementation under review, and 
included a variety of the following; 
o management reports produced by the Project Team responsible for 
implementing the said policy; 
o progress and status reports of the project; 
o correspondence; 
o minutes of meetings; 
o speeches and press releases; 
o newspaper articles; and 
o responses to Parliamentary Questions. 
                                            
15 The essential distinction between reports and records is the time when the documents were written.  A record 
is primarily concerned with a translation taking place now.  The report is usually written after an event has 
taken place (Mann, 1976: 59) [italics added for emphasis]. 
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 While serving as a key source of data on the factors influencing failure in policy 
implementation, these documents also served as a basis upon which key persons 
involved in the policy could be identified for follow-up research.   
In fact, the second research method for data collection adopted in this phase of the 
study involved the application of in-depth and semi-stuctured interviews.   
The objective for holding these interviews was primarily to obtain first-hand data of 
the case under review so as to corroborate the data obtained from the documentary 
evidence.  Furthermore, the interviews were intended to provide the researcher with 
an opportunity to ask interviewees to elaborate upon specific issues identified during 
the documentary research and to clarify any inconsistencies or concerns arising 
from the documentation. 
Recognising that group recollections may be more reliable than individual 
recollections (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe et al., 1991) consideration was initially given 
for the organisation of group consultations, after interviewees were interviewed on 
an individual basis.  However, this proved unnecessary, as the information derived 
from the individual interviews was not inconsistent or contradictory. 
All interviews were taped and were subsequently transcribed.  The interviews were 
held with persons involved in initiating and implementing the policy under review, 
and with change agents hired to facilitate the process.  The data from these 
interviews provided the main source of information for this phase of the research. 
2.2.2 Data Analysis 
Documentary research is one of the least explained research techniques in the 
literature (May, 1993: 133) and specific methodologies of data collection and 
analysis are limited.   
While the method of data collection and analysis adopted by this research evolved 
in response to the content, quality and quantity of the documentation available, the 
procedures and techniques developed by well-established qualitative research 
studies were rigorously followed.  In particular, the research treated documentary 
evidence in the same way as interview transcripts are treated.  The data collected 
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 from the documentary sources of evidence was analysed using the general 
principles of data codification proposed by Strauss and Corbin (1998).  By so doing, 
it was possible to organise the issues identified during the data collection process 
into discrete categories according to their respective properties and dimensions 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998: 19).  This is explained further in Section 2.4. 
On the other hand, the data obtained from the interviews were analysed through the 
application of cognitive (causal) mapping techniques.  While this technique could 
also have been used for the analysis of the documentary sources of evidence, the 
latter is considered a surrogate for cognition and one-to-one interviews are likely to 
be the best method (source) for eliciting cognitive maps (Eden, Ackermann et al., 
1993: 2).  The process adopted during this part of the data collection and analysis 
followed the techniques and mechanisms outlined by Wrightson (1976),  as modified 
by Huff, Narapareddy et al. (1990).  This is explained further in Section 2.4.  
Appendix 3 provides an account of the philosophical grounding and development of 
cognitive mapping as a research technique, and its application to this study. 
2.3 Research Procedure 
Figure 6 overleaf outlines the process adopted during this part of the research. 
Due to the confidentiality agreements that had to be undertaken in order to ensure 
access to certain documentation and the interviews, the above process had to be 
carried out without the help of research assistants.     
Sections 2.4 and 2.5 elaborate on the steps taken to select the case study and the 
approach adopted for data collection and analysis.   
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 Figure 6 – Outline of Research Procedure (Project 1). 
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2.4 Selecting the Case Study 
To overcome the potential of personal bias and to ensure sampling objectivity, it was 
decided that the example of failed policy that would be used as the case study for 
this phase of the research should not be directly chosen by the researcher.  The 
preferred approach was to determine the example of failed policy implementation 
following adequate interviews with persons who, for a considerable number of years, 
have been directly involved in various positions at the highest levels of government. 
Three interviews were targeted for this purpose.  Initially, the first interview was 
intended to elicit a number of potential examples of failed policy implementation that 
would then be proposed to the other two interviewees for validation and/or refutation 
until a consensus was reached on one particular example of policy.   
However, only two of the three persons that had been targeted for an interviewee 
accepted to be interviewed, and a change to the above protocol was necessary.  In 
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 the circumstances, it was decided that each of the two interviewees would 
independently be asked to identify a set of policies that they considered as 
examples of failed policy implementation.  The results would be compared to isolate 
or short-list the example(s) cited in common.  The researcher would then choose 
one of the common examples on the basis of some pre-established criteria.  A 
different approach would have to be taken if no common example was cited.  
However, this latter approach proved to be unnecessary. 
Prior to the actual interview, a copy of the ‘Proposal Document’ prepared during the 
first year of the DBA programme was sent to each of the interviewees.  This was 
accompanied by a brief outline of the project for Phase 1 of the research, 
summarising the research issue, question, objectives and methodology.  A summary 
of the purpose of the interview, including a definition of terms being used, and the 
criteria that were to be used by the interviewees in considering the examples of 
policy implementation was also enclosed (see Appendix 4).  The purpose of these 
documents was to ensure that the interviewees would gain familiarity with the 
research being undertaken as well as an appreciation of the central importance of 
the interview to the rest of the research project.   
Two of the examples of failed policy implementation mentioned by each interviewee 
were identical.  Both examples concerned Cabinet policy decisions taken in the 
early 1990’s on the basis of recommendations arising from two milestone reports on 
the management and organisation of the Civil Service - an ‘Operations Review of 
the Public Service’, and a further ‘Report on the organisation of the Public Service’ 
prepared by a specially appointed ‘Public Service Reform Commission’.  The two 
policy decisions taken by Cabinet concerned administrative measures leading to (1) 
a review of human resource management practices and capacity building for the 
Civil Service, and (2) a major initiative intended to reform and modernise the 
financial management framework of government. 
After considering both examples, it was decided that the policy of Financial 
Management Reform would be selected for the first case study.  This policy was 
chosen because: 
1. considerable documentation on the subject was available; 
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 2. some of the persons who were involved in the implementation of this policy were 
known by the researcher, therefore increasing the probability of appointments for 
interviews; and 
3. the subject matter is still current today, with a number of new measures being 
undertaken in an attempt to achieve what was not gained 10 years ago. 
2.5 Steps taken in Data Collection and Analysis 
The steps followed in the data collection and analysis process are outlined in Figure 
7.  The first part of the data collection process focused on documentary sources of 
evidence.   
The process was initiated with a physical archival search in the libraries and 
registries of the Management Efficiency Unit (Office of the Prime Minister), and the 
Malta Information Technology and Training Services (MITTS) Limited.  These two 
organisations had a common predecessor, the Management Systems Unit Limited, 
which had been responsible for providing consultancy services and project 
management support to the Ministry of Finance in the implementation of the 
financial management reform programme.  A large number of records, including 
project-related documents and some newspaper articles, were found.  As these 
were poorly archived, they had to be first sorted by subject and chronological order, 
following which, a ‘screening’ exercise was undertaken with the intention of 
separating those records containing direct or indirect reference to the possible 
causes of failure in the policy implementation process, from any other unnecessary 
documentation.  Furthermore, as the policy under review was (at the time) under the 
scrutiny of a Cabinet Committee, reference to the records and minutes of meetings 
held at this level was also considered important.   
In order to facilitate the process of analysing all the relevant documentation, a 
database was developed to log a short-listed number of key documents.  
Constructed using Microsoft Access, the database is composed of three core 
modules intended to register various details of the information contained in, and 
related to, the key documents.  These include the following: 
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 Figure 7:  Steps in Data Collection and Analysis  
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 o An ‘Actors’ module – to register the base data (personal and career details) of 
persons who were either authors and/or recipients of the documents being 
reviewed, or who were denoted as key persons to a particular event or process.   
o Every person registered on the system was automatically assigned a unique 
number to serve as the only reference key during the research process so that 
the person’s identity was protected. 
o A ‘Document’ module intended to create a ‘stock register’ of the documents 
deemed most important and relevant for analysis.   
o Once again, every document registered into the system was automatically 
assigned a primary key as a unique reference number.  The data stored in this 
module included the date and title of the document, a description of the type of 
document16, and a filing code according to where the document was stored.  A 
‘notes’ field was also created to register any comments or observations by the 
researcher. 
o A ‘Storyline’ module intended to register and track any major events in 
chronological order.   
o The data stored in this module included the date of the event, a brief description 
of the event, the intended objectives of the event, and its outcomes.  A 
relationship was also created between this module and the ‘Document’ and 
‘Actor’ modules so that every event could be linked with the relevant document 
and actor related to it.  
Every document registered in the database was then examined in detail and all 
references to issues or factors that were considered to have led to failure in policy 
implementation were extracted and analysed.  Following the approach adopted by 
Strauss and Corbin (1998), these factors were then coded into discrete categories 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘factor-categories’ to denote the relation to this research) 
according to their properties and dimensions.   
Page 53 
 In relation to this research, a ‘factor-category’ is defined as a unique class of factors 
(or issues) influencing the failure (or success) of policy implementation as perceived 
by the author(s) of the document under review.  A factor-category may have multiple 
‘properties’, each of which denotes a different aspect of that specific class of 
factors.  On the other hand, dimensions represent the polar ends of a particular 
aspect (property) of a class of factors (factor-category).  
The example below illustrates the approach adopted in the codification process. 
Quotation (Doc. 40 p,7) 
“It is also essential that the financial management reforms are seen as an integrated 
Government of Malta initiative and not as an appendage or one that is being driven or 
managed by external entities”. 
Quotation with Concepts in bold and denoted by  //    // 
“It is also essential that the financial management reforms // are seen as an integrated 
Government of Malta initiative // and // not as an appendage or one that is being driven or 
managed by external entities  //”. 
 Factor-
Category 
Property Dimensions 
// are seen as an integrated 
G.O.M initiative// 
Ownership Visibility Seen…Unseen 
// not…driven or managed by 
external entities  // 
Ownership Location Internal…External
To facilitate handling the emerging codification system, a fourth module was created 
in the database as a sub-set of the ‘Documents’ module.  This made it possible to 
record, for every document, and according to their respective factor-categories, 
properties and dimensions, all references to issues or factors considered as 
potentially influencing failure in policy implementation. 
                                                                                                                                       
16 Documents were classified under one of the following headings: Circular, Correspondence, Legislation, 
Letter, Minutes, Memorandum, Memo to Minutes, Presentation, and Report. 
Page 54 
 A number of standard reports were also created so that various forms of output on 
the information contained in the above modules could be generated to assist in the 
analysis.  An outline of the above-mentioned modules and standard reports is 
contained in Appendix 5. 
Once all of the documentary sources of evidence were collected and analysed, the 
next part of the process was to identify a number of suitable persons to be 
interviewed.   
Using primarily the ‘Actors’ module of the database, it was possible to identify and 
list those persons who occupied a central role in one or more aspects of the policy 
under review.  These persons were divided into three groups to reflect their position 
in Government – Politicians, Civil Servants and Consultants – and then listed in 
order of importance to reflect the role they fulfilled in the policy implementation.   
Due to time and resource constraints, a total of nine (9) interviews were targeted.  In 
order to overcome any potential bias in the identification of issues contributing to 
failure in policy implementation, it was decided that an equivalent number of 
interviewees from each group of ‘actors’ should be identified for an interview.   
All the identified interviewees were contacted and appointments with eight (8) of 
them were established.  The ninth interviewee was no longer resident in Malta and 
could not be reached for an interview.  Another person from his same group was 
therefore identified and an interview established.  Nine (9) interviews were therefore 
held. 
Prior to each meeting, interviewees were sent a brief paper (see Appendix 6) 
outlining: 
o the purpose of the research; 
o the approach being undertaken; 
o progress achieved to date; 
o a brief overview of the policy decision that would be discussed during the 
interview; and 
o the purpose of the interview and the proposed approach. 
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 Every interview was audio-taped and later transcribed ‘ad verbatim’ except for those 
instances where the conversation, or rather parts of it, was held in Maltese.  In the 
latter case, a direct translation was made as the tape was being transcribed.  To 
ensure that these parts of the interview were translated correctly and accurately 
reflected the content and spirit of what had been said in Maltese, they were checked 
and confirmed by a person of trust.  There were only a very few disagreements and, 
in these cases, a consensus position was reached following a suitable discussion. 
Causal mapping was the technique that was selected to facilitate the analysis of the 
interviews.  The principles and systematic coding procedures produced by 
Wrightson (1996), as modified by Huff, Narapareddy et al. (1990), were closely 
applied.  As such, every statement made by an interviewee that reflected his/her 
perception of what factors led to failure and why, was isolated and broken into its 
subject and cause concepts.  Concepts were then labelled with a reference code 
and linked to one another according to pre-defined standard ‘relationships’ as 
produced by Huff, Narapareddy et al. (1990: 315).  Furthermore, the following 
protocol was observed: 
o concepts were coded using the original wording in the transcript; 
o concepts that served as ‘examples’ were nonetheless coded and retained for 
reference; and 
o identical concepts referenced during different parts of the interview were 
merged.  The wording of the concept that seemed to best explain the 
interviewee’s frame of mind was retained. 
The example below illustrates the approach described above.  A full transcript of an 
interview, identifying the concepts codified for analysis, is included in Appendix 7.     
Quotation (Doc 67) 
“Interviewee: First of all, as I see it, for any policy or change or improvements that you want to 
do, you must start from the beginning, in the sense that you must have planning, good 
planning, a very comprehensive system, comprehensive and human system,  in the sense, 
when I say human, I mean you don’t just say ‘this is what needs to be done’… who is going to 
do it?  Are they capable of doing it? If they cannot do it, we get people from outside?  If so 
then that is not a good system.  And the third is enforcement”. 
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 Quotation with concepts in bold and denoted by  //    // 
“Interviewee: First of all, as I see it, for any policy or change or improvements that you want  to 
do, you must start from the beginning, in the sense that you must have planning, //good 
planning//, //a very comprehensive system//, comprehensive and //human system//,  in the 
sense, when I say human, I mean you don’t just say //‘this is what needs to be 
done’//…//who is going to do it?  Are they capable of doing it?// If they cannot do it, //we 
get people from outside?// If so then that is not good planning.  And the third is 
//enforcement//”. 
List of Coded Concepts and Causal Relationships  
Code Concept Link Code  Concept 
[67,1A] good planning /-/  GOAL Concept: failure [in 
policy implementation] … 
success 
[67,1B] A very comprehensive 
system 
/-/  GOAL Concept: failure [in 
policy implementation] … 
success 
[67,1C] A human system /-/  GOAL Concept: failure [in 
policy implementation] … 
success 
[67,1D] [saying] ‘this is what 
needs to be done’ 
/-e/ [67,1C] A human system 
[67,1E] [asking] ‘who is going to 
do it? [and] are they 
capable of doing it? 
/e/ [67,1C] A human system 
[67,1F] we get people from 
outside 
/-/ [67,1A] good planning 
[67,1G] Enforcement /-/  GOAL Concept: failure [in 
policy implementation] … 
success 
Note:   
o The concept labels, or code, represent the Document No (in this case 67), page 
number in the interview transcript (in this case 1), and sequential lettering of the 
concepts (in this case A to G). 
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 o The Goal Concept does not feature in the quotation but is paraphrased by 
‘failure [in policy implementation]…success’.  The symbol ‘…’ means ‘rather 
than’. 
o The words in square brackets are additions to complete the verbatim phrase 
from the transcript. 
o /-/ denotes ‘negatively affects’. 
o /e/ denotes ‘is an example of’. 
o /-e/ denotes ‘is not an example of’. 
The concepts were then graphically ‘mapped’ using Decision Explorer 3.1.  With its 
in-built macros and tools, the software also proved to be a valuable resource for 
exploring the make-up and structure of each map at different levels of analysis.  
Through a number of iterations, it was possible to identify the most dominant and 
central concepts, facilitating the conceptual ordering of various categories of factors 
influencing failure in policy implementation.  Where possible, the derived maps were 
shared with the interviewees so that their composition could be reviewed and 
validated by the ‘owner’. 
As a final step in the data analysis, the results obtained from the sequential 
examination of the documentary sources of evidence and the individual causal maps 
of interviewees, were compared to identify similar and contrasting conceptual 
relationships.   
The results and findings of the above-mentioned analysis are discussed in Section 
3.0.   
2.6 Reliability and Validity 
One of the criticisms that this phase of the research may encounter is that it adopted 
a methodology that was only tested with one example, or case study, of failed policy 
implementation.   
At first glance, this may score low in terms of the study’s reliability and external 
validity.  However, considerable rigour was followed in determining and 
documenting every step and operation of the data collection and analysis process.  
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 The objective was to develop a protocol of procedures that could be repeated by 
other researchers, with the intent of leading to the same results.  The custom-built 
database also ensures that all documents used during the study can be easily 
traced.  Furthermore, the analysis of the causal maps derived from each interview 
followed a sequential and reported logic and operation that can be easily replicated 
by other researchers using the same data set.  The ability to create an audit trail of 
the procedures followed and a chain of evidence should therefore increase the 
study’s reliability (Yin, 1994: 98).   
While the adoption of a single case study methodology limits the possibility of 
generalising the results obtained beyond the strict domain of this example, such 
generalisation was never the intention of this phase of the project.  Indeed, the 
object was to explore and develop an understanding of why a particular case of 
policy failed to be implemented as intended, so as to obtain a data set for comparing 
the results with a contrasting case of success at a subsequent stage of the 
research.   
In contrast, the strongest aspects of the research methodology probably pertain to 
its internal and construct validity. 
By following the tried and tested protocols of the causal mapping technique for 
analysing the interviews, it can be objectively stated that any inferences derived 
thereof, reflect the original perceptions and frame of mind of the interviewee.  One 
possible cause for criticism in this respect lies in respect of the codification of 
concepts derived from the documentary sources of evidence, as these were subject 
to the researcher’s interpretation and could not be validated by the original author(s) 
of the documents.  However, as with the causal mapping protocol, the original 
wording contained in the documents was used during the coding process, and every 
concept was clearly referenced to establish authenticity.  Furthermore, method 
triangulation itself should increase the internal validity of this phase of the study by 
counter-balancing the strengths and weaknesses of the different methods employed 
(Easterby-Smith, Thorpe et al., 1991: 133).   
On the other hand, the construct validity of this phase of the research is primarily a 
function of the operational measures established to overcome elements of 
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 subjectivity in data collection.  The use of multiple sources of evidence was 
deliberate so that, to the extent possible, bias from a single source is overcome 
through evidence obtained from other sources (Yin, 1994: 90).  Besides relying upon 
both secondary and primary sources of information, the study was also based upon 
various types of different documents and records prepared by different people, from 
different backgrounds and, possibly, with different interests.  Similarly, a cross-
section of persons from different backgrounds, possibly holding different 
perspectives of the problem under investigation, were also interviewed so as to 
overcome elements of bias.  The construct validity of the study should also be 
reflected in the ability to clearly establish and record a chain of evidence supporting 
the achieved results (Yin, 1994: 34), although this could have been further 
strengthened if the research had been conducted with the assistance of other 
researchers.  Unfortunately, because of confidentiality agreements, this was not 
possible.  Nonetheless, it should be noted that when the cognitive maps were 
shared with interviewees, no alterations were requested. 
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 3.0 Results / Findings 
3.1 Background to Selected Case Study 
In order to gain a better appreciation of the elements influencing the research issue, 
it is probably pertinent to outline the main events that led to the development of the 
policy under review.  A brief overview of the context and reasons for which the policy 
was developed, and the operational structure within which it was managed and 
implemented, is presented below. 
3.1.1 Context 
In 1987, the Maltese Nationalist Party was returned to Office after having served for 
sixteen (16) years in Opposition.  Their election manifesto underscored the need for 
a number of political and economic reform initiatives that were marketed under the 
slogan ‘Work, Justice and Liberty’ (Nationalist Party, 1987) – a slogan that is 
strongly reflective of a time of considerable social turmoil. 
Recognising that success in the implementation of the Government’s economic and 
social programme was, to a great extent, dependent upon the efficiency and 
competence of the administrative machinery, the new Government established the 
reform of the Public Service as one of its key priorities.   
Indeed, within a year of being elected into Office, the Government appointed a 
Public Service Reform Commission (PSRC) “to examine the organisation of the 
Public Service, and to recommend means by which the Service can efficiently 
respond to the changing needs for effective government” (Public Service Reform 
Commission, 1989).  Concurrently, it also commissioned a Consultant to conduct an 
‘Operations Review’ of the Public Service with the following terms of reference: 
“to evaluate the existing organisational structures [of the Public Service] in light 
of the government's policy objectives and to recommend appropriate 
delineations, organisational structures and mandates; and 
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 to develop a suitable Information Technology plan which will identify needs, 
opportunities and cost/benefits for the application of computer technology where 
applicable" (Tabone, 1988: 5). 
3.1.2 Reasons behind the Financial Management Reform policy decision 
The Operations Review presented its findings in two reports, each addressing one 
of the two terms of reference mentioned above.  The first report, and the only one of 
direct relevance to this study, focused on the operational aspects of government, 
identifying those problems that were impeding it from functioning effectively and 
proposing areas for reform and recommendations for remedial action (Tabone, 
1988). 
The core problems were divided into three categories.  Those relating to: 
1. human resource management issues, in particular the mechanisms used for 
acquiring manpower and the conditions of service of public employees; 
2. environmental support issues relating to the infrastructural, technological and 
expert support services available to the civil service; and 
3. organisational issues, in particular those relating to (1) the manner in which 
government functions were structured; (2) the processes and mechanisms by 
which policy was developed; (3) the powers and functions of management to 
mould policies and resources into Public Services; and (4) the accountability 
measures to ensure that the government and the administration attained 
established goals. 
Of particular relevance to the decision leading to the development of a policy of 
financial management reform, are the observations made in the report concerning 
the organisational issues of the Public Service.  Among other things, the report 
noted that: 
o there was “no capability within government to conduct planning of any 
sort…with the attendant research and analysis that this necessitates” such that 
it was “largely the job of Ministers to take the necessary steps to turn ideas into 
substantive initiatives” (p.20); 
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 o there was little consultation between Departments and the Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) during the Budget Allocations process such that “allocations bear little 
relevance to the needs of Departments” (p.21).  Submissions needed to “be 
more substantive, requests more realistic and expectations more moderate” 
(p.21).  New roles and approaches to financial management were deemed 
essential; 
o there were a number of legal and administrative measures that “pose a 
fundamental anachronism to management accountability” (p.24) and “a lack of 
delegated powers [that] could conceivably result in poor financial management 
aimed at getting around the constraints” (p.25).  Rather than focusing on 
policies and measures for development, the “prevailing mode of administration 
is geared towards control in the two most critical areas of financial and human 
resources management” (p.25); 
o financial guidelines were in dire need of upgrading “to reflect the realities and 
requirements of modern management” (p.26); 
o the audit function was lacking in that it is focused on a review of expenditure as 
opposed to ensuring value for money (p.30).  The creation of an Internal Audit 
function to re-align the auditing perception was deemed necessary. 
The findings and conclusions reached by the Public Service Reform Commission 
echoed those reached by the Operations Review.  In its first report (Public Service 
Reform Commission, 1989), the PSRC identified the need to restore the institutional 
fabric of the Public Service, to build its organisational capacity, and to safeguard 
employee rights, as the three over-arching objectives of government in its attempt to 
reform the Public Service.  To guide the attainment of these objectives, the PSRC 
proposed eleven (11) goals, of which Goal Number 2 was of particular relevance to 
the domain of financial management. 
Under Goal 2, 'Creating a culture of excellence and integrity' (p.16-18), the 
Commission recommended the compilation of departmental corporate plans, with 
the Ministry of Finance and the Department of Audit acting as lead players to set 
standards of performance; the development of reporting systems and standards to 
evaluate financial/operational performance; a review of the Financial Administration 
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 and Audit Act (1962) to improve lines of accountability; a review of the allocations 
process to improve the distribution of funds and the establishment of economic 
priorities; and a review of the format and content of the Financial Estimates to 
provide more meaningful budget projections. 
Complementing some of the findings and recommendations established by the 
Operations Review, the PSRC also identified a weakness in the Public Services' 
ability with respect to planning, policy analysis, design and advisory services.  It 
identified role ambiguity as a key contributor to the loss of structure and the 
elaboration of central controls (p.25) and proposed delineation of accountability at 
various levels of Government (p.28) and the need for decentralising financial 
management (p.26).  Furthermore, it proposed substantive changes to the 
budgetary process and the strengthening of auditing and accountability procedures 
that focus on a measurement of outcomes, as opposed to processes. 
The findings of both the Operations Review and the PSRC led the Government to 
consider the need for a major reform programme for the Public Service with 
Financial Management Reform as a key policy priority. 
3.1.3 Monitoring and Controlling Implementation 
To introduce the vast program of reform contemplated in the above mentioned 
reports, the government organised itself to establish an operational set up to 
oversee, direct and implement the various policy decisions that were required. 
While operational responsibility for policy implementation was to rest with individual 
line ministries and departments, the Government established a Cabinet Committee 
on Reform to provide direction to, and oversee, the implementation of all Public 
Service Reform initiatives17.   
The Management and Personnel Office was established in the Office of the Prime 
Minister to assume overall responsibility for matters pertaining to human resource 
management, including the development of manpower plans and complementing 
                                            
17 Source:  Data. 
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 exercises, on-going personnel administration (pending delegation to line 
departments at a later stage), collective bargaining and the development of human 
resource management capabilities in line departments (Public Service Reform 
Commission, 1990: 10). 
The Staff Development Organisation was also established in the Office of the Prime 
Minister to identify the training needs of the Public Service, to develop suitable 
programmes to address these needs, and to provide the necessary training to 
furnish the skills and expertise required to implement the identified changes (Public 
Service Reform Commission, 1990: 10). 
The Management Systems Unit (MSU), composed of a number of local and 
expatriate professionals, was also established within the Office of the Prime Minister 
to facilitate the ambitious reform programme.  By providing expert advice in the 
various disciplines of management, MSU was to develop and implement new human 
resource management, financial management and technology management policies 
and assist in the development of human resource management capacities in 
departments (Public Service Reform Commission, 1990: 10). 
Following the development of a Work Program and Strategy for Financial 
Management Reform by the MSU, and its subsequent presentation and 
endorsement by Government in late 1990, a ‘Financial Management Group’ was 
established in 1991 within the MSU to specifically assist the Ministry of Finance in 
delivering the Financial Management Policy Reform Programme.  The Financial 
Management Group was led by an expatriate of Maltese origin and resourced by a 
number of expatriate experts in public finance. 
In addition, a ‘Steering Committee’ was established chaired by the Permanent 
Secretary of the Ministry of Finance, and with membership extended to the Ministry 
of Economic Services, the Ministry of Social Policy, the Ministry of Public Works and 
the Financial Management Group of MSU.  The objectives of this committee were to 
translate the Work Program and Strategy developed by MSU into a prioritised 
programme of works for the financial management reform initiative, and to co-
ordinate the work of the Financial Management Group. 
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 Over a period of approximately 5 years, between 1991 and 1996, the financial 
reform programme addressed the following priority initiatives: 
o the development of new Financial Policies, Procedures and Regulations; 
o Financial Delegation and Accountability; 
o the introduction of modern Financial Planning and Budgeting procedures; 
o the establishment of a Department Accounting System (Chart of Accounts); 
o the establishment of an Internal Auditing Function; and 
o the development of a Financial Management Training Programme. 
During the above-mentioned period: 
o the country experienced one election in February of 1992 returning the same 
party to power; 
o the Ministry of Finance experienced the leadership of two Ministers (the first 
between 1987 and 1992, and the second between 1992 and 1996) and two 
Permanent Secretaries (with the changeover taking place in 1994); 
o the leadership of the MSU changed once in 1992; 
o the Cabinet Committee on Reform commissioned a number of strategic reviews 
on the reform programme of the civil service, but only one on the Financial 
Management Reform Programme, and then only in 1996, prior to an election; 
o the Steering Committee met only for a few times; and 
o the Financial Management Group was disbanded as a separate group within 
the MSU in 1995, and merged with the Human Resource and General 
Management Group to create one Consultancy Division. 
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 3.2 Results of Documentary Analysis 18 
The archival search returned several documents that were related to the selected 
case of policy implementation.  Sixty-nine (69) records were short-listed as key 
documents and logged into the purpose-built database mentioned earlier.  Table 1 
below provides a break-down of these records by type of document. 
Table 1: Key Records by ‘Type’ of Document 
Type of Document Number of 
Records 
Minutes of Meetings 36 
Reports 15 
Legislation 6 
Memoranda to Minutes 4 
Letters 3 
Correspondence Files 3 
Presentations 1 
Circulars 1 
Every one of the records identified above was examined in detail.  Any statements 
contained in them that identified factors affecting the implementation of policy were 
highlighted and subsequently recorded in the database.  In some instances, the 
statements contained in the records specifically mentioned issues or events that led 
to failure in the implementation of the financial management reform programme19.  
In others, reference to such factors was less direct but nonetheless relevant to the 
policy under review20.   
                                            
18 This section is intended to summarise the findings arising from the documentary analysis.  The interpretation 
of the results is discussed in Section 4.0. 
19 For example, “[Some] of the financial management proposals had not yet been implemented because the 
Minister responsible had not yet become personally involved in their implementation” (Doc. 25, p5). 
20 For example, “Ministries and departments must first be fully equipped to receive such delegation” (Doc 64, 
p38). 
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 Furthermore, while some statements made specific reference to factors or issues 
leading to failure (the specific object of this first Project), others referred to factors 
that were perceived to lead to successful implementation21.  The former statements 
were extracted from records that provided an account of some past event, while the 
latter were obtained from records that were planning some future event.  Both types 
of statements were considered important for the analysis as they each reflected a 
different side of the same coin.   
These statements echoed the perceptions or concepts that various individuals felt 
were influencing the policy implementation process.  A total of ninety-one (91) such 
concepts were identified from eighteen (18) of the key records mentioned above, as 
follows: fifty one (51) concepts were derived from three (3) Reports, thirty (30) 
concepts from ten (10) Minutes of Meetings, seven (7) concepts from three (3) 
Memoranda to Minutes, two (2) concepts from one (1) Letter, and one (1) concept 
from the Circular. 
While an examination of the cause and effect relationships between various 
concepts may have enriched the findings, such relationships could not be 
determined with accuracy or to an acceptable level of confidence.  The analysis of 
this data set was therefore approached reflecting the codification principles and 
techniques developed by Strauss and Corbin (1998).  The concepts were examined 
and codified along their dimensions, properties and categories.   
Fourteen (14) factor-categories were identified exhibiting, in total, twenty-eight (28) 
different properties and thirty-two (32) dimensions.  These are listed in Table 2 
overleaf.  The Table also lists the number of concepts per factor-category, property 
and dimension, and the number of records from where the concepts were derived.  
A direct quotation from the documentary data is also included to illustrate and add 
meaning to each factor-category, property and dimension. 
                                            
21 For example, “A criteria for successful execution…is commitment from both the political as well as senior 
officials” (Doc 40, p7). 
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Table 2:  Results of Documentary Data Codification (Project 1)
 
Factor-Category Property Dimension No. of 
Concepts 
No. of 
Records 
Quotation from Documents 
Authority Freedom of Action Delegated…Withheld 3 2 In implementing reforms…managers [must] be given authority commensurate with 
responsibility” (Doc 41, p3). 
Environment (Context) Expectations   Realistic…Unachievable 1 1 [A] critical success factor [is] realistic expectations of improvement which do not exceed any 
organisations' capacity to deliver and which are affordable (Doc 56, p3) 
 Orientation (of Management) Process…Results 1 1 [The] Ministry of Finance [is] process bound (Doc 60, p13) 
Reliability Accountable…Unaccountable 1 1 One of the most important factors to the success of the projects…a well controlled and 
structured project management and accountability framework (Doc 40, p25). 
External Support Commitment Consistent…Unsustained 1 1 The Committee agreed…on the continued need for sustained support (Doc 34, p3). 
Management Involvement Commitment Active…Passive 1 1 To ensure successful implementation, all partners to the implementation plan must provide an 
active and fully committed role…(Doc 64, p44). 
Commitment Committed…Uncommitted 13 10 The Ministry of Finance must make a total and completely unqualified commitment (Doc 64, 
p40). 
Co-operation Co-operative…Unco-operative 2 2 [The] Ministry of Finance [is] uncooperative (Doc 60, p13). 
Managerial Responsibility Clarity Clear…Unclear 1 1 Roles delineation and managerial responsibility are not always clearly defined and as a result 
there is lack of accountability (Doc 12, p2). 
Methodology (of Implementation)     Approach Gradual…Abrupt 2 1 Success was more likely to ensue by phasing-in the coverage of the complete business 
planning approach as against attempting full implementation as a goal (Doc 64, p37). 
Direction Controlled…Uncontrolled 1 1 One of the most important factors to the success of the projects…a well controlled and 
structured project management and accountability framework (Doc 40, p25). 
Structure Rigid…Liberal 1 1 One of the most important factors to the success of the projects…a well controlled and 
structured project management and accountability framework (Doc 40, p25). 
Organisation   Resourcefulness Adequate…Inadequate 2 2 [A] critical success factor [is] the provision of adequate departmental resources (Doc 56, p3). 
Structure Effective…Ineffective 1 1 [A] critical success factor [is] the need to set up…effective structures (Doc 56, p3). 
Ownership   Belief Believe…Disbelieve 2 2 Permanent Secretaries still needed to be fully convinced (Doc 34, p3). 
Location Internal…External 14 8 Management must assume ownership of their plans (Doc 64, p36). 
Visibility Seen…Unseen 5 2 Ownership must be seen as well as stated (Doc 40, p31). 
Performance Evaluation Responsibilisation   Accountable…Unaccountable 2 2 [The] performance evaluation of Directors [is seen] as being of critical importance to the whole 
reform exercise (Doc 30, p4). 
Personal Capabilities Proficiency Skilled…Inept 3 2 [A] critical success factor [is] the filling of senior posts in the Ministry of Finance with people of 
suitable quality, skills and experience (Doc 56, p3). 
Qualifications Qualified…Unqualified 3 3 The major constraints in inhibiting reform have been…loss of qualified personnel (Doc 62, p5). 
Planning    Approach Co-ordinated…Unco-ordinated 1 1 [A] critical success factor [is] the establishment of effective mechanisms for co-ordination with 
other agencies engaged in the process of reform (Doc 56, p3). 
Approach Holistic…Fragmented 1 1 The need was felt for an overall plan which would better integrate all the different components 
of the reform (Doc 34, p7). 
Approach Incremental…Immediate 2 1 A planning approach [that] develops sequentially and incrementally…[will] result in continued 
measurable success (Doc 40, p11). 
Approach Top-down…Bottom-up 1 1 Success will be achieved through a top-down approach to both planning as well as 
implementation (Doc 40, p11). 
Timing Pre-defined…Emergent 2 1 A first essential step to success is the development of a strategy and plan (Doc 40, p2). 
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Table 2:  Results of Documentary Data Codification 
Political Involvement Commitment Commitment…No 
Commitment 
4  3 A criterion for successful execution…is commitment from both the political as well as senior 
officials (Doc 40, p2). 
Intervention Direct…Indirect 3 3 [A] Ministry management committee…chaired by the Minister…is a vehicle for ensuring reforms 
are implemented in the Ministry (Doc 56, p3). 
Ownership Own…Disown 3 3 It was important for every Minister and those around them as well as for the leadership in the 
Service to ‘own’ the reform initiatives (Doc 25, p9). 
Willingess Willing…Unwilling 2 1 Political will…is the most important prerequisite for successful action (Doc 64, p38). 
Results    Timeliness Early…Late 5 2 There must be early demonstrable results (Doc 40, p2). 
Visibility Visible…Not Visible 3 2 There must be visible change…demonstrable (Doc 40, p2). 
Role Delineation Clarity Clear…Unclear 4 3 [Need for] clearer delineation of responsibilities (Doc 34, p7). 
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 If one were to consider the frequency of concepts per factor-category as a measure 
of the latter’s importance, or centrality, as perceived by the actors to the policy 
implementation, ‘Ownership’, ‘Management Involvement’ and ‘Political Involvement’, 
would be identified as the most important or dominant factors influencing the 
implementation of policy.  In total, the factor-category ‘Ownership’ was cited twenty-
one (21) times in twelve (12) different records.  ‘Management Involvement’ was cited 
sixteen (16) times in thirteen (13) different records, while ‘Political Involvement’ was 
cited twelve (12) times in ten (10) different records. 
However, deciding on the centrality of factor-categories merely on the basis of a 
frequency count may be somewhat questionable.  As previously stated, an 
examination of the cause and effect relationships between the various concepts 
would have enriched the findings and provided a better means for determining the 
relative importance of the concepts.  However, from the data available, such causal 
relationships could not be properly determined.   
Given the transparency and traceability of the data collection process, the same 
results should be obtained if the operations of the study are replicated.  It is 
therefore probably safe to state that the study should score relatively high in terms 
of its reliability.  Likewise, its construct validity, at least as measured through the 
establishment of a chain of evidence for the derived results, should also be relatively 
robust.  However, the fact that the content of the data, and the conclusions of the 
codification process, could not be verified by the original authors of the 
documentation (to ascertain that they correctly reflect one’s thoughts and 
perceptions) leaves something to be desired in terms of the analysis of the data and 
the internal validity of the study. 
In view of this, it is felt that while the results of this part of the study can be 
considered to be indicative of both the situation prevailing at the time and the 
general issues and events that influenced the implementation of the financial 
management reform policy, they cannot, in and of themselves, be considered as 
conclusive findings.   
As such, the results of the documentary analysis have been treated more as a 
‘backdrop’ to the interviews that followed in the second part of the study’s data 
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 collection and analysis process, rather than as a ‘filter’ for identifying areas to guide 
and focus the proceedings of these interviews.  Indeed, the interviews were 
approached as though no prior analysis of any kind had been made.  They were 
intentionally left unstructured so as not to direct or influence the interviewees to 
necessarily discuss any particular categories that were obtained from the 
documentary analysis. 
The results and findings of the interviews are summarised next in the following 
section. 
3.3 Results of Interviews 22 
As mentioned earlier, a total of nine (9) semi-structured interviews were targeted 
with persons selected from among politicians, civil servants and consultants that 
were key to the policy under review.  Three (3) persons from each group were 
interviewed.   
Only one of the interviews was unsuccessfully completed.  The interview in question 
was terminated soon after it had commenced, as the interviewee felt he could not 
make a valid contribution.  Due to the role that this interviewee played in the policy 
under review, the choice of an alternative interviewee was limited to one other 
person.  However, securing an interview with this person was not possible. 
Table 3 summarises the results of the interviews per interviewee per group.  The 
terms being used are defined in the notes below. 
Notes: 
1. A ‘concept’ is defined as an idea or mental image expressed by the interviewee 
in the form of a statement, to describe an issue, event, feeling or experience that 
the interviewee believes can explain a particular phenomenon in relation to the 
research issue.  Concepts are derived from the transcript of the interview and 
represent the interviewee’s own choice of words.  
                                            
22 This section summarises the findings of the interviews.  The results are discussed in Section 4.0. 
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Table 3 – Results of Interviews (Project 1) 
 Interview 
Interviewee Group  Civil Servants   Consultants   Politicians  
Interview Reference Number          65 68 72 66 70 67 71 73 74
Interview Duration 1hr 40 mins 4 hrs 1 hr 1 hr 1hr 40 mins 1hr 15mins 1hr 15 mins 15 mins 40 minutes 
 
Total Number of Concepts1        110 75 63 68 96 97 69  72 
Number of Heads2        10 1 4 1 3 8 1  3 
Number of Tails3        36 22 28 23 4 45 24  18 
Link-to-Node Ratio4        1.22:1 1.16:1 1.19:1 1.12:1 1.11:1 1.3:1 1.1:1  1.18:1 
 
Number of Clusters5        3 3 4 3 4 3 3  3 
Number of Factor-Categories6        10 5 5 5 6 9 7  4 
List of Factor-Categories Context Group dynamic    Accountability Power Relations Values/Customs Planning Conditioning  Customs 
 Accountability Role execution Goal alignment Role 
Fragmentation 
Resistance  Employee
participation 
Customs  Accountability 
Power Planning Political
intervention 
 Political Will Leadership Management 
involvement 
Cloning  Capabilities 
Cloning Politics Group dynamic Administrative
Will 
Capabilities Control Political maturity  Roles and 
responsibilities 
Leadership Capabilities Leadership Interpersonal
Relationships 
Role 
Fragementaton 
Cooperative 
enforcement 
Politics   
Organisational
politics 
Trust Resistance Collegiality   
Trust Ownership Customisation   
Participation Accountability   
Personal/Group
dynamics 
Comprehen-
siveness 
   
Customisation   
  
       
     
       
       
        
      
        
 
1,2,3,4,5,6 See ‘Notes’ on page 72 
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 2. A ‘head’ is a concept that in cognitive mapping notation, has no out-going links 
(see Note 4 below) to other concepts in the interviewee’s map.  A head 
represents a terminal concept in a chain of argument and therefore has no 
perceived consequences. 
3. A ‘tail’ is a concept that has no in-coming links from other concepts.  As such, a 
tail has no supporting explanation and represents a starting point in a chain of 
argument.  
4. A ‘link’ denotes a relationship between two concepts.  A ‘node’ is the term used 
for the location of a concept in a map (Jenkins and Johnson, 1997: 901).  The 
‘link-to-node’ ratio represents the proportion of links to nodes within any given 
map (Jenkins and Johnson, 1997: 901).   
5. The word ‘cluster’ is used to refer to a group of concepts that share some 
similar topic or theme and that together form a ‘family’ of related ideas. 
6. ‘Factor-categories’ are sub-elements (or sub-groups) of a cluster, and in relation 
to the objective of this research, define classes of factors (or issues) influencing 
failure (or success) in policy implementation.  They are compatible with the 
‘factor-categories’ derived from the documentary research and illustrated in 
Table 2. 
The data illustrated in Table 3 was obtained after each interview was transcribed, 
codified and graphically mapped.  Every map is unique to the person interviewed but 
some comparisons can nonetheless be made. 
A first difference between the interviews lies with respect to their duration.  This was 
not pre-established prior to the meetings and interviews were concluded when the 
interviewee found that there was nothing new or more to add to what had already 
been said.  While experience has shown that the number of concepts elicited during 
an interview is more dependent upon the length of the interview and the skills of the 
interviewer (Eden, Ackermann et al., 1992: 312) the results obtained in this research 
do not seem to support this view.  Indeed, there is no immediately apparent 
relationship between the number of concepts elicited during the interviews and their 
respective durations. 
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 The absolute number of nodes or concepts in a map, or their ratio per unit time (of 
the interview) is sometimes used as a measure of cognitive complexity.  However, a 
better indicator is probably the link-to-node ratio, which is understood to suggest 
depth of thinking in consideration of the issue under review.  A higher link-to-node 
ratio indicates a densely connected map and supposedly a higher level of cognitive 
complexity (Eden, Ackermann et al., 1992: 313).  The reason behind higher levels of 
complexity cannot be determined from the data but, from observation, and with 
hindsight, it was noted that the interviewees with the most densely populated maps 
were those who seemed best prepared for the interview and who were the most 
involved.  Indeed, in one instance, at the beginning of the interview, the interviewee 
provided the researcher with a six-page report of what he considered were the 
reasons that led to failure in policy implementation in the case under review. 
Another measure of cognitive simplicity or complexity is the ratio of ‘heads’ and 
‘tails’ to ‘nodes’.  Maps with a small number of ‘heads’ indicate a form of idealized 
thinking (Eden, Ackermann et al., 1992) where the interviewee’s concepts are all 
pointing towards a common end or goal.  The opposite applies with a large number 
of ‘heads’ indicating that the interviewee perceives multiple possible consequences 
in relation to the issue being researched.  On the other hand, a large number of 
‘tails’ indicate a flat hierarchy of concepts and a relatively simple hierarchy or chain 
of argumentation. 
However, the purpose of this research is not to establish levels of cognitive 
complexity in relation to a research issue.  The objective is to determine what factors 
are perceived by different individuals to have contributed to failure.  Furthermore, 
the study aims to understand whether similarities exist between the factors elicited 
by the different interviewees and, if so, whether they are perceived to manifest 
themselves in similar or different ways.  Equally important is the need to determine 
whether different ‘groups’ of interviewees (civil servants, consultants and politicians) 
elicit factors that are similar intra-group, but different between one group and 
another.  These analyses will help establish a better understanding of the ‘gap’ 
between the policy-making and strategy implementation arms of government.  The 
information can be used at a later phase of the research to propose a model for 
bridging the ‘politico-administrative divide’. 
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 Two techniques are widely used for analysing the emergent features of an 
individual’s cognitive map.  The first, called ‘domain analysis’, is a technique 
intended to identify the most dominant concepts in a map by calculating the intensity 
of relationships around concepts in their immediate vicinity.  The higher the number 
of links going into, or flowing out of, a concept, the ‘busier’ the concept and hence 
the higher the probability of it being a key issue.  The advantage of running this 
analysis on a cognitive map (especially one with a high number of concepts), is that 
it allows the researcher to progressively focus on those areas of the map that are 
most densely populated.  In so doing, it also allows the gradual identification of 
‘clusters’ of concepts that carry similar character or meaning in relation to the 
concepts to which they are inter-related.  Common trends in ideology around 
particular issues can be identified and emerging themes symbolising the 
interviewee’s cognitive process are elicited. 
Supporting this approach is the second technique called ‘central analysis’.  This 
technique is similar in scope to the domain analysis, but as the name may suggest it 
is intended to calculate the centrality of concepts in the wider context of the entire 
cognitive map, rather than in the immediate vicinity of individual concepts.  The 
resultant centrality scores are therefore measures of the relative dominance of 
concepts in the whole model.   
Despite the utility of these two techniques to focus the analysis of a cognitive map, 
the examination of a large map [typically 30-120 nodes from a single one-hour 
interview (Eden, Ackermann et al., 1992: 310)] may nonetheless be a daunting task.  
As all the maps resulting from the interviews of this research fell into this category, 
another technique in addition to the two already discussed was used to facilitate the 
analysis process.   
Termed ‘stripping’, this technique involves a process that enables a conceptual map 
to be collapsed to its barest elements by eliminating (hence the term ‘stripping’) all 
concepts in the map that have no branched explanations or consequences.  These 
concepts only serve to further elaborate the argumentation of the model and, once 
removed, enable the researcher to more easily identify, and at a macro-level, the 
key chains of argument.  Domain and central analysis can also be performed at this 
level of detail and a comparison of the most dominant concepts that are returned 
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 both when the map is ‘stripped’, and when it is not, can help determine the level of 
importance of concepts at progressive levels of conceptual complexity. 
Switching between the stripped and un-stripped model of the cognitive map also 
helps to focus analysis at the level of clusters mentioned above.  In certain 
instances, this enables clusters to be broken-down into further groups of composite 
concepts that, while still related to the overall theme of the cluster, manifest different 
variations of the same theme.  The formation of specific groups of concepts as sub-
elements of the clusters represent families of concepts that share similar 
characteristics and, in relation to this research, represent classes of factors that are 
perceived to influence failure or success in policy implementation.  These sub-
elements are what constitute ‘factor-categories’.  In some instances, the concepts 
that compose a factor-category may have different ‘properties’, each of which 
denotes a different aspect of that specific class of factors.  An example from one of 
the interviews will serve to illustrate this point. 
An analysis of the cognitive map of Interviewee 67 revealed three clusters of 
concepts each representing a particular theme.  One of the clusters pertained to the 
interviewee’s perception on the need of “a human system” guiding the 
implementation of policy.  Further analysis allowed the concepts in the cluster to be 
divided into two groups each representing a somewhat different variation of the 
same theme.  The first pertained to the interviewee’s perception on the need for 
management to draw employees to participate in the planning and implementation 
of policy.  The second reflects the interviewee’s perception of the need for 
management to involve itself in the activities performed by their subordinates in the 
implementation of policy.  The two factor-categories were therefore labelled 
‘employee participation’ and ‘management involvement’.  In turn, the interviewee 
approached the principle of employee participation from two angles.  One related to 
the need for participation to ensure the application of “just” policies, while the other 
concerned the need for participation as a means to an end.  The properties of this 
factor-category could be fairness and deviousness respectively.  In this case, both 
are seen to have the potential to overcome, or limit the possibility of, failure in policy 
implementation, albeit in different ways. 
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 While each of the eight (8) interviews23 were analysed using the same techniques 
mentioned above, and following the operational logic mentioned, not all clusters 
were necessarily broken-down into multiple factor-categories.  Similarly, factor-
categories did not necessarily exhibit multiple properties. 
The resultant factor-categories per interviewee are listed in Table 3 and a detailed 
explanation of the rationale leading to the elicitation of these categories per 
interviewee is included in Appendix 8.  Figure 8 below summarises the elicited 
factor-categories per interviewee group, highlighting similarities and differences by 
distributing the elicited factors in sets across a Venn diagram.   
Figure 8 – Factor-Categories by Interviewee Group 
Context
Role Execution
Goal Alignment
Political Intervention
Role Fragmention
Resistance
Administrative Will
Political Will
Control
Cooperation
Ownership
Conditioning
Political Maturity
Collegiality
Power
Planning
Participation
Grp Dynamic
Trust
Cloning
Org. Politics
Customisation
Customs
Capabilities
Accountability
Leadership
Politicians
ConsultantsCivil Servants
 
Source: Compiled by Author 
                                            
23  As mentioned earlier, one of the interviews had to be concluded abruptly and could not be replaced by 
interviewing another individual. 
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 4.0 Summary and Conclusions 
As one may have expected, some of the factor-categories elicited from the 
interviews are unique to specific individuals, while others are either common 
between all eight interviewees or similar to one another.   
To arrive at a consolidated framework of factors influencing failure in policy 
implementation, it was necessary to compare and contrast the results of the 
individual interviews to draw out similarities, or differences, in the elicited factor-
categories and their corresponding properties and dimensions.  This was done in a 
two-stepped approach. 
The first was to reduce the data of each individual interview by isolating, from the 
corresponding cognitive map, the factor-categories elicited by the interviewee and 
their corresponding properties and dimensions (see Charts in Appendix 9).  The 
second step involved the grouping of these results into a consolidated list of factor-
categories, properties and dimensions.  This presents the sum total of all the issues 
identified by interviewees to have led to failure in the considered example of policy 
implementation. 
Figure 9 presents a chart of the consolidated results of the reduced cognitive maps, 
illustrating the elicited factor-categories (denoted in a circle), their respective 
properties and dimensions, and the causal relationships between them.   
The properties and dimensions have been divided into three groups – Enablers, 
denoted by the letter ‘E’; Inhibitors, denoted by the letter ‘I’; and Derivatives, 
denoted by the letter ‘D’.  Enablers are those properties (or aspects) of a factor that 
‘trigger’ or catalyse the manifestation of that factor.  Inhibitors, are those properties 
of a factor that ‘restrain’ or hinder a factor from occurring, while derivatives are those 
properties of a factor that are consequential to its occurrence.   
The numbers in square brackets refer to the identification key of the interview from 
which the factor-category and property/dimensions were derived.   
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 The significance of dividing the properties and dimensions into three groups is two-
fold.  First, it helps facilitate the separation of those things influencing failure that can 
be controlled by policy implementers (enablers/inhibitors) from those that cannot be 
controlled by them (derivatives).  Efforts can therefore be channelled where they are 
most effective.  Secondly, by separating ‘enablers’ from ‘inhibitors’, policy 
implementers can distinguish between those aspects that need to be avoided, and 
those things that need to be encouraged, in order to prevent failure. 
All of the factor-categories illustrated in Figure 9 have the potential to influence 
failure in policy implementation.  However, some factor-categories are more 
significant than others because besides influencing failure in their own right, they 
also influence the occurrence of other factors, thereby potentially compounding the 
problem.   Multiple ‘routes’ leading to failure are therefore possible.   
Figure 10 contains the same information illustrated in Figure 9.  However, the 
information is presented in a way that is intended to illustrate a hierarchical order of 
causal relationships between factor-categories.  In this figure, factor-categories are 
shown in double-edged boxes, while their properties and dimensions are shown in 
single-edged boxes.  The solid arrows indicate that each factor-category 
independently influences failure.  The dotted arrows indicate a relationship between 
two or more factor-categories and their properties and dimensions.  The type of 
relationship is denoted by the letter ‘E’, if it enables or amplifies the occurrence of 
that factor, or by the letter ‘I’, if it inhibits the factor from occurring. 
The utility of Figure 10 is that it provides a ‘road map’ of the factors that are 
perceived to have influenced failure in the implementation of the financial reform 
programme.  The most ‘dangerous route’ followed is probably the one represented 
by the tallest chain of argumentation in the map (that starting with ‘Cloning’).   Low, 
rather than high mobility in management turnover, coupled with a practice of 
internal, rather than external promotions, influenced failure by causing the ‘cloning’ 
of management behaviour and the replication of past failures.  This practice also 
catalysed the formation of ‘customs’ and the propagation of old habits, which in turn 
had a ‘conditioning’ effect on people’s attitudes, leading to ‘resistance’ and ‘dis-
ownership’ of the policy. 
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 To complete the road map, it is also important to consolidate the results obtained 
from the interviews with those derived from the documentary research.  Once again, 
a number of similarities exist between the two data sets.  Some factor-categories 
and their properties/dimensions are common, others are similar, and others still are 
different.  Table 4 highlights these similarities and differences, and illustrates how 
they have been treated. 
Figure 11 presents the updated ‘road map’ to failure, after the factor-categories, 
properties and dimensions from the documentary data were merged with those 
derived from the interviews. 
Text in blue colour refers to those factor-categories and/or properties and 
dimensions that were found to be common to both interview and documentary data.  
Text in red colour refers to those factor-categories and/or properties and dimensions 
that were unique to the documentary data set, while that in black is unique to the 
data derived from the interviews 
 
Figure 11 concludes the results of this phase of the study.  It addresses the 
research question by (1) identifying what factors curtailed the effective 
implementation of this policy, and (2) by examining how the factors influenced 
failure, both at an individual and collective level. 
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 Summary of Part 2 
Part 2 summarises the findings and conclusions of the first stage of the research 
programme intended to explore the issues influencing the implementation of public 
policy in Malta.  Specifically, this stage of the research focused on identifying the 
factors that influenced the failed implementation of a Cabinet policy decision that 
was aimed at reforming the financial management framework of Government.   
The research paradigm was based upon an interpretivist philosophy and adopted an 
inductive approach based upon the application of case study research.  Data was 
collected through both documentary research and personal interviews held with the 
key players involved in the implementation of the policy under review.  Data analysis 
was qualitatively driven.  Documentary evidence was analysed following the 
procedural norms of data codification as proposed by Strauss and Corbin (1998), 
while the data derived from the interviews were analysed following the application of 
cognitive mapping techniques as outlined by Wrightson (1976) and modified by Huff 
et al. (1990).  Twenty-six (26) factors were identified to have influenced the failed 
outcome of this policy initiative and the inter-relationships of the factors were 
‘mapped’ to illustrate a hierarchical order of causal relationships between them.  
While all the factors played a different and important role, the three factors that all 
classes of stakeholders agreed were missing or ineffective were accountability, 
leadership and competent policy implementors. 
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 Overview of Part 3 
Part 3 of the thesis discusses the second project of the research.  It is essentially 
identical to Part 2, except that rather than exploring a failed policy initiative, it 
focuses on a case study of successful policy implementation.  The study is also 
presented in four Chapters.   
Chapter 1 introduces the purpose and objectives of the project, and defines the 
meaning of successful policy implementation in the context of this research.   
Given that Project 2 replicated the methodology followed in the first project, Chapter 
2 does not repeat the research procedure that was followed.  Instead, the focus of 
the discussion is on those aspects of the study that were different from the first 
project – that is, the rationale behind the selected case study and the data sources 
used. 
Chapter 3 discusses the policy that was used as the subject of the case study (the 
introduction of a system of Local Government, through the establishment of Local 
Councils, and a Department for Local Councils), distinguishing between the political 
objectives that this policy decision sought to achieve, and the actual objectives 
relating to its implementation.  It is the latter, not the former, that the study sought to 
examine. 
The findings of the study are discussed in Chapter 4, which highlights the factors 
perceived to influence the successful outcome of the policy’s implementation.  As in 
the first project, these factors were derived from both documentary evidence and 
interviews with the key persons involved in the policy’s implementation.  The 
Chapter concludes by presenting a consolidated ‘road map’ of success, that 
illustrates what factors were considered (according to the evidence) to influence the 
successful implementation of the policy decision, and the manner in which these 
factors affected success. 
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 1.0 Overall Purpose and Project Objectives 
This part of the thesis presents the findings and conclusions of the second Phase of 
the DBA research programme.  It explores the issues influencing the implementation 
of public policy in Malta by examining a case of successful policy implementation. 
In the context of this research, a case of successful policy implementation was 
defined as one in which the strategic action adopted by the administrative arm of 
Government is considered to have delivered the intended policy and achieved the 
intended outcomes. 
The project was guided by two primary objectives:  to identify what issues or factors 
led to success in the implementation of the policy under review, and to examine how 
the identified issues influence success, so that a framework that gives context and 
meaning to these factors can eventually be developed. 
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 2.0 Methodology 
The methodology adopted in this part of the research follows the same operational 
logic as that of Project 1.  The research paradigm, methods and procedures 
followed in Project 2 are identical to those adopted in the first project, as explained 
in Part 2.  
The differences that exist lie in terms of the actual example of policy implementation 
that featured as the case study for this part of the research, and the data sources 
used.  These are explained in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 below. 
2.1 Selecting the Case Study for Project 2 
The selection of an example of successful policy implementation followed the same 
steps as those followed for the selection of an example of failure for the case study 
in Project 1.  Indeed, the examples of successful policy implementation that could be 
used as the case study for Project 2 had been elicited during the same interviews 
held with the objective of identifying a case study of failure for Project 1 (see pages 
44 to 46). 
Two of the examples of successful policy implementation that had been mentioned 
by each interviewee were identical.  Both examples concerned Cabinet decisions 
taken in the early 1990s and concerned the development of the necessary 
legislative, institutional and operational frameworks leading to (1) the introduction of 
Value Added Taxation (VAT) and the establishment of a VAT Department, and (2) 
the introduction of a system of Local Government, through the establishment of 
Local Councils, and a Department for Local Councils. 
After considering both examples, it was decided that the policy decision regarding 
the introduction of Local Government would be selected for the second case study.  
This policy was chosen because: 
1. more documentation was available on this policy decision than that regarding 
VAT; 
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 2. most of the persons who were involved in managing the implementation of this 
policy were known by the researcher and this, therefore, increased the 
probability of appointments for interviews; and 
3. the subject matter is still current today, with new initiatives being in the pipeline 
for the introduction of a system of Regional Government. 
2.2 Data Sources 
As with Project 1, two methods of data collection were used in this phase of the 
study; namely, documentary research and interviews. 
In addition to the documentary sources of information mentioned in page 41, the 
documentation reviewed for Project 2 also included Parliamentary Debates and a 
White Paper on the subject of the policy decision being studied.  There was no such 
documentation relevant to the example of policy implementation examined in Project 
1. 
As regards primary data collection, interviews were targeted with Politicians, Civil 
Servants and Consultants so that the same approach followed in Project 1 would 
also be replicated in this phase of the research (see pages 46 to 53).  Following the 
same logic presented in Project 1, an equivalent number of persons from each 
group of ‘actors’ should have been selected so as to overcome, or minimise, any 
potential bias in the identification of issues contributing to success.  While this was 
achieved in Project 1, it was not possible in Project 2 because there were only eight 
(8) persons who were directly involved in the implementation of this particular policy 
and who were really key to its success.  Four (4) of these were Consultants, three 
(3) were Civil Servants, and the last one (1) was a Politician.  All the identified 
interviewees were contacted for appointments and, fortunately, all accepted to be 
interviewed. 
Prior to each meeting, interviewees were sent a brief paper (see Appendix 10) 
outlining: 
o the purpose of the research; 
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 o the research methodology; 
o the process followed in selecting the policy for the case study of success; 
o a brief overview of the policy decision and implementation programme that 
would be discussed during the interview; and 
o the purpose of the interview and the proposed approach. 
2.3 Reliability and Validity 
As with Project 1 of the research, one of the criticisms that this phase may 
encounter is that it adopted a methodology that was only tested with one example, 
or case study, of successful policy implementation.   
Again, this may score low in terms of the study’s reliability and external validity.  
However, as with Project 1 of the research, considerable rigour was followed in 
determining and documenting every step and operation of the data collection and 
analysis process.  The protocol of procedures established in Project 1 was 
meticulously followed and could be easily repeated by other researchers.  Use of the 
custom-built database once again ensures that all documents used during the study 
can be easily traced.  Furthermore, the analysis of the causal maps derived from 
each interview followed a sequential and reported logic and operation that can be 
easily replicated by other researchers using the same data set.  The ability to create 
an audit trail of the procedures followed and a chain of evidence should therefore 
increase the study’s reliability (Yin, 1994: 98).   
While the adoption of a single case study methodology limits the possibility of 
generalising the results obtained beyond the strict domain of this example, such 
generalisation was never the intention of this phase of the project.  Indeed, the 
object was to explore and develop an understanding of why a particular case of 
policy was successfully implemented as intended, so as to obtain a data set for 
comparing the results with the contrasting case of failure examined earlier in the first 
phase of the research (i.e., Project 1), and to draw similarities and differences with 
comparable information in the literature.  As shall be explained later, this 
comparison shall constitute the first part of the study to be undertaken in the next 
phase of the research. 
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In contrast to the aforesaid, the strongest aspects of the research methodology 
probably pertain to its internal and construct validity. 
By following the tried and tested protocols of the causal mapping technique for 
analysing the interviews, it can be objectively stated that any inferences derived 
therefrom reflect the original perceptions and frame of mind of the interviewees.  
One possible cause for criticism in this respect lies in the codification of concepts 
derived from the documentary sources of evidence, as these were subject to the 
researcher’s interpretation and could not be validated by the original author(s) of the 
documents.  However, as with the causal mapping protocol, the original wording 
contained in the documents was used during the coding process, and every concept 
was clearly referenced to establish authenticity.  Furthermore, method triangulation 
should itself increase the internal validity of this phase of the study by counter-
balancing the strengths and weaknesses of the different methods employed 
(Easterby-Smith, Thorpe et al., 1991: 133).   
On the other hand, the construct validity of this phase of the research is primarily a 
function of the operational measures established to overcome elements of 
subjectivity in data collection.  The use of multiple sources of evidence was 
deliberate so that, to the extent possible, bias from a single source is overcome 
through evidence obtained from other sources (Yin, 1994: 90).  Besides relying upon 
both secondary and primary sources of information, the study was also based upon 
various types of different documents and records prepared by different people, from 
different backgrounds and, likely, with different interests.  Similarly, a cross-section 
of persons from different backgrounds were also interviewed so as to overcome 
elements of bias.  The construct validity of the study should also be reflected in the 
ability to clearly establish and record a chain of evidence supporting the achieved 
results (Yin, 1994: 34), although this could have been further strengthened if the 
research had been conducted with the assistance of other researchers.  Once 
again, this was not possible because of confidentiality agreements.  Nonetheless, it 
should be noted that when the cognitive maps were shared with interviewees, no 
alterations were requested. 
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3.0 Background to the Selected Case Study 
In order to gain a better appreciation of the elements influencing the research issue, 
it is pertinent to outline the main events that led to the development of the policy 
under review.  A brief overview of the context and reasons for which the policy was 
developed, and, the operational structure within which it was managed and 
implemented, are presented below. 
3.1 Historical Development and Context of Local Government 
The concept of local government has a long history in the socio-political and cultural 
development of Maltese society.   
The first form of local government can be traced back to the introduction of the 
Italian ‘commune’ system when the Maltese islands formed part of the Kingdom of 
the Two Sicilies.  This system was somewhat devalued with the arrival of the 
Knights of St. John in the 16th Century, who were very careful to ensure their 
retention and administration of power.   
The second ‘wave’ of local government can be traced to the French occupation of 
the islands, when Napoleon, through a proclamation dated 13th June 1798, ordered 
the division of Malta and Gozo into a number of cantons, each one to be 
administered by a municipal body composed of five (5) members (Schiavone, 1994: 
1).  These were short-lived as, in 1800, the administration of the Maltese Islands fell 
under the command of the British empire. 
Between 1801 and 1896, other forms of local government were established.  Most 
notably, during the period 1852 and 1857, was the introduction of a number of 
district councils by the then Governor Sir William Reid.   
During the early to mid 1900s, the British administration was eager to maintain full 
control of Malta, due to its strategic location as a staging post for the trade route to 
the East and, later, as a major military base for its Navy.  Due to this and the policy 
of centralised administration that followed, the concept of local government lost 
some of its momentum. 
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The movement for local government re-appeared with the establishment of Civic 
Councils between the late 1950s and early 1970s, followed later, with the 
development of voluntary Resident's Associations (Government of Malta, 1992: 8).  
In both cases, the principal objective of these organisations was to sustain and 
improve community life by keeping local customs and cultural activities alive, and by 
ensuring the protection of historical monuments and buildings that characterised the 
history of a town or village.  However, the capacity of such organisations to achieve 
this objective was limited due to the absence of legislation that formally recognised 
and legitimised their existence, as well as the lack of human and financial resources 
to sustain their activities. 
Recognising the strong sense of belonging and distinctiveness that the Maltese feel 
towards their hometown or village, political attention was given to this perceived 
need in the early 1980s.  In the run-up to the 1981 general elections, both major 
political Parties made reference to the need for developing concrete policies for the 
promotion of local administration in their respective electoral manifestos.  However, 
it was the Nationalist Party that specifically proposed that: 
“a Nationalist Government, in accordance with its proposed plan to decentralise the exercise 
of administrative power wherever possible, will, after taking soundings of public opinion in the 
various districts of the Maltese Islands, set up Local Councils” (Nationalist Party, 1981: 18). 
Notwithstanding that this perceived need was also recognised by the Labour Party, 
no particular action was taken by the Government during the Labour Party’s term in 
Office between 1981 and 1987.   
The establishment of Local Councils again occupied a prominent position in the 
1987 electoral manifesto of the Nationalist Party.   Although not implemented after 
the Party was elected to Office because of other priorities in the vast electoral 
programme (News Reporter, 1992: 1), the political agenda on Local Councils 
continued to develop and a White Paper outlining the principles, form and content 
for the proposed Local Councils was eventually published in January 1992.    
Specifically, it proposed the establishment of Local Councils as a vehicle for the 
decentralisation of power and the application of the principle of subsidiarity.   
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General elections were again held in February 1992 and the Nationalist Party was 
again returned to Office.  It was during this term that the current system of local 
government was established in Malta, with the phased introduction of sixty-seven 
(67) Local Councils between November 1993 and May 1994 24. 
3.2 Political Context 
The policy regarding the establishment of a system of local government developed 
at a time when the 1987 Nationalist administration also identified the reform of the 
Public Service as one of its key priorities for ensuring the successful implementation 
of its economic and social programme.  While the two initiatives probably occupied 
equal importance at a political level, it is the reform of the Public Service that 
received the Government’s immediate attention.  
Within a year of being elected, the Government appointed a Public Service Reform 
Commission (PSRC): 
“to examine the organisation of the Public Service, and to recommend 
means by which the Service can efficiently respond to the changing needs 
for effective government” (Public Service Reform Commission, 1989).   
Concurrently, it also commissioned a Consultant to conduct an ‘Operations Review’ 
of the Public Service so as to: 
“evaluate the existing organisational structures [of the Public Service] in 
light of the government's policy objectives and to recommend appropriate 
delineations, organisational structures and mandates; and 
develop a suitable Information Technology plan which will identify needs, 
opportunities and cost/benefits for the application of computer technology 
where applicable" (Tabone, 1988: 5). 
                                            
24 Today, there are sixty-eight (68) Local Councils in Malta and Gozo. 
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The findings and conclusions reached by the Public Service Reform Commission 
and by the Operations Review complemented one another.  The problems with the 
Civil Service were identified as being wide and far-reaching and were defined as 
being both of a political and operational/organisational nature.   
To introduce the vast program of reform contemplated in the above-mentioned 
reports, the Government organised itself to establish an operational set-up to 
oversee, direct and implement the various policy decisions that were required. 
One of the decisions undertaken in this regard was the establishment of the 
Management Systems Unit (MSU), within the Office of the Prime Minister.  This 
decision later turned out to be instrumental for the successful implementation of the 
Government’s policy concerning the introduction of local government. 
MSU was composed of a number of local and expatriate professionals, and was 
tasked with the responsibility for facilitating the ambitious reform programme.  By 
providing expert advice in the various disciplines of management, MSU was to 
develop and implement new human resource management, financial management 
and technology management policies, and assist in the development of human 
resource management capacities in departments (Public Service Reform 
Commission, 1990: 10).  As such, it was expected to fulfil a consultancy/advisory 
role, as well as to act as facilitator for the project management of administrative 
reform initiatives. 
The Government also established a Cabinet Committee on Reform to provide 
direction to, and oversee, the implementation of all Public Service Reform initiatives.   
A number of reform programmes were undertaken between mid-1989 and 1992.  
Most of these were intended to address those areas that were considered to require 
urgent attention and that could produce early, positive results for the reform 
initiative.  One of these was the restructuring of the Works Division of what later 
became known as the Ministry for the Environment.  This reform was a critical step 
for the introduction of local government, as road maintenance, street cleaning and 
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similar activities were identified as the primary functions that could be devolved in 
the phased introduction of a system of local government 25. 
3.3 Local Government Policy – Political Objectives 
The Government’s policy on local administration was made public through a White 
Paper published on the 10th January 1992.  The White Paper clearly articulated the 
rationale behind this policy initiative and the objectives that the Government aimed 
to achieve. 
As hinted in the title of the White Paper itself – ‘Local Councils: the citizen closer to 
power’26 – the principal aim behind the introduction of a system of local government 
was to provide a recognised and structured mechanism and framework that would 
provide citizens with greater access to, and control over, power.   
Drawing upon its own political beliefs, the Government identified three key 
objectives for this policy initiative: 
1. Subsidiarity – premised on the belief that decisions should not be taken at a 
high level whenever they can be taken by an authority at a lower level that is 
closer to the people to be directly affected by such decisions.  As such, the 
introduction of local government was a measure that would devolve power and 
control over resources from the domain of central Government, to the hands of 
citizens. 
2. Democratisation – the introduction of a system of local administration was to 
provide a further impetus to the democratisation of Government, so that private 
citizens would not need to depend upon the personal intervention of Ministers 
or Members of Parliament to ensure that their local needs are properly 
addressed. 
                                            
25 Source:  Interview with former MSU Consultant and Project Manager for the ‘Operations Review of the Works 
Division’. 
26 The White Paper was published in the Maltese language.  Its exact title was – ‘Kunsilli Lokali: Ic-cittadin 
jersaq izjed lejn il-poter’. 
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3. Depolarisation – based on the need to broaden and enrich discussions of the 
nation’s resources beyond the agendas of the two main political parties.  A 
system of local government would (1) provide individual citizens with the 
opportunity to directly participate in matters of public affairs, and (2) provide 
minority groups that did not command sufficient support for representation in 
Parliament, with the opportunity of sharing in public administration at local level. 
Considering that the concept of Local Councils had featured in electoral manifestos 
for over a decade, the White Paper was perceived as a concrete step towards the 
establishment of a system of local government - a perception that was further 
strengthened by the fact that the White Paper was published on the eve of a general 
election.   
Although the basic principles upon which it was premised obtained general support, 
a number of issues arose pertaining to the scope, composition, functions, 
obligations and resourcing of Local Councils.  These became the focus of a healthy 
public debate and, after being returned to Office in February 1992, the Government 
organised itself to handle the response received and to prepare the ground for the 
effective implementation of this policy initiative. 
3.4 Local Government Policy – Objectives for Implementation 
Although the policy initiative originated as an offshoot of an Operations Review of 
the Works Division in the Ministry for the Environment, following the 1992 elections, 
the Government decided to transfer ownership and responsibility for this programme 
to the portfolio of the Office of the Prime Minister.   
Specific political responsibility for managing, monitoring and controlling its 
implementation was immediately entrusted to the Personal Assistant to the Prime 
Minister who, since the Party’s election to Office in 1987, had been heavily involved 
in the development of Government policy and regarded as the Prime Minister’s 
mouthpiece and executive arm 27. 
                                            
27 Source:  Interview Document # 149, discussed later. 
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The Management Systems Unit Limited was requested to appoint a Project 
Manager to develop and co-ordinate the technical aspects of this policy initiative 
and facilitate its implementation.  MSU’s involvement increased over time, to an 
extent that, by 1993, some fifty (50) people (both MSU personnel and Civil Servants 
on secondment) were deployed on the project. 
Administrative responsibility for the initiative, from a Public Service viewpoint, 
was entrusted to the Director General in the Office of the Prime Minister. 
Considerable detailed technical preparation was required to lead to the 
establishment of Local Councils and the project was therefore divided into a number 
of discrete but inter-related sub-projects to reflect the terms of reference with which 
the initiative was established (Appendix 11).  In essence, these activities 
constituted the objectives of the implementation programme, as summarised below: 
Activity Objective/Undertaking 
1. Locality Boundaries To determine the geographical boundaries between 
Local Councils.   
This required tracing the traditional borders of 
Malta’s towns and villages, and culminated in the 
plotting and digitising of these boundaries onto 
existing high quality digital base maps. 
2. Functions To determine what role the Local Councils would 
fulfil and how they would do it. 
This required the identification of those activities 
which, until then, had been performed by central 
government agencies but which would slowly be 
devolved to Local Councils. 
3. Migration Plan To determine a staged implementation for the 
transfer of responsibility from central Government to 
Local Councils. 
This required the preparation of a phased 
implementation programme for the functions 
identified above, that included the identification of 
organisational and resourcing requirements, the 
preparation of supporting administrative material 
(such as guidelines, procedures manuals etc.), 
training programmes, communication campaigns 
etc. 
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4. Funding To determine an appropriate basis to guide the 
funding of Local Councils and ensure fairness and 
equity in the distribution of funds by central 
government. 
This required the development of a funding formula 
based on variables such as the locality’s area and 
population, special needs etc. as well as extensive 
discussion/negotiation sessions to ensure perceived 
fairness and equity. 
5. Contract Preparation To prepare template contract agreements on the 
basis of which Local Councils would outsource the 
delivery of activities/functions. 
This required the collection of large amounts of 
demographic and physical information about each 
locality.  As most of this information was not readily 
available at the time, it required the application of 
extensive work in the areas of work measurement, 
unit costs, work methods etc. and the development 
of geographical information systems. 
6. Regulations and 
Procedures 
To determine an appropriate regulatory and 
operational framework for Local Councils to ensure 
the effective execution of their functions. 
This required the preparation of a comprehensive 
package of regulations, procedures, guidelines and 
computerised templates, which documentation 
covered areas such as finance, audit, tendering, 
complaints handling, officer procedures etc. 
Another identified requisite for this initiative was the establishment of a Department 
of Local Councils to assist Local Councils in the initial phases of their introduction, to 
co-ordinate their activities, and to supervise the development of the policy initiative.  
However, this task was not established as an objective of the project as outlined in 
the Table above. 
The project objectives/terms of reference, as outlined above, were implemented 
between 1992 and 1994.  MSU’s support to both the policy initiative and, eventually, 
to the Department of Local Councils, continued beyond that period, albeit at 
progressively reducing intensity.  Today, the Management Efficiency Unit, MSU’s 
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successor, also provides ad hoc consultancy support to the Department of Local 
Councils. 
The major events and activities that occurred during the project’s development 
between 1992 and 1994 are summarised in Figure 12 below. 
Figure 12 – Event Time Line 
Concept of 'Local Councils' appears for the first time in the electoral manifesto of the Nationalist Party.1981
1987 'Local Councils' again feature in the electoral manifesto of the Nationalist Party.
The Nationalist Party is elected to Office after 16 years in Opposition.
1989 Government launches administrative reform programme for the Public Service
   -  Operations Review of the Works Division, a major activity of the reform programme.
1992 [Jan] Publication of White Paper on Local Councils
[Feb] General Elections - Nationalist Party returned to Office for second consecutive term.
Terms of Reference established.
Appointment of a 'Steering Committee' composed of the PA to the PM (political champion);
the Director General Administration (Public Service champion); and the MSU Project 
Manager (technical champion).
Appointment of MSU Project Team.
[Mar] Incubation / Launch of Implementation Programme.  Focus of Key Activities:
-  analyse White Paper / public comments
-  develop political framework, prepare legislative brief and seek Cabinet approval
-  develop operational / organisational framework and comprehensive project plan
1993 Focus of Key Activities of Implementation Programme:
-  definition of funding formula; preparation of technical documentation; drafting of
   financial procedures, operating manuals and guidelines; development of
   migration plan for services to be transferred from Departments to Local Councils;
   establishment of training programmes; formulation of communications strategy;
   finalisation of Bill and subsidiary regulations.
[Jun] Department of Local Councils established.
[Jul] Enactment of Local Councils Act.
[Nov] First Elections of Local Councils (12 established).
1994 [Jan- Elections for establishment of remaining Local Councils (55).
Mar]
Focus of Key Activities of Implementation Programme:
- support to the Department of Local Councils; application, use and modification
  of documentation; training of councillors, secretaries and staff; establishing and
  equipping offices; support to Local Councils in contract management.
1995
-
1996
Focus of Key Activities:
- continued migration of functions from Departments to Local Councils; ad hoc
  support to the Department of Local Councils; administrative, financial and
  technical support to Local Councils.
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4.0 Results/Findings 
4.1 Results of Documentary Research 
An archival search for documentary sources of information returned several 
documents that were somehow related to the selected case of policy 
implementation.  One hundred and three records (103) were short-listed as possible 
key documents and logged into the purpose-built database (see page 56).  Table 5 
below provides a break-down of these records by type of document. 
Table 5: Key Records by ‘Type’ of Document 
Type of Document Number of 
Records 
Reports 42 
Parliamentary Debates/Questions 14 
Memoranda 11 
Newspaper Articles 11 
Letters 7 
Correspondence Files 7 
Legislation 5 
Minutes of Meetings 5 
Presentations 1 
The records identified above were examined in detail and any statements contained 
in them that identified factors affecting the successful implementation of policy were 
highlighted and subsequently recorded in the database.  In general, the statements 
were of one of two types.  They were either retrospective, having been extracted 
from records that provided an account of some past event, or they were forward-
looking, having been extracted from records that were planning some future event.  
Furthermore, some of the latter records occasionally referred to issues that were to 
be avoided to prevent failure.  These statements were considered to be equally 
important for the analysis as they reflected the polar end of some success factor. 
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The statements derived from the records echoed the perceptions or concepts that 
various individuals felt were influencing the policy implementation process.  Despite 
the large number of documents that were examined, only a total of thirty-seven (37) 
concepts were identified from twelve (12) of the records mentioned above.  Twenty-
eight (28) concepts were derived from six (6) Reports, four (4) concepts from two (2) 
Letters, three (3) concepts from three (3) Memoranda, and two (2) concepts from 
the Minutes of one (1) meeting. 
The reason for such limited results cannot be determined with accuracy, but at least 
two observations are possible.  Firstly, people may tend to criticise failure more than 
they laud success and, as such, the reasons behind success may go unaccounted 
for.  Secondly, the methodology that was followed required the coding of concepts 
from statements that made direct reference to success (or failure).  Had this protocol 
not been followed, a number of other statements would have been captured, but the 
derivation of concepts therefrom would not have been as objective as the research 
requires.   
Despite the possible subjectivity in these observations it was noted that the 
documentation seemed to place considerable emphasis on the following factors: (1) 
clarity of direction, as evidenced in the on-going quest to update and refine the 
project’s vision and terms of reference; (2) strong leadership and focused 
ownership, as evidenced by the choice of establishing a small project team 
composed of political, administrative and technical ‘champions’; (3) clarity of roles, 
as evidenced by the distinct terms of reference established for each member of the 
team; (4) strong and sustained commitment, as evidenced through the deployment 
of a large number of resources and the holding of un-interrupted weekly meetings 
throughout the entire life cycle of the project (two years); (5) comprehensive 
planning, as evidenced through extensive research activities and the establishment 
of detailed plans; and (6) extensive consultation with numerous stakeholders, as 
evidenced through the communication plans and activities that were rolled out 
throughout the entire process. 
More objectively, the identification and analysis of the thirty-seven concepts (37) 
mentioned above reflected the codification principles and techniques developed by 
Strauss and Corbin (1998).   
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The concepts were examined and codified along their dimensions, properties and 
categories.  Thirteen (13) factor-categories were identified exhibiting, in total, 
eighteen (18) different properties and twenty (20) dimensions.  These are listed in 
Table 6 overleaf.  The Table also lists the number of concepts per factor-category, 
property and dimension, and the number of records from where the concepts were 
derived.  A direct quotation from the documentary data is also included to illustrate 
and add meaning to each factor-category, property and dimension. 
If one were to consider the frequency of concepts per factor-category as a measure 
of the latter’s importance or centrality to the policy implementation, as perceived by 
the actors, ‘Planning’, ‘Ownership’ and ‘Personal Capabilities’, would be identified as 
the most dominant factors.  In total, the factor-category ‘Planning’ was cited nine (9) 
times in six (6) different records.  ‘Ownership’ was cited five (5) times in four (4) 
different records, while ‘Personal Capabilities’ was cited three (3) times in three (3) 
different records.   
However, deciding on the centrality of factor-categories merely on the basis of a 
frequency count is somewhat questionable especially when one considers the small 
number of records involved.  An examination of the cause and effect relationships 
between the various concepts would have enriched the findings and provided a 
better means for determining the relative importance of the concepts.  However, 
from the data available, such causal relationships could not be properly determined.   
Given the transparency and traceability of the data collection process, the same 
results should be obtained if the operations of the study are replicated.  It is 
therefore considered safe to state that the study should score relatively high in terms 
of its reliability.  Likewise, its construct validity, at least as measured through the 
establishment of a chain of evidence for the derived results, should also be relatively 
robust.  However, the fact that the content of the data, and the conclusions of the 
codification process, could not be verified by the original authors of the 
documentation (to ascertain that they correctly reflect one’s thoughts and 
perceptions) leaves something to be desired in terms of the analysis of the data and 
the internal validity of the study. 
Table 6:  Results of Documentary Data Codification (Project 2) 
 
Factor-Category Property Dimension No. of 
Concepts 
No. of 
Records 
Quotation from Documents 
Consultation   Reach Broad…Limited 1 1 “…extensive consultation [should] be held with all interested parties” (Doc 137,p.3) 
Degree Extensive…Limited 1 1 “…extensive consultation [should] be held with all interested parties” (Doc 137,p.3) 
Timing Continuous…Inconstant 1 1 “…extensive consultation [should] be held with all interested parties” (Doc 137,p.3) 
Environment (Context) Structure Centralised…Decentralised 1 1 “Introducing Local Government in a country which has had a centrally oriented administration 
for almost two centuries is bound to be a very complex process” (Doc 137,p.1) 
External Support Commitment Consistent…Unsustained 1 1 “MSU’s services to this Department have been a determining factor to the success of the 
subsidiarity exercise” (Doc 119,p.1) 
Management Involvement Commitment Committed…Uncommitted 2 1 “Commitment to the project [must be] generated at the top and communicated to all levels” 
(Doc 137,p.4) 
Managerial Responsibility Scope Focused…Unfocused 1 1 “A measure…which would not only contribute to the success of the project but also focus efforts 
of the various players would be the appointment of a person within OPM whose specific 
responsibility will be the setting up of the Local Government system in accordance with the Bill” 
(Doc 139,p.2). 
Methodology (of Implementation)     Approach Gradual…Abrupt 2 2 “The proposals envisage the transfer of far too much activity and…as drafted are a recipe for 
disaster.” (Doc 132,p.2) 
Approach Correct…Expedient 1 1 ”…it [should] take how much it takes, but we want to do a good job” (Doc 115,p.1) 
Approach Formal (structured)…Informal 1 1 “…the project will be run using formal Project Management techniques” (Doc 137,p.2) 
Organisation   Resourcefulness Adequate…Inadequate 1 1 “Lack of availability of staff from the effected departments / agencies will slow the pace at which 
the project can proceed” (Doc 137,p.4) 
Ownership   Location Internal…External 5 4 “OPM owns this project and MSU are working directly to OPM’s agenda” (Doc 81,p.56) 
Personal Capabilities Proficiency Skilled…Inept 2 2 “…to be done satisfactorily…we propose to train them in work management and work planning 
techniques” (Doc 112) 
Location Internal…Outsourced 1 1 “[the] Chairman stressed that the long-term strategy should be that of developing in-house 
capabilities” (Doc 95,p.2) 
Planning    Approach Customised…Generic 3 2 “…as an important next step, a staged implementation plan should be developed to address the 
issues raised” (Doc 95,p.1) 
Approach Co-ordinated…Unco-ordinated 5 3 “In order for this project to be a success, it should be consistent with the reform process 
currently taking place in Government” (Doc 132,p.5) 
Detail Thorough…Superficial 1 1 “Introducing Local Government in a country which has had a very centrally oriented 
administration…requires very careful planning and preparation” (Doc 137,p.1) 
Political Involvement Commitment Committed…Uncommitted 2 1 “Commitment to the project [must be] generated at the top and communicated to all levels” 
(Doc 137,p.4) 
Results    Timeliness Early…Late 2 2 “Critical early implementation [of the Local Councils Department is] essential to realize effective 
coordination” (Doc 82,p.36) 
Role Delineation Clarity Clear…Unclear 3 3 “Each project team member will be assigned clear and specific duties” (Doc 137,p.2) 
    
    
    
    
   
    
    
 
 
Legend:  
 
Category     = Class of Factors/Issues influencing success/failure of policy implementation 
Property      = Aspect of a Class of Factors/Issues 
Dimensions = Polar ends of a particular Aspect of a Class of Factors/Issues 
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In view of this, it is felt that while the results of this part of the study can be 
considered to be indicative of both the situation prevailing at the time and the 
general issues and events that influenced the implementation of the local councils 
policy, they cannot be considered as conclusive findings.   
As such, the results of the documentary analysis have been treated more as a 
‘backdrop’ to the interviews that followed in the second part of the study’s data 
collection and analysis process, rather than as a ‘filter’ for identifying areas to guide 
and focus the proceedings of these interviews.  Indeed, the interviews were 
approached as though no prior analysis of any kind had been made.  They were 
intentionally left unstructured so as not to direct or influence the interviewees to 
necessarily discuss any particular categories that were obtained from the 
documentary analysis. 
The results and findings of the interviews are summarised in the following section. 
4.2 Results of Interviews 
As mentioned previously, a total of eight (8) semi-structured interviews were 
targeted and held with persons who were key to the policy under review.  Four (4) 
Consultants, three (3) Civil Servants and one (1) Politician were interviewed.  One of 
the interviews had to be stopped shortly after it had commenced because the 
interviewee had to attend another urgent meeting.  Due to this, a second interview 
was scheduled.  The transcript of both interviews were merged together and 
considered as one. 
Table 7 summarises the results of the interviews.  In Project 1, the results had been 
presented per interviewee group.  Given that only one of the interviewees 
represents the politician group in this Project, the protocol established in Project 1 
wherein interviewees were divided by ‘actor’ category was not followed so as to 
protect the person’s identity.  The terms used in the Table are defined in the notes 
below. 
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Table 7 – Results of Interviews 
    Interview     
Interview Reference 
Number 
142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 
Interview Duration 1 hour 1 hour 1 hour 1 hour 1 hour 2 hours 50 minutes 1 hr 40 mins 
 
Total Number of Concepts1 62 92 75 119 110 145 60 95 
Number of Heads2 3 4 2 2 1 3 1 4 
Number of Tails3 17 20 19 37 41 47 26 32 
Link-to-Node Ratio4 1.26:1 1.41:1 1.39:1 1.25:1 1.22:1 1.20:1 1.11:1 1.21:1 
 
Number of Clusters5 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 2 
Number of Factor-
Categories6 
5 8 6 7 6 6 4 6 
List of Factor-Categories Co-operation Enabling 
Support 
Policies 
Context Experience Context Individual 
Qualities 
Commitment Planning 
 Commitment Context Stakeholder 
Involvement 
Management 
Style 
Political Will Collective 
Capabilities 
Skills and 
Capabilities 
Location of 
Responsibility 
 Organisational 
Context 
Values / 
Beliefs 
Planning Values / 
Beliefs 
Location of 
Responsibility 
Attitude Planning Co-ordination 
 Choice of 
Strategy 
Demand Process Political 
Commitment 
Role  
Delineation 
Location of 
Responsibility 
Strategy Trust 
 Resourcing Commitment Resource 
Capabilities 
Networks Skills and 
Capabilities 
Process  Leadership 
  Individual 
Qualities 
Commitment Process Motivation Enthusiasm  Skills and 
Capabilities 
  Collective 
Qualities 
 Attitudes     
  Approach       
1,2,3,4,5,6 See ‘Notes’ on following page. 
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Notes: 
1. A ‘concept’ is defined as an idea or mental image expressed by the interviewee 
in the form of a statement, to describe an issue, event, feeling or experience 
that the interviewee believes can explain a particular phenomenon in relation to 
the research issue.  Concepts are derived from the transcript of the interview 
and represent the interviewee’s own choice of words.   
2.  A ‘head’ is a concept that, in cognitive mapping notation, has no out-going links 
(see Note 4 below) to other concepts in the interviewee’s map.  A head 
represents a terminal concept in a chain of argument and therefore has no 
perceived consequences. 
3. A ‘tail’ is a concept that has no in-coming links from other concepts.  As such, a 
tail has no supporting explanation and represents a starting point in a chain of 
argumentation. 
4. A ‘link’ denotes a relationship between two concepts.  A ‘node’ is the term used 
for the location of a concept in a map (Jenkins and Johnson, 1997: 901).  The 
‘link-to-node’ ratio represents the proportion of links to nodes within any given 
map (Jenkins and Johnson, 1997: 901).   
5. The word ‘cluster’ is used to refer to a group of concepts that share some 
similar topic or theme and that together form a ‘family’ of related ideas. 
6. ‘Factor-categories’ are sub-elements (or sub-groups) of a cluster, and in relation 
to the objective of this research, define classes of factors (or issues) influencing 
success in policy implementation.  They are compatible with the ‘factor-
categories’ derived from the documentary research and illustrated in Table 6. 
The data illustrated in Table 7 were obtained after each interview was transcribed, 
codified and graphically mapped using Decision Explorer 3.1.  While every cognitive 
map is unique to the person interviewed, some comparisons can nonetheless be 
made. 
First, it could be noted that the duration of five of the interviews is identical.  This is a 
coincidence, as interviews did not have a pre-established time limit.  The interviews 
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were only concluded when the interviewee found that there was nothing new or 
more to add to what had already been said.  Experience has shown that the number 
of concepts elicited during an interview is more dependent upon the length of the 
interview and the skills of the interviewer (Eden, Ackermann et al., 1992: 312).  
However, the results obtained in this Project do not seem to support this view.  In 
this regard, a similar conclusion can be drawn to that reached by Project 1; that is, 
there is no immediately apparent relationship between the number of concepts 
elicited during the interviews and their respective durations. 
The absolute number of nodes or concepts in a map, or their ratio per unit of time (of 
the interview) is sometimes used as a measure of cognitive complexity.  However, a 
better indicator is probably the link-to-node ratio, which is understood to suggest 
depth of thinking in consideration of the issue under review.  A higher link-to-node 
ratio indicates a densely connected map and, supposedly, a higher level of cognitive 
complexity (Eden, Ackermann et al., 1992: 313).  The reason behind higher levels of 
complexity cannot be determined from the data but, from observation and with 
hindsight, it was noted that the interviewees with the most densely populated maps 
were those who seemed best prepared for the interview and who had been the most 
involved.  In almost all these cases, the interviewees were guided by written notes 
that they had prepared prior to the interview. 
Another measure of cognitive simplicity or complexity is the ratio of ‘heads’ and 
‘tails’ to ‘nodes’.  Maps with a small number of ‘heads’ indicate a form of idealised 
thinking (Eden, Ackermann et al., 1992) where the interviewee’s concepts are all 
pointing towards a common end or goal.  The opposite applies with a large number 
of ‘heads’ indicating that the interviewee perceives multiple possible consequences 
in relation to the issue being researched.  On the other hand, a large number of 
‘tails’ indicates a flat hierarchy of concepts and a relatively simple hierarchy or chain 
of argumentation. 
However, the purpose of this research is not to establish levels of cognitive 
complexity in relation to a research issue.  The objective is to determine what factors 
are perceived by different individuals to have contributed to success.  Furthermore, 
the study aims to understand whether similarities exist between the factors elicited 
by the different interviewees and, if so, whether they are perceived to manifest 
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themselves in similar or different ways.  Equally important is the need to determine 
whether different ‘groups’ of interviewees (Civil Servants, Consultants and 
Politicians) elicit factors that are similar intra-group, but different between one group 
and another.  These analyses will help establish a better understanding of the ‘gap’ 
between the policy-making and strategy implementation arms of government, which 
information can be used during the third phase of the research to propose a model 
for bridging the ‘politico-administrative divide’. 
Two techniques are widely used for analysing the emergent features of an 
individual’s cognitive map.  The first, called ‘domain analysis’, is a technique 
intended to identify the most dominant concepts in a map by calculating the intensity 
of relationships around concepts in their immediate vicinity.  The higher the number 
of links going into, or flowing out of, a concept, the ‘busier’ the concept is said to be 
and, hence, the higher the probability of it being a key issue.  The advantage of 
running this analysis on a cognitive map (especially one with a high number of 
concepts), is that it allows the researcher to progressively focus on those areas of 
the map that are most densely populated.  In so doing, it also allows the gradual 
identification of ‘clusters’ of concepts that carry similar character or meaning in 
relation to the concepts to which they are inter-related.  Common trends in ideology 
around particular issues can be identified and emerging themes symbolising the 
interviewee’s cognitive process can be elicited. 
Supporting this approach is a second technique called ‘central analysis’.  This 
technique is similar in scope to the domain analysis, but as the name may suggest, 
it is intended to calculate the centrality of concepts in the entire cognitive map, 
rather than in the immediate vicinity of individual concepts.  The resultant centrality 
scores are therefore measures of the relative dominance of concepts in the whole 
model.   
Despite the utility of these two techniques to focus the analysis of a cognitive map, 
the examination of a large map [typically 30-120 nodes from a single one-hour 
interview (Eden, Ackermann et al., 1992: 310)] may nonetheless be a daunting task.  
As all the maps resulting from the interviews of this research fell into this category, 
another technique in addition to the two already discussed was used to facilitate the 
analysis process.   
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Termed ‘stripping’, this technique involves a process that enables a conceptual map 
to be collapsed to its barest elements by eliminating (hence the term ‘stripping’) all 
concepts in the map that have no branched explanations or consequences.  These 
concepts only serve to further elaborate the argumentation of the model and, once 
removed, enable the researcher to identify more easily, and at a macro-level, the 
key chains of argumentation.  Domain and central analysis can also be performed at 
this level of detail and a comparison of the most dominant concepts that are 
returned both when the map is ‘stripped’, and when it is not, can help determine the 
level of importance of concepts at progressive levels of conceptual complexity. 
Switching between the stripped and un-stripped model of the cognitive map also 
helps to focus analysis at the level of clusters mentioned above.  In certain 
instances, this enables clusters to be further brokendown into groups of composite 
concepts that, while still related to the overall theme of the cluster, manifest different 
variations of the same theme.  The formation of specific groups of concepts as sub-
elements of the clusters represent families of concepts that share similar 
characteristics and, in relation to this research, represent classes of factors that are 
perceived to influence success in policy implementation.  These sub-elements are 
what constitute ‘factor-categories’.  In some instances, the concepts that compose a 
factor-category may have different ‘properties’, each of which denotes a different 
aspect of that specific class of factors.  An example from one of the interviews will 
serve to illustrate this point. 
An analysis of the cognitive map of Interviewee 142 revealed three clusters of 
concepts each representing a particular theme.  One of the clusters pertained to the 
interviewee’s perception of the need for ‘effective group dynamics’ to ensure 
successful policy implementation.  Further analysis allowed the concepts in this 
cluster to be divided into two broad groups each representing a somewhat different 
variation of the same theme.  The first pertained to the interviewee’s perception of 
the presence of a strong collaborative relationship among the various members of 
the team designated with the responsibility for driving this initiative.  The second 
group reflected the interviewee’s perception of the presence of a supportive 
environment that was brought to bear upon the policy initiative as a result of a sense 
of dedication from a number of persons/quarters within Government.  The two 
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factor-categories were therefore labelled ‘co-operation’ and ‘commitment’.  In turn, 
the interviewee explained his perception of co-operation from two perspectives.  
One related to the development of a strong, informal personal relationship among 
the members of the implementing team, while the other concerned the availability of 
formal political support for the initiative.  The properties of this factor-category could 
therefore be teamwork and sponsorship respectively.  The dimensions of these 
properties would be ‘informal…formal’ and ‘formal…informal’ respectively.  Both are 
considered to have influenced the successful implementation of the policy under 
review. 
While each of the eight (8) interviews were analysed using the same techniques 
mentioned above, and following the operational logic mentioned, not all clusters 
were necessarily broken down into multiple factor-categories.  Similarly, factor-
categories did not necessarily exhibit multiple properties.   
A detailed explanation of the rationale leading to the elicitation of the factor-
categories listed in Table 7 is included in Appendix 12.  Figure 13 below 
summarises the elicited factor-categories per interviewee group, highlighting 
similarities and differences by distributing the factors in sets within a Venn diagram.   
Figure 13 – Factor-Categories by Interviewee Group 
Demand
Experience
Values / Beliefs
Networks
Management Style
Enabling Support Policies
Individual Qualities
Collective Qualities
Attitudes
Approach
Cooperation
Strategy
Stakeholder Involvement
Resourcing
Resource Capabilities
Political Will
Trust
Leadership
Coordination
Context
Commitment
Process
Motivation/Enthus.
Role Delineation
Loc. of Resp.
Skills &
Capabilities
Planning
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4.3 Summary and Conclusions 
As may have been expected, some of the factor-categories elicited from the 
interviews are unique to specific individuals, while others are either common among 
all eight interviewees or are similar to one another.   
To arrive at a consolidated framework of the factors influencing success in policy 
implementation, it was necessary to compare and contrast the results of the 
individual interviews to draw out similarities, or differences, in the elicited factor-
categories and their corresponding properties and dimensions.  This was done in a 
three-stepped approach as explained below28. 
Step 1 - The data of each individual interview was reduced by isolating, from the 
corresponding cognitive map, the factor-categories elicited by the 
interviewee and their corresponding properties and dimensions (see 
Charts in Appendix 13).   
Step 2 - The factor-categories elicited by each interviewee were grouped into one 
list, organised in alphabetical order, and compared.  Identical factor-
categories were merged together.  Similar factor-categories were 
consolidated and labelled under a common term (see Appendix 14). 
Step 3 - The properties and dimensions (per factor-category) elicited by each 
interviewee were grouped into one list, organised in alphabetical order, 
and compared.  Identical properties and dimensions were merged 
together and the relationship with their respective factor-categories was 
maintained.  This operation was called ‘First Pass Grouping’ (see 
Appendix 15).  Similar properties and dimensions were then reduced 
and consolidated under one heading.  This operation was called ‘Second 
Pass Grouping’ (see Appendix 16). 
                                            
28 The protocol followed in consolidating the interviewees’ factor-categories, properties and dimensions was the 
same as that followed in Project 1.  However, a description of the approach that had been followed had been 
omitted in the Project 1 report. 
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The consolidation of the factor-categories and their corresponding properties and 
dimensions, presents the sum total of all the issues that had been identified by the 
interviewees to have influenced success in the implementation of the considered 
policy. 
Figure 14 presents the same consolidated results but in the form of a single 
reduced cognitive map.  The map illustrates the elicited factor-categories (denoted 
in a circle), their respective properties and dimensions, and the causal relationships 
between them.   
The properties and dimensions have been divided into three groups – Enablers, 
denoted by the letter ‘E’; Inhibitors, denoted by the letter ‘I’; and Derivatives, 
denoted by the letter ‘D’.  Enablers are those properties (or aspects) of a factor that 
‘trigger’ or catalyse the manifestation of that factor.  Inhibitors, are those properties 
of a factor that ‘restrain’ or hinder a factor from occurring, while Derivatives are 
those properties of a factor that are ‘consequential’ to its occurrence.   
The numbers in square brackets refer to the identification key of the interview from 
which the factor-category and property/dimensions were derived – [142,145] would 
therefore mean that the factor-category or property/dimension as the case may be, 
was common in both interviews 142 and 145. 
The significance of dividing the properties and dimensions into three groups is two-
fold.  First, it helps facilitate the separation of those things influencing success that 
can be controlled by policy implementers (enablers/inhibitors) from those that cannot 
be controlled by them (derivatives).  Efforts can therefore be channelled where they 
are most effective.  Secondly, by separating ‘enablers’ from ‘inhibitors’, policy 
implementers can distinguish between those aspects that need to be stimulated, 
and those things that need to be avoided, in order to increase the probability of 
success. 
All of the factor-categories illustrated in Figure 14 have the potential to influence 
success in policy implementation.  However, some factor-categories are more 
significant than others because besides influencing success in their own right, they 
also influence the occurrence of other factors, thereby potentially compounding the 
positive outcome.   Multiple ‘routes’ leading to success are therefore possible.  
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Figure 14 
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Figure 15 contains the same information as that illustrated in Figure 14.  However, 
the information is presented in a way that is intended to illustrate a hierarchical order 
of causal relationships between factor-categories.  In this Figure, factor-categories 
are shown in double-edged boxes, while their properties and dimensions are shown 
in single-edged boxes.  The solid arrows indicate that each factor-category 
independently influences success.  The dotted arrows indicate a relationship 
between two or more factor-categories and their properties and dimensions.  The 
type of relationship is denoted by the letter ‘E’, if it enables or amplifies the 
occurrence of that factor, or by the letter ‘I’, if it inhibits the factor from occurring. 
The utility of Figure 15 is that it provides a ‘road map’ of the factors that are 
perceived to have influenced success in the implementation of the Local Councils 
project.  The most ‘direct route’ to success is probably the one represented by the 
shortest chain of argumentation in the map, for example, ‘Stakeholder Involvement’.  
However, the most influential route is likely to be one that links various factors 
together.  Thus, for example, the decision to locate political responsibility for this 
policy initiative in the Prime Minister’s portfolio, rather than that of another Minister, 
ensured a high, rather than low, commitment from both the political and 
administrative arms of Government, such that the policy could be implemented 
effectively. 
To complete the road map, it is also important to consolidate the results obtained 
from the interviews with those derived from the documentary research.  Once again, 
a number of similarities exist between the two data sets.  Some factor-categories 
and their properties/dimensions are common, others are similar, and others still are 
different.  Table 8 highlights these similarities and differences, and illustrates how 
they have been treated. 
Figure 16 presents the updated ‘road map’ to success, after the factor-categories, 
properties and dimensions from the documentary data were merged with those 
derived from the interviews. 
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Figure 15 
Table 8 – Consolidation of Data from Documentary Research and Interviews 
 
Data as codified from Documentary Sources   Data after consolidation with results from Interviews 
Factor-Category Property Dimension  Factor-Category Property Dimension 
Consultation   Reach Broad…Limited = Stakeholder Involvement Participation Broad…Limited 
Degree Extensive…Limited = Stakeholder Involvement (Degree of) Consultation Extensive…Limited
Timing Continuous…Inconstant  Stakeholder Involvement = (Timing of ) Consultation Long-term…Short-lived 
Environment (Context) Structure Centralised…Decentralised    + Context
External Support Commitment Consistent…Unsustained    = Approach Expert Support High…Low
Management Involvement Commitment Committed…Uncommitted    = Commitment Personal Involvement
Managerial Responsibility Scope Focused…Unfocused = Resourcing Focus Focused…Unfocused 
Methodology (of Implementation) Approach Gradual…Abrupt    = Approach Implementation Staggered…Sudden
Approach Correct…Expedient = Approach Type Effective…Economical
Approach Formal (structured)…Informal + Approach
Organisation       Resourcefulness Adequate…Inadequate = Resourcing Critical Mass Sufficient…Insufficient
Ownership      Location Internal…External NEW
Personal Capabilities Proficiency Skilled…Inept = Personal / Team Attributes Proficiency Skilled…Inept 
 Location Internal…Outsourced = Personal / Team Attributes   Critical Mass Sufficient…Insufficient
Planning       Approach Customised…Generic = Planning Approach Customised…Generic
Approach Co-ordinated…Unco-ordinated Approach= Cooperation (coordination) High…Low
Detail Thorough…Superficial = Planning Detail Thorough…Superficial
Political Involvement Commitment Committed…Uncommitted    = Commitment Personal Involvement High…Low
Results      Timeliness Early…Late NEW
Role Delineation Clarity Clear…Unclear =    Role Delineation Clarity Clea…Unclear
     
   
      
      
     
       
 
 
Notes: ‘=’ means that the Factor-Category/Property/Dimensions emerging from Data Codification is equivalent to Factor-Category/Property/Dimensions notation used for data obtained from the Interviews 
 ‘+’ means that while the Factor-Category emerging from Data Codification has an equivalent in the Interview data, its Property/Dimensions are different and are therefore being added to the results from the Interviews 
  ‘NEW’ means that the Factor-Category emerging from Data Codification has no equivalence in the Interview data 
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Figure 16 
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Text in blue colour refers to those factor-categories and/or properties and 
dimensions that were found to be common to both interview and documentary data.  
Text in red colour refers to those factor-categories and/or properties and 
dimensions that were unique to the documentary data set, while the text in black is 
unique to the data derived from the interviews. 
4.4 Observations 
Figure 16 addresses the research question by (1) identifying what factors led to the 
successful implementation of the policy under review, and (2) by examining how the 
factors influenced success, both at an individual and collective level.  In essence, it 
concludes this phase of the study, although the following observations are also worth 
noting. 
The factors that were identified to have influenced the successful implementation of 
this example of policy can be broadly divided into two classes – people-oriented, and 
process-oriented factors – as illustrated in Figure 17 below. 
Figure 17 – People-oriented vs. Process-oriented Factors of Success 
People-Oriented Process-Oriented 
Attitude
Trust
Enthusiasm
Personal/Team Attributes
Values/Beliefs
Ownership
Leadership
Commitment
Co-operation
Demand 
Context 
Location of Responsibility 
Stakeholder Involvement 
(Use of) Networks 
Approach 
Role Delineation 
Management Style 
(Choice of) Strategy 
Results 
(Effective) Resourcing 
(Effective) Planning 
This classification is significant because it separates those ‘variables’ that can be 
designed and, to a greater or lesser degree, be controlled by policy implementers 
(the process-oriented factors), from those factors that can be influenced by them, but 
that cannot be rationally planned or controlled (people-oriented factors).  Thus, for 
example, decisions on where to ‘locate political responsibility’ for a policy initiative, or 
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to whom to entrust it, can create the necessary framework of accountability that is 
needed to control the likelihood of success.  On the other hand, while the probability 
of success can be improved by motivating the persons involved in the 
implementation of a particular policy, the ability to generate the level of ‘enthusiasm’ 
required to ensure success is finally dependent upon the personal disposition of the 
persons involved in the implementation programme, and their willingness to make 
the initiative a success.  In this sense, while decision-makers can influence their 
motivation, their level of co-operation and commitment to a policy implementation 
initiative can never be planned or controlled.   
A second observation is a perceived sense of hierarchy among the elicited factors.  
While factors were not specifically prioritised or rank-ordered by the interviewees, it 
is nonetheless possible to identify relationships among the factors that would 
suggest different levels of importance in terms of how the factors are perceived to 
influence success.  The logic that seems to prevail is that while each individual factor 
has the potential to contribute to the successful outcome of a policy implementation 
programme, factors that act in ways to generate, or accentuate, other factors are 
likely to compound the chain of events that influence success and can therefore be 
perceived to be more important than others.  Thus, for example, if ‘clear delineation 
of roles’ between politicians and administrators is perceived to lead to greater 
‘cooperation’ between both stakeholder groups, then it is intrinsically more important 
because it acts in a way that generates another factor that drives success.  The 
probability of success is therefore perceived to improve.  As shall be explained in 
Part 4, the perceived level of importance of the factors elicited in both Projects 1 and 
2 was explored at the beginning of Project 3 so that the rest of the research could be 
focused on those variables that are perceived by the ‘practitioners’ to be more salient 
in terms of their potential to influence failure and success. 
Notwithstanding the absence of such empirical data, it may nonetheless be pertinent 
to highlight those factors that interviewees’ seemed to have emphasised during this 
Project.  ‘Commitment’ is probably the most important factor.  Besides being 
identified by six of the eight interviewees, it was explored and explained from various 
angles (see the properties and dimensions in Figure 16) and was also perceived to 
have been influenced by other factors.  In a nutshell, the commitment was seen to 
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exist at both an individual and collective level and the dedication of everyone 
involved in the implementation process ensured the convergence of efforts and the 
effective achievement of a common goal.  Strongly linked to commitment, was the 
decision to ‘locate political responsibility’ for the policy initiative in the portfolio of the 
Prime Minister.  Although intrinsically symbolic in nature, this decision was a 
strategic one and acted to elevate the commitment to a political level.  It signalled the 
Government’s resolve to deliver this particular policy, thereby providing the project 
team with the authority and ‘muscle’ it needed to solicit support from all stakeholders 
and ensure the timely delivery of activities.  A third factor identified by six of the eight 
interviewees was the individual and collective skill and capability of the persons 
entrusted with the policy implementation.  While commitment and authority were very 
important because they created the right framework or context for implementation, it 
was the intellectual and physical ‘ability’ of the project team members that could 
ultimately ensure the timely and effective delivery of the project.  This may sound an 
obvious conclusion, but is really not so obvious for an institution that seems to be 
devoid of policy/project implementation skills. The extent to which these three factors 
have also been found to be important in other studies on policy implementation is 
explored in the context of Project 3. 
In relation to the results that were obtained in Project 1, a further two observations 
are worth noting.  The first is that although fewer factors were identified in Project 2, 
interviewees seemed to explore these factors in greater depth.  Evidence of this is 
the large number of properties and dimensions per factor (see Figure 16), although 
an explanation is not immediately apparent.  The second observation is that 
accountability is possibly at the core of both failure and success.  In Project 1, failure 
was, in essence, attributed to the absence of an accountability framework that would 
have ensured the delivery of results.  In Project 2, accountability was not explicitly 
mentioned, but was nonetheless implied, as evidenced through the way in which the 
project was planned, structured and managed (the process-oriented factors) and the 
innate abilities and motivations of the resources assigned to it (the person-oriented 
factors).  
 
 Page 131 
Summary of Part 3 
This part of the thesis summarised the findings and conclusions of the second stage 
of the research.  It focused on identifying the factors that influenced the successful 
implementation of a Cabinet policy decision regarding the establishment of Local 
Councils as a first step towards the introduction of a system of Local Government.   
Similar to the strategy adopted in Project 1, this phase of the research was based 
upon an interpretivist philosophy and adopted an inductive approach that was based 
upon the application of case study research.  Data was again collected through both 
documentary research and personal interviews held with the key players involved in 
the implementation of the policy under review.  In both cases, data analysis was 
qualitatively driven.  Documentary evidence was analysed following the procedural 
norms of data codification as proposed by Strauss and Corbin (1998), while the data 
derived from the interviews were analysed following the application of cognitive 
mapping techniques as outlined by Wrightson (1976) and modified by Huff et al. 
(1990).  Twenty-one (21) factors were identified to have influenced the successful 
outcome of this policy initiative.  Although not based on statistical evidence, the top 
three pivotal factors that seemed to have significantly influenced the successful 
outcome of the policy initiative were (1) the level of commitment of the key players to 
the policy initiative, (2) the decision to locate political responsibility for the initiative in 
the Office of the Prime Minister, and (3) the presence of a team composed of 
persons with different yet complementary skills and capabilities.  Collectively, these 
factors were deemed to have created an accountability framework that ensured the 
effective delivery of the policy programme. 
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Overview of Part 4 
This part of the thesis discusses the third and final step (or project) of the research 
and is presented in four Chapters. 
The first Chapter introduces the study by outlining the purpose of the project and the 
two objectives it set out to achieve; that is, (1) the prioritisation of the factors elicited 
in the first two projects to determine which of them are considered to be the most 
critical to success and failure, and (2) the development of proposals for improving 
the likelihood of successful policy implementation. 
Chapter 2 provides a detailed description of the research methodology, structure and 
methods defining this part of the study.  In particular, it discusses the application of a 
survey that was used for identifiying the factors considered by stakeholders to 
critically influence failure and/or success, and it explains the results derived from this 
quantitative study. 
Chapter 3 then discusses the relevant literature and theoretical principles that inform 
the object of this project.  It focuses on an in depth treatise of the relevant literature 
on ‘commitment’ and ‘leadership’ that occupy the foreground of the study, as well as 
a consideration of aspects of the literature pertaining to some of the other critical 
factors perceived to influence success and failure in policy implementation.  Building 
on the results identified from the quantitative study and the literature review, it then 
presents a number of proposed measures that could be undertaken to improve the 
effective implementation of public policy in Malta.   
Chapter 4 summarises the recommendations that were proposed to address 
successful policy implementation through improved leadership and commitment.  It 
identifies the key objective(s) guiding each of the propositions made, and the 
action(s) deemed necessary for their effective implementation. 
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1.0 Overall Purpose and Project Objectives 
This part of the thesis summarises the findings and conclusions of the third project of 
the research programme.  Building on the findings and conclusions of Projects 1 and 
2, it addresses the second part of the research question guiding this study29 by 
proposing measures that could be taken to address the critical factors influencing the 
outcome of policy implementation initiatives in Malta.   
As a ‘project’ in itself, this phase of the research aimed to achieve two objectives.  
The first was to prioritise the factors of failure and success elicited in Projects 1 and 
2 respectively, so that the rest of the research could focus on those factors identified 
by stakeholders to be the most critical or influential on policy implementation in 
Malta.  The second objective was to develop proposals to address these factors.  
The development of such proposals would be based upon the lessons learnt from 
the case studies of Projects 1 and 2 respectively, as well as on a review of the body 
of knowledge pertaining to such factors.   
Project 3 was approached in two ‘Steps’, each of which addressed one of these two 
objectives. 
 
                                            
29  See page 10. 
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2.0 Methodology 
2.1 Overview of Approach 
In keeping with the research paradigm, it was considered important that the selection 
of the critical factors (Step 1) was done by, and with the participation of, the persons 
who are ultimately affected by such factors.  Two methods were considered: conjoint 
analysis and the application of a survey.  Although preference had originally been 
given to the former method, it was the latter that was actually employed in Step 1 of 
this project.  The rationale for this choice is explained in Appendix 17. 
Having short-listed the critical factors, the second step of the project was then to 
focus on exploring the measures that could be taken to build on success and to 
overcome, or limit, failure.  Once again, two options were considered.  Option 1 was 
based on the identification of suitable measures through the application of the 
repertory grid technique.  Option 2 aimed to achieve the same objective, but in a less 
structured manner, basing itself on a more interpretative consideration of (i) the 
results obtained from Projects 1 and 2, (ii) a review of the literature relating to the 
critical factors short-listed in Step 1 of this project, and (iii) the researcher’s own 
experience in the implementation of public policy in Malta.  While the application of 
the repertory grid technique was considered the ideal method, it was the second 
option that was ultimately applied.  The reasons for this are also explained in 
Appendix 17. 
2.2 Step 1 – Focusing on Failure and Success 
2.2.1 Research Procedure 
The first step of this project involved the administration of a survey.  This was based 
on the application of a questionnaire that required respondents to critically consider 
the factors elicited from Projects 1 and 2 and to prioritise these factors in order of 
their perceived importance.  The process followed in developing and administering 
the questionnaire is outlined in Figure 18. 
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Figure 18  -  Steps followed in developing the survey questionnaire 
Establish parameters /
objectives
Identify solutions
Devise Questionnaire
Decide method of
transmission
Pilot test
and review
Conduct Survey
 
Source: Compiled by Author 
Before attempting to draft the actual questionnaire, it was considered appropriate to 
clearly establish the objectives that this instrument aimed to accomplish, and the 
manner in which they would be achieved.  The principal aims of the questionnaire 
were to: 
1. present to respondents the factors considered to influence failure and success in 
policy implementation as identified through the research undertaken during 
Projects 1 and 2; 
2. get respondents to critically consider these factors and, based on their own 
experience in the implementation of policy initiatives, establish either (i) their 
likelihood to contribute to failure, or (ii) their importance to the successful 
outcome of such initiatives; and 
3. ask respondents to identify, in priority order, the top five factors that they 
considered, from experience, to be either (i) the most damaging to a policy 
implementation initiative, or (ii) the most critical to success. 
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Furthermore, the questionnaire also had to reflect a number of other matters that 
were considered critical to ensure a response that was adequate in both content 
(valid and reliable) and quantity (a sufficient number of persons would respond).  
Table 9 lists these secondary objectives and describes how they were addressed. 
Table 9 – Secondary Questionnaire Objectives 
Objective Addressed by… 
Not time consuming 
(maximum 10 minutes)  
Limited request; information in table format; 
close-ended statements/questions; use of tick-
boxes. 
Easy to use Clear instructions; use of tick-boxes. 
Easy to understand In English; avoided jargon/buzz words and 
acronyms; pilot tested and adjusted as necessary 
Understood by everyone in 
the same way 
Factors clearly defined; respondents asked to 
limit interpretation to definitions provided. 
Focus response  Limited respondents to factors elicited from the 
studies – ‘others’ field not provided. 
Stimulate interest/be engaging  Provided sufficient background without detracting 
attention to what was really required. 
Attract attention/stimulate a 
response 
Allowed anonymous responses; offered a reward 
for timely response. 
Easy to analyse Constructed a simple database that facilitates 
data entry and analysis. 
After considering the above objectives, the questionnaire was drafted in three 
stages.  First, it was considered necessary to define the factors identified in Projects 
1 and 2.  This ensured that the factors would be presented in a manner that is faithful 
to the interpretation arising from Projects 1 and 2; that they would be easy to 
understand; and that all the respondents would understand them in the same way. 
In arriving at these definitions, considerable effort was made to use the original 
words or terms used by the interviewees of Projects 1 and 2 to explain the factors 
that they had identified30.    Where this was not possible, the definitions reflected the 
words used in my own description of the factors as presented in Appendix 8 and 
                                            
30  These were either derived from the concepts constituting the cognitive maps or lifted from the transcripts. 
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Appendix 12 relating to Projects 1 and 2 respectively.  However derived, definitions 
that were not deemed to be detailed enough to provide a proper understanding of 
the factor concerned were further qualified by reference to the properties and 
dimensions of the factor as identified from the data analysis stage of Projects 1 and 
2.  For example, the factor ‘Administrative Will’ that was identified in Project 1 as 
having contributed to failure was presented and defined as follows: 
Factor name/label: (Absence of) Administrative Will 
Definition: a lack of visible commitment to a policy by the administrative 
arm of Government [because of] feelings of imposition, or a 
disbelief in the merits of the policy itself. 
o ‘Administrative Will’ was the actual factor title or name used in Project 1.  The 
use of ‘absence of’ in brackets denotes that it was the lack of such a factor that 
was actually perceived by interviewees to contribute to failure. 
o ‘A lack of visible commitment to a policy’ were words used by the 
interviewees of Project 1 to explain the lack of administrative will.  
o ‘…by the administrative arm of Government’ were words intentionally added 
for the purposes of this questionnaire to clearly specify the person(s) to whom 
the factor made reference.   
o The use of ‘because of’ in square brackets was meant to illustrate a further 
qualification to the definition. 
o ‘feelings of imposition’ and ‘a disbelief in the merits of the policy itself’ 
reflected properties/dimensions of the factor as identified from the data analysis 
of Project 1.  They were included in the definition to substantiate the qualification 
and give further meaning to the definition. 
The protocol described above was applied in the derivation of all definitions.  The 
resultant definitions of failure and success are listed in Tables 10 and 11 
respectively. 
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Table 10 – Definitions of Factors contributing to Failure 
Factor  Defined as… 
(Absence of) 
Accountability 
the absence of a suitable framework that holds people responsible for the 
tasks and duties assigned to them, and the outcomes of their 
performance. 
(Absence of) 
Administrative Will 
a lack of visible commitment to a policy by the administrative arm of 
Government [because of] feelings of imposition, or a disbelief in the 
merits of the policy itself. 
(Inadequate) 
Capabilities 
the lack of resourcefulness of the individuals involved in implementation, 
[characterised by] their limited experience and inadequate skills / 
qualifications. 
Cloning (of 
management 
practices) 
the practice of ‘replicating’ traditional approaches to management, 
[characterised by] an adherence to conventional rules, norms and 
traditional behaviour. 
(Lack of) 
Collegiality 
the absence of a friendly relationship between individuals party to an 
implementation programme [driven by] their inability or unwillingness to 
operate as a team. 
Conditioning actions taken by senior decision makers to influence the behaviour of 
persons [with the objective of] inducing them to oppose or resist the 
implementation of a policy programme  
Context an unproductive environment [characterised by] conflicting interests 
among politicians. 
(Lack of) 
Cooperation 
the reluctance of individuals to collaborate with one another to achieve 
some common goal. 
(Entrenched) 
Customs 
the perpetuation of established organisational systems and cultures that 
stifle change and innovation. 
(Lack of) 
Customisation 
a standardised, rather than bespoke, approach to the implementation of 
policy. 
Divergent Goals  the inability to agree on a common set of goals, [because of] different 
stakeholder priorities and uncooperative behaviours. 
(Dysfunctional) 
Group Dynamic 
a group of persons working individually rather than as part of a team, 
[because of] different interests,  and feelings of inequity, and imposition. 
(Lack of) 
Leadership 
the inability to develop and command a following for a particular policy, 
[because of] one’s ineptness, an unclear or changing vision, and/or 
waivering commitment. 
Management 
Aloofness 
the inability or unwillingness of management to interact with subordinates 
and get directly involved in the implementation of a policy initiative. 
Mistrust the lack of confidence in persons involved in implementation, [because of] 
different political ideologies, feelings of disloyalty and the fear of 
sabotage. 
Organisational 
Politics 
the competitive struggle for power, [driven by] dissimilar stakeholder 
goals, feelings of threatened interests and the fear of losing control over 
resources. 
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(Lack of policy) 
Ownership 
individuals’ unwillingness to assume responsibility for the policy and its 
implementation 
(Lack of) 
Participation 
the inability or reluctance to actively engage the involvement of various 
stakeholders in the implementation of a policy initiative. 
(Ineffective) 
Planning 
an uncoordinated and fragmented approach to implementation, that is 
reactive to emerging issues and imposed top-down, rather than proactive 
in style and developed bottom-up. 
(Absence of) 
Political Will 
a lack of visible commitment to a policy by the political arm of 
Government 
Political 
Immaturity 
the imposing attitudes and behaviour of politicians, particularly young or 
new Ministers / Parliamentary Secretaries, who lack experience and 
political savvy. 
(Low) Political 
Intervention 
the absence of Ministerial involvement in the implementation and 
administration of policy [characterised by] low support and low visible 
participation. 
Power (Struggles) the quest for authority and control over resources that alienates attention 
away from the management of policy and into the domain of (small ‘p’) 
politics. 
Resistance the opposition confronting a policy initiative, [because of] external 
imposition, inadequate understanding of the policy objectives, and the 
fear of losing power. 
(Lack of 
apparent) Results 
the tardiness and low visibility of outcomes from a policy implementation 
initiative. 
Role 
Fragmentation 
the division of responsibility for a policy initiative among many individuals, 
such that there is no clarity of focus and ambiguous ownership.  
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Table 11 – Definitions of Success Factors 
Success Factor Defined as… 
(Effective) 
Approach 
a well-researched and structured process to implementation, [characterised 
by] clarity of vision, thorough attention to detail and fast decision-making. 
(Positive) Attitude an optimistic, team-oriented disposition and a persistent determination to 
succeed. 
Commitment a tangible and visible political and administrative will to deliver policy. 
Cooperation collaborative behaviour between stakeholders to a policy, [characterised by] 
goal alignment, the development of strong personal relationships, and a high 
willingness to share skills and information. 
(Effective) 
Planning 
the detailed organisation of activities. 
(Effective) 
Resourcing 
the focused deployment of skilled and motivated resources in quantities 
sufficient to provide a critical mass. 
Enthusiasm a heightened level of personal / team motivation, [characterised by] an intrinsic 
belief in the policy, the presence of incentives and visible political support. 
Leadership the ability to develop and command a following, [characterised by] clarity of 
vision and a legitimate mandate. 
Location of 
Political 
Responsibility 
the power emanating from the place or position that holds political ownership 
for the policy, and its ability to command authority over the deployment of 
resources. 
Management Style the enthusiastic and optimistic behaviour of management, and their ability to 
adapt to prevailing circumstances. 
Ownership a perceived state of belongingness to, and responsibility for, a policy 
implementation programme. 
Project Team 
Dynamic 
the presence of a group of individuals with different but complementary skills 
and expertise, working collaboratively towards a common goal. 
Role Delineation the clear demarcation of responsibility between individuals, particularly 
between politicians and civil servants. 
Skills and Abilities the capability and resourcefulness of individuals involved in implementation, 
[characterised by] qualities such as extensive experience, adequate training 
and qualifications, and a practical approach to policy management. 
Stakeholder 
Involvement 
broad and active consultations with persons or entities likely to affect, or be 
affected by, the policy. 
Trust a high degree of confidence in persons involved in the implementation 
initiative, [characterised by] the belief that individuals will not sabotage the 
initiative, or cause deliberate harm. 
(Use of) Networks utilising one’s personal-informal relationship with others to gain access to, or 
control over, resources. 
Values / Beliefs people’s conviction of the ‘rightness’ or ‘goodness’ of a policy initiative, 
because it is consistent with their personal values. 
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With respect to the definitions regarding Success, it should be noted that: 
1. the factor originally identified and labelled in Project 2 as ‘Personal/Team 
Attributes’ was divided into two separate factors; one relating to the individual 
‘Skills and Abilities’ of the persons involved in the implementation programme, 
and the other relating to the ‘Project Team Dynamic’, referring to the collective 
attributes of the individuals operating as a team.  This was done because (1) 
when combined, the resulting factor had too broad a meaning and therefore could 
lead to misinterpretations by different interviewees, and (2) after a 
reconsideration of the interview transcripts, separating the two factors was 
deemed to be more consistent with the original data. 
2. the factor originally labelled ‘(Choice of) Strategy’ was combined with that 
labelled ‘Approach’, as (1) the elements distinguishing the two were really not as 
clear cut as originally thought during the analysis of Project 2 and, (2) leaving the 
two factors separate would have only served to confuse interviewees. 
Having defined the factors, the next stage in the compilation of the questionnaire 
considered what rating scale would be most appropriate for this survey.  Consistent 
with the objectives identified earlier, it was decided that a three-point scale would be 
adopted as it would be fast to apply, and as it would also make it easier for 
respondents to deliver judgements of choice between the factors.  Furthermore, it 
was decided that a qualitative scale, rather than one that relied on a numeric scoring 
system, would also be more appropriate for the respondents’ treatment of the 
factors.  Different statements were used for rating the factors contributing to failure 
and those influencing success.  This was done to: 
1. reflect the findings of Projects 1 and 2 that suggest that factors contributing to 
failure and success are not necessarily different sides of the same coin; and to 
2. reflect differences that existed in the syntax of the definitions used, which 
differences seemed necessary to better explain the two categories of factors.   
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Respondents rating the factors influencing FAILURE were asked to rate the factors 
along the following scale: 
o ‘LIKELY to contribute to failure’ 
o ‘MOST LIKELY to contribute to failure’ 
o ‘WILL CERTAINLY contribute to failure’ 
Factors influencing SUCCESS were to be rated as either: 
o ‘IMPORTANT for success’, or 
o ‘VERY IMPORTANT for success’, or 
o ‘CRITICAL for success’. 
These scales enabled the factors to be separated into three categories of different 
relative importance.  However, it did not provide a system for weighting the relative 
importance of factors within a category.  This was necessary as the objective of the 
questionnaire was to narrow the research on those few factors that are perceived to 
deeply impact failure and success.  To achieve this, respondents were asked to 
reflect upon the factors rated as either ‘WILL CERTAINLY contribute to failure’ or 
‘CRITICAL for success’, and to list the top five (5) factors in each of the two 
categories in their perceived order of priority.  The decision to limit these factors to 
only five (5) reflected the intent of the study to focus on the factors falling (roughly) in 
the top quartile in terms of their perceived importance in influencing failure or 
success. 
The third stage of drafting the questionnaire considered the instructions that would 
be necessary to facilitate its interpretation and use.  As the questionnaire was 
presented in table format, little explanation was considered necessary.  The 
instructions were therefore limited to an explanatory paragraph placed at the 
beginning of the questionnaire itself.  However, further consideration was given to 
the need to stimulate an interest in the questionnaire and to entice a response.  This 
was approached in two ways.  First, a covering letter was prepared to briefly explain 
the purpose of the survey and the importance of the response to the research.  
 Page 147 
Three slightly different letters were drafted, customised as necessary for each of the 
three respondent categories (politicians, civil servants and consultants).  All letters 
were personally addressed and, in those cases where the respondent was a 
personal friend or acquaintance of the researcher, the letters were informally signed.  
Secondly, respondents were invited to participate in a lottery for a weekend break at 
a hotel located on the sister island of Gozo, which is often used as a retreat or get-
away by many Maltese.  Those choosing to participate were requested to fill in their 
personal details, including their role/position in Government. 
The final stage of drafting the questionnaire considered its length and the duration it 
would take respondents to complete.  The questionnaire was found to be too 
lengthy, requiring between 20 to 30 minutes to complete.  Because of this, it was 
decided that it should be split into two – one addressing the factors on failure and the 
other addressing success.  Likewise, the targeted population31 of respondents was 
randomly divided into two groups, and each group was sent one of the two 
questionnaires.  Sample copies of the covering letters and the two questionnaires 
are enclosed in Appendix 18. 
The next step was to consider how the questionnaire should be transmitted to 
potential respondents.  Two methods were considered; e-mail and regular mail.  The 
benefits of using e-mail were fast transmission and virtually no cost.  However, after 
considering the quantity of junk mail that is typically received in one’s e-mail account, 
it was decided that the risk of having the questionnaire treated as such and trashed 
by potential respondents, was too high to ignore.  Regular mail was therefore 
selected as the preferred option. 
Prior to conducting the proper survey, the questionnaires were piloted with thirteen 
(13) persons32 representing politicians, civil servants and consultants.   The choice of 
persons was not random and it included persons who are close acquaintances or 
friends of the author.  The reason for this choice was to ‘ensure’ a response.  Even 
then, only twelve (12) responses were received.  The pilot respondents reported no 
                                            
31   Population and sample size are discussed in Section 2.2.2. 
32   Approximately 5% of the sample size. 
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difficulty in completing the questionnaire and only directed attention to one or two 
definitions and a few typing errors.  The former were changed to improve their 
explanation, and the latter were edited and corrected. 
Following the above, copies of the covering letters and questionnaires were 
prepared and mailed simultaneously to all targeted respondents.  The responses 
received were then registered and analysed following the protocol described in 
Section 2.2.3. 
2.2.2 Data Sample 
Two things were considered in determining an appropriate data sample – its 
composition and its size.  The need for identifying a credible sample that would 
involve representatives of all the persons involved in policy implementation was 
important to ensure an un-biased data set.  A sufficiently large sample was also 
important to strengthen the generalisability of findings and to further improve the 
external validity of the results obtained. 
A credible sample for this study required representatives of all three ‘actor’ groups 
involved in policy implementation; that is, politicians, civil servants and consultants.  
The politician group included Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries currently in 
office, as well as Shadow Ministers from the Party in opposition.  Shadow Ministers 
were included in the study so as to ensure a cross-representation of policy makers in 
Malta and to dispel any potential political bias. 
All civil servants partake in policy implementation through the conduct of their daily 
duties.  However, given the dynamics and culture of the Maltese civil service, it is 
only those persons in middle to senior management positions that are actually 
responsible for managing policy and that can directly, or indirectly, influence its 
implementation.  Therefore, while all civil servants could potentially contribute to 
identifying the factor(s) that critically influence policy implementation in Malta, it is fair 
to assume that the most significant contribution will arise from senior management.  
In comparison to more junior staff, these persons have more knowledge of policy 
management and have a broader and more holistic understanding of the 
opportunities and limitations of policy implementation as applicable in the Maltese 
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context.  For this reason, it was decided that the questionnaire would be targeted to 
civil servants in the positions of Permanent Secretary, Director General and 
Director33.   
From time to time, the Administration engages a number of consultants to assist it 
in both the formulation and the implementation of policy.  However, the Government 
of Malta also has its own in-house management consultancy organisation that is 
tasked with the majority of consultancy projects relating to policy implementation.  It 
is, therefore, the only organisation that holds a credible experience base of public 
sector management consultants.  Representatives of this actor category were 
chosen from this organisation.  To ensure an informed response to the 
questionnaire, it was decided that only consultants with at least 5 years experience 
with this organisation would be included in the study.  Furthermore, in order to 
overcome any potential bias arising from people’s experiences, or perceptions, of the 
current state of policy implementation, the consultants participating in the study had 
to have worked under different political Administrations. 
As at the 15th of April 2002, the potential number of politicians, civil servants and 
consultants that could be targeted according to the criteria identified above was 37, 
158 and 24 respectively.  Given the small number of persons in each actor group it 
was decided that, following customary research practice (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe et 
al., 1991: 122), the survey would be treated as a census and all 219 persons would 
be included for the purposes of this study. 
2.2.3 Data Collection and Analysis 
Table 12 summarises the number of mailed questionnaires per actor category, and 
the number of replies received. 
                                            
33   A Permanent Secretary is accountable for a Ministry.  A Director General would normally be accountable for a 
Division (i.e., a group of Departments) within a Ministry, while a Director is accountable for a Department. 
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Table 12 – Summary of Mailed Questionnaires and Replies 
   Mailed        Received     
 Pilot Success Failure Total Pilot Success % Failure % Total % 
                 
Ministers1 1 10 9 20 0 2 20% 5 56% 7 35%
Shadow Ministers 0 9 8 17  0 2 22% 0 0% 2 12%
Politicians 1 19 17 37 0 4 21% 5 29% 9 24%
                 
Perm. Secretaries2 1 6 7 14 1 5 83% 6 86% 12 86%
Directors General 0 12 11 23 0 4 33% 3 27% 7 30%
Directors 6 57 58 121 6 25 44% 30 52% 61 50%
Unknown Position3 n/a N/a n/a n/a  n/a 2 n/a 2 n/a 4 n/a 
Civil Servants 7 75 82 158 7 36 48% 41 50% 84 53%
                 
Consultants 5 9 10 24 5 8 89% 8 80% 21 88%
                 
Unknown Group4 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 8 n/a 14 n/a 22 n/a 
                       
 13 103 109 219  12 56 54% 68 62% 136 62%
 
 Including pilot questionnaires 62 74 
1 Includes (i) Parliamentary Secretaries, and (ii) the Personal Assistant to the Prime Minister who sits 
in Cabinet meetings and plays an active role in both the development and implementation of policy. 
2 Includes the Cabinet Secretary who partakes in the implementation of policy and who, previous to 
this role, occupied the position of Permanent Secretary. 
3 Refers to respondents who chose to remain anonymous, but who identified themselves as Civil 
Servants without indicating their position in Government.   
4 Refers to respondents who chose to remain completely anonymous. 
One hundred and thirty six (136) completed questionnaires were received, 
representing 62% of the population surveyed.  The reasons behind such a significant 
response are unknown.  It is possible that respondents felt that the subject of the 
study merits research because the issues encountered in the implementation of 
policy are real and problematic.  It is also possible that people were more inclined to 
participate in the survey than usual because of their acquaintance with the author.  It 
is also possible that the respondents were simply enticed by the free weekend break. 
 To facilitate the data capture process and the subsequent analysis, a database was 
constructed using Microsoft Access©.  The fields of the database replicated those of 
the questionnaire and each response was entered as a record in the database.  The 
data were then manipulated using the query and filtering functions of the programme 
itself and were analysed in three steps.   
Step 1 involved a frequency count of the rating of each factor, first in relation to the 
three-point rating scale, then in relation to the number of times it featured in the top 
quartile in terms of priority ranking.  Table 13 below illustrates an example of the 
results of this operation. 
Table 13 – Example of Results of Frequency Count 
 
 
Factor 
Influencing 
FAILURE 
LIKELY  
to 
contribute 
to Failure 
MOST 
LIKELY 
to contribute 
to Failure 
WILL 
CERTAINLY 
contribute to 
Failure 
LEFT 
Out 
Most
Dam-
aging
2nd
Most
Dam-
aging
3rd 
Most 
Dam-
aging 
4th 
Most 
Dam-
aging 
5th
Most
Dam-
aging
(Absence of) 
Accountability 
16 22% 23 31% 34 46% 1 9 12 3 4 3 
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Table 14 – Example of Success Factors in Rank-Order Priority as Per Rating Scale 
 
SUCCESS Factor Important…
 
VER
Y Im
portant…
 
C
R
ITIC
A
L…
 
C
ritical as a %
 of all 
respondents 
  
  to contribute to 
Success 
  
Leadership 6 19 37 60% 
Commitment 9 17 36 58% 
(Effective) Approach 11 25 26 42% 
Location of Political Responsibility 15 24 22 35% 
 Etc…..     
 A B C * 
* Sort ordering procedure : First by Column C, then B, then A 
In a second operation, the factors were then sorted according to the number of times 
they were identified as a top five (5) factor of failure, or success.  An example is 
illustrated in Table 15. 
Table 15 – Example of Top Quartile Success Factors in Rank-Order Priority  
 
SUCCESS Factor 
M
ost 
D
ifficult 
2nd 3rd 4th 5th 
N
o of tim
es factor 
features in top 5 
%
 respondents 
listing factor in top 5 
  
  
…most difficult to 
manage or obtain   
Commitment 7 9 4 7 6 33 53% 
Leadership 8 7 10 2 1 28 45% 
(Effective) Approach 6 6 3 1 4 20 32% 
Ownership 3 2 6 6 2 19 31% 
   Etc….        
 A B C D E F*  
* Sort ordering procedure: First by Column F, then A, B, C, D and E. 
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In effecting the above operations, success and failure factors were treated 
separately.  Furthermore, the factors in each of the two categories were sorted per 
actor group and also as one collective data set (see Tables in Appendix 20). 
The third and final step of the data analysis involved a comparison of the perceived 
rank order priority of the top 5 success and failure factors per actor group, based on 
the analysis derived from the second operation described above and illustrated in 
Table 15.  The objective of this step was to identify any overlaps in the different 
actors’ perception of what constituted the most important factors of failure/success. 
2.2.4 Results/Observations 
Table 16 lists the top five most important factors per actor group, while Figures 19 
and 20 illustrate the similarities and differences through the use of a Venn diagram.  
The charts in Figures 21 and 22 illustrate the number of times each one of these 
factors featured in the top quartile per actor category, indicating the perceived level 
of importance of each factor and the degree of similar perceptions within and 
between each actor group.   
Table 16 – Top 5 Success and Failure Factors per Actor Group 
Actor Group Top 5 Success Factors Top 5 Failure Factors 
Politicians (Effective) Approach 
Commitment 
Leadership 
Skills and Abilities 
Cooperation 
(Absence of) Political Will 
(Lack of) Leadership 
(Lack of) Policy Ownership 
Role Fragmentation 
(Absence of) Administrative Will 
Civil Servants Commitment 
Leadership 
Ownership 
Role Delineation 
Stakeholder Involvement 
(Absence of) Political Will 
(Absence of) Accountability 
(Lack of) Leadership 
(Absence of) Administrative Will 
Divergent Goals 
Consultants (Absence of) Political Will 
(Absence of) Admin. Will 
Ownership 
Role Delineation 
Stakeholder Involvement 
(Absence of) Political Will 
(Absence of) Administrative Will 
(Lack of) Leadership 
(Absence of) Accountability 
Divergent Goals 
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Figure 19 – Top 5 Success Factors by Actor Group 
Role delineation
Ownershiip
(Eff.) Approach
Skills & Abilities
Cooperation
Location of Political
Responsibility
Trust
Stakeholder
involvement
Commitment
Leadership
PoliticiansCivil Servants
Consultants
 
Source: Compiled by Author 
Figure 20 – Top 5 Factors of Failure by Actor Group 
Divergent Goals RoleFragmentation
(Absence of)
Accountability
Political Will
Admin. Will
Leadership
PoliticiansCivil Servants
Consultants
(Lack of)
Policy
Ownership
 
Source: Compiled by Author 
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Figure 21 – Degree of Congruence in Perceived Level of Importance of Top Quartile 
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Figure 22 – Degree of Congruence in Perceived Level of Importance of Top Quartile 
Factors of Failure 
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At least four observations can be drawn from the obtained results. 
1. It seems that respondents approached the survey objectively and were 
unbiased in selecting their replies.  For example, politicians attributed a 
considerable degree of failure to the factor ‘(Absence of) Political Will’, while civil 
servants identified ‘(Absence of) Administrative Will’, and ‘(Absence of) 
Accountability’, as two major factors of failure.  The willingness of each 
stakeholder group to share responsibility for failure, and success, is very 
encouraging.  It indicates a readiness by all parties to assume an element of 
fault and to work towards achieving a common goal.   
2. The relatively high percentage scores indicated in Figures 21 and 22 would 
suggest that respondents within each actor category share a similar perception, 
or understanding, of what factors are critically influencing success and failure in 
policy implementation.  In this respect, the groups can be said to be relatively 
homogenous.  This has its advantages.  First, the search for a solution can be 
focused on one, or a few, core issues, therefore economising on time and 
resources.  Second, it is likely that each group would be more willing to share 
and deploy resources in search of a solution.  Third, the presence of 
homogenous groups should facilitate the acceptance and adoption of measures 
that are collectively considered as potential solutions to the perceived 
problem(s).  Of course, homogeneity may also lead to groupthink, stifling 
creativity and creating a considerable impasse to change and to improvements 
in policy implementation. 
3. The Venn diagrams in Figures 19 and 20 illustrate a number of overlaps 
between the top quartile factors identified by each stakeholder group, 
suggesting that politicians, civil servants and consultants share similar levels of 
appreciation with regards to the problems affecting modern policy management 
in Malta.  Although a greater element of agreement seems to exist on the factors 
influencing failure, rather than those driving success, it is fair to state that 
besides the intra-group homogeneity mentioned in point 2 above, there is also a 
significant element of inter-group homogeneity.  The absence of divergent or 
opposing views between the three key stakeholders should further facilitate the 
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search for, and adoption of, suitable measures to overcome failure and build 
upon success. 
4. There is agreement among all actor groups on what constitutes the key factors 
influencing success and failure in policy implementation (see Figures 19 and 
20).  ‘Commitment’ and ‘Leadership’ are considered to be the critical success 
factors, while ‘(Absence of) Political Will, ‘(Absence of) Administrative Will’ and 
‘Lack of Leadership’ are identified as the key factors influencing failure.  While 
‘Leadership’ would seem to be the only factor that is common to both failure and 
success, reference to the definitions in Tables 10 and 11 should clearly indicate 
that the factors labelled ‘(Absence of) Political Will’ and ‘(Absence of) 
Administrative Will’ are equivalent to the factor labelled ‘Commitment’.  Different 
labels had been used in Projects 1 and 2 respectively so that reference to these 
factors was consistent with the language used by the interviewees of both 
projects.  Therefore, from this point of the report, all references to ‘Commitment’ 
are inclusive of the factors labelled ‘(Absence of) Political Will’ and ‘(Absence of) 
Administrative Will’. 
2.2.5 Conclusions 
Despite the presence of similar factors in the data sets for both success and failure, 
different factors populate their respective Venn Diagrams (Figures 19 and 20).  This 
outcome seems to support the view concluded by Projects 1 and 2 that different 
factors may act to influence success and failure in policy implementation.   
The results also seem to indicate that some factors are perceived to be more 
influential on success and failure as indicated by both their frequency count relative 
to that obtained by other factors, as well as by their prioritised rank order position.  In 
particular, the fact that Commitment and Leadership are positioned at the centre of 
the Venn Diagrams for both failure and success indicates that they are considered 
by all stakeholder groups to have the most determining influence on the outcome of 
a policy implementation initiative.   
In order to statistically support, or reject, the conclusion that differences between the 
perceived importance of the factors influencing success and failure do exist, a 
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goodness-of-fit test was performed on the data.  The test parameters used for each 
of the two data sets are illustrated in Table 17 below. 
Table 17 – Goodness-of-Fit Test Parameters 
Failure  Success 
Ho = the population distribution is uniform; i.e., each factor is perceived to be 
equally important by an equal percentage of the population. 
H1 = the population distribution is not uniform; i.e., the perceived importance of 
each factor is not equal. 
Level of significance, ∝ = 0.05 & 0.01 Level of significance, ∝ = 0.05 & 0.01 
Degrees of Freedom, df = k-1 = 25 Degrees of Freedom, df = k-1 = 20 
Test Ratio, TR = 37.7 & 44.3 Test Ratio, TR = 31.4 & 37.6 
Decision Rule = Reject Ho and accept 
H1if the test ratio, TR, is > 37.7 & 44.3 
Decision Rule = Reject Ho and accept 
H1if the test ratio, TR, is > 31.4 & 37.6 
The test was administered on the total population results of each data set, as well as 
for each actor group within each of the two data sets.  The test results are 
reproduced in Appendix 21 and summarised in Table 18. 
Table 18 – Summary Results of Goodness-of-fit Test 
Data Sets TR  
∝ = 0.05 
TR 
∝ = 0.01 
TR 
Obtained 
Failure 
 - All Actors (74 respondents) 
 - Politicians (5 respondents) 
 - Civil Servants (45 respondents) 
 - Consultants (10 respondents) 
 - Unknown (14 respondents) 
37.7 44.3  
175.83 
28.68 
102.53 
73.16 
54.17 
Success 
 - All Actors (62 respondents) 
 - Politicians (4 respondents) 
 - Civil Servants (39 respondents) 
 - Consultants (11 respondents) 
 - Unknown (8 respondents) 
31.4 37.6  
92.00 
18.00 
52.00 
46.00 
18.00 
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A number of conclusions can be drawn from the results obtained: 
1. The composite computed test ratio for each data set (i.e., TR for all 
respondents) exceeds the chi-square critical value specified in the decision rule 
for both levels of significance.  The null hypothesis should therefore be rejected 
and one may conclude that the different factors are perceived to have different 
degrees of influence on policy implementation.  
2. The computed test ratio for the actor groups in each data set also exceeds the 
chi-square critical value, with the exception of the two ‘Politicians’ groups and 
the ‘Unknown’ group of the success data set.  In these latter cases, the test 
ratios fall within the areas of acceptance under both levels of significance and 
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. However, while it seems that these 
respondents share contrasting views on which factors influence success and 
failure, they only represent a small percentage of the total respondents in each 
data set.  Therefore, they should not alter the conclusions drawn in (1) above, 
especially when one considers that the composite computed test ratios for both 
failure and success exceed the chi-square critical value by factors of 4 and 3 
respectively. 
3. It is significant to note that the difference between the observed and expected 
scores of the individual factors that had previously been identified as the top five 
most important factors per actor category (see Venn Diagrams – Figures 19 and 
20), are considerably high.  With a few exceptions, they are also higher than the 
same figures obtained for the other factors in their respective data sets (see 
column labelled ‘O – E’ in Appendix 20).  Such results confirm that not only did 
respondents choose to select these factors more often than they chose others, 
but also that the number of selections exceed what would be expected under a 
uniform distribution.  This, therefore, confirms their individual importance relative 
to the other factors. 
4. Further to (3) above, the central position occupied by the factors ‘Commitment’ 
and ‘Leadership’ in the Venn Diagram in Figure 2, and ‘Political Will’, 
‘Administrative Will’ and ‘Leadership’ in the Venn Diagram in Figure 20, can also 
be statistically confirmed, given the larger difference between observed and 
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expected scores of these factors relative to those of the other top most 
important factors identified in the Venn Diagrams. 
5. Notwithstanding the statistical validity of the results achieved, it could be argued 
that the finding that ‘leadership’ is perceived to be one of the two critical 
success/failure factors, is only a direct result of the decision to use leaders as 
the respondents to this survey (see Section 2.2.2).  Consequently, it could also 
be argued that a broader cross-sectional representation of civil servants could 
have resulted in a different view of what constitutes the critical factor(s) 
influencing implementation.  However, it should be noted that leadership was 
selected as a critical factor influencing both success and failure.  While it could 
be expected that leaders may identify leadership as a critical success factor if 
they are explaining the reasons behind some successful initiative, it is less 
expected of them to identify leadership as a critical factor contributing to failure.  
The fact that it was identified as a critical failure factor means that the leaders 
were self-critical of their own weaknesses and hence objective in their response. 
2.3 Step 2 – Proposing Measures for addressing the Critical Factors  
Following from the above conclusions, the research focused on a consideration of 
the most influential factors identified in the Venn Diagrams and confirmed by the 
Goodness-of-Fit test.  While due consideration was given to the findings in the 
literature relating to all these factors, it is the literature on Leadership and 
Commitment that occupied the foreground of the review.  In fact, references to the 
literature on the other factors have been embedded in the discussion on the 
literature on Leadership and Commitment, which they seem to complement and 
support. 
This step of the project dealt exclusively with secondary data and was divided in 
three parts.  The first part concerned a familiarisation of the relevant literature.   It 
started with an electronic search of publications using ABI/Proquest and a 
subsequent review of the material considered to be most relevant to the study.  
Where possible, particular attention was given to the literature relating to public 
administration and to Malta and small states.  Having gained a good understanding 
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of the literature, the next part was to cross-reference the findings of Projects 1 and 2 
to the literature with the objective of drawing any similarities and differences between 
the two sources of information.  Finally, the third part focused on the development of 
propositions for improved implementation practices, building on the knowledge 
imparted by the literature and the contributions made by the interviewees of Projects 
1 and 2.   
While the traditional approach to writing a thesis separates the literature review from 
the results and conclusions of the study, in this case it was considered more 
appropriate to address the two simultaneously.  It is felt that this approach provides a 
more logical flow to the development of proposals and also makes more interesting 
reading. 
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3.0 Theoretical Positioning and Emerging Proposals 
3.1 A Focus on Leadership 
To describe the literature on leadership as extensive is simply an understatement.  
One review of the literature carried out in 1981 cited more than 5,000 articles and 
books on the subject (Bass, 1981), and an electronic search of publication 
databases carried out for this literature review returned even more thousands of 
scholarly works and peer-reviewed articles; 1,200 of which covered just the period 
1999-200134.  This alone supports the view that leadership is perhaps the most 
widely studied topic in the organisation sciences (Daft, 1992: 468), although its 
perceived importance is by no means restricted to organisations.  Indeed, the study 
of leadership by researchers of management and organisational disciplines has been 
pre-empted and pursued by an equally zealous enthusiasm on the subject by 
philosophers, historians, anthropologists and politicians (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 
1999:1).  For centuries, people have assumed that leadership also plays a central 
role in politics, sports and many other human activities (Baron and Greenberg, 1989: 
373) and even ancient writers such as Confucius, Aristotle, Socrates and Plato 
emphasised the importance of leadership as a prime shaper of societies (Kakabadse 
and Kakabadse, 1999:1).     
Maybe because of this varied interest, different people have approached the topic in 
different ways and for different purposes, using the term to refer to a variety of things 
including a person, a position or a process (Hollander, 1978: 19).  Notwithstanding 
this, and the emergence of different definitions to explain the term, there seems to be 
agreement among researchers and practitioners alike that the importance of 
leadership stems from a recognition of the deep impact or influence that it can have 
on people’s actions and behaviours towards the attainment of some defined goal.  
Indeed, leadership is defined as the process of influencing others to achieve certain 
goals (Collins Cobuild, 1995: 332).  It is probably because of this that the basic 
                                            
34   Subject search using ABI/Proquest Database. 
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motive underlying centuries of hypothesis, debate and research seems to have been 
the quest to understand what distinguishes leaders from ordinary human beings and 
what can be done to make this form of extraordinary activity a more ordinary 
occurrence at work, at home and at other places of social interaction, presumably for 
the benefit of the individual and of society at large.    However, despite the fact that 
so many words have been written about it, leadership still remains one of the least 
understood subjects (Kakabadse, Nortier et al., 1998: 35), at times seemingly like 
the Abominable Snowman, whose footprints are everywhere but who is nowhere to 
be seen (Bennis and Nanus, 1985: 20).   
Figure 23 attempts to find a way around this labyrinth by summarising the various 
approaches to leadership that have been pursued over the years.  It presents the 
principal concept, or basis, of the thinking underlying each of the three main 
approaches (trait, style and contingency), as well as the general focus of the 
research pursuing such approaches and the results or characteristics of this activity.  
Some of the more representative works in the literature shaping each of the three 
approaches are also identified.   
Born to Lead: The Trait Approach 
The first form of research on leadership is that which is described in the literature as 
the trait approach.  This approach stresses the personal characteristics of the leader, 
and deals both with who becomes a leader and what qualities make a leader 
effective.  The earliest thinking in this regard emphasised hereditary factors in 
making individual leaders (Galton, 1870), thereby giving rise to the ‘born to lead’ 
philosophy of leadership.  In this respect, the characteristics shaping the ‘great man’ 
(Carlyle, 1907) were perceived to be innate to the individual, although decades of 
research activity have failed to produce an agreed upon list of key traits shared 
among all leaders (Geier, 1969).  Notwithstanding this, some traits that have been 
attributed to ‘great leaders’, especially as applied to organisational management, 
include a high need for power coupled with a high degree of self-control (McClelland 
and Boyatzis, 1982); a high degree of self-confidence, need for achievement and 
dominance (Constantini and Craik, 1980); the power to persuade and convince 
others to do what they ask of them (Cialdini, 2001), and the ability to command 
respect, admiration and excitement from followers or
Figure 23  -  Approaches to Leadership 
TIME 
 
Approach Trait  Style Contingency 
Variations on Theme Charismatic Leadership Behavioural Leadership Contextual Leadership 
Basis of Theory / 
Approach 
Leaders are ‘born to lead’ Successful leadership is a function of 
leaders’ behaviour / approach. 
Effective leadership is contingent upon prevailing situations. 
Focus / Emphasis of 
Approach 
Identifying the characteristics that make 
a great leader and that set leaders 
apart from ordinary human beings. 
Understanding how successful leaders 
behave and how their actions affect their 
followers. 
Understanding which style of leadership will prove most effective under which specific conditions. 
Characteristics of 
Theory / Approach 
Leaders possess one or more of the 
following traits: 
• High levels of ambition; dominance; 
need for power and achievement; 
self-confidence and self-control; 
competence and expertise; 
commitment 
• Clear visions of where they want to 
go / lead others to go 
• An aura that sets them apart 
• Willing to take risks 
• Able to handle crisis 
Traits remain stable over time and 
across different groups. 
Leadership style can be: 
1. Participative vs. Autocratic 
• Four patterns identified by Muczyk & 
Reimann 1987 -  directive autocrat; 
permissive autocrat; directive 
democrat; directive autocrat.   
• Styles have advantages / 
disadvantages.  Relative success 
depends on conditions in organisation / 
its stage of development. 
• Leaders match style to needs of the 
organisation. 
2. Person-oriented vs. Production-
oriented 
• Dimensions independent but not 
incompatible 
• Five styles suggested by Blake & 
Mouton – country club mgmt; 
impoverished mgmt; organisation 
mgmt; team mgmt; authority-
obedience. 
Basic theories: 
1. Situational Leadership (leadership and employee-task maturity) 
• Hersey and Blanchard suggest that leaders will be most effective in influencing subordinate behaviour and performance 
when their style of leadership matches their subordinates’ level of (task) maturity. 
• When subordinates’ maturity is low, leaders will be more effective through directive action.  As subordinates master their 
jobs, leaders should show consideration.  When subordinates reach full maturity, need for both decreases.  Four styles of 
leadership will be required – directing, coaching, supporting, delegating. 
2. Contingency Theory (matching leaders/tasks) 
• Fiedler suggests that effective leadership is a function of two basic styles of leadership (task-oriented or relationship-
oriented) and their application depending upon a leader’s degree of control over the situation. 
• Task-oriented leaders (low LPC) > person-oriented leaders (high LPC) when situational control is very high or very low.  
High LPC > Low LPC when situational control is moderate. 
3. Cognitive Resource (leadership and leaders’ cognitive ability) 
• Fiedler & Garcia suggest that leaders’ intelligence / cognitive abilities will affect performance of subordinates only when 
leaders are directive and stress is low. 
4. Normative Theory (leadership and decision-making) 
• Vroom & Yetton view effective decision-making as a key determinant of effective leadership. 
• Five distinct methods of decision-making are proposed ranging from total autocratic to total participative. 
• Choice of method depends upon the quality of the decision and the importance of its acceptance. 
5. Path-Goal Theory (leadership as goal setting) 
• According to House, subordinates perform better when they view their leader helping them achieve goals. 
• Leaders can be instrumental (directive); supportive; participative; achievement-oriented. 
• Styles are not mutually exclusive – rather should be used interchangeably depending on aspects of work  environment and 
characteristics of subordinates 
6. Vertical Dyad Model (leader-follower relation) 
• Dansereau, Graen and Haga suggest that effective leadership is a function of the quality of the relationship and exchanges 
between leaders and followers. 
• Leaders holding negative views of their subordinates will be less effective in stimulating motivation, commitment and 
performance than those who hold positive views on subordinates and offer help/support. 
Representative 
Authors 
Stogdill, 1948,1974; Geier, 1969; 
Constantini and Craik 1980; McClelland 
and Boyatzis 1982; Conger and 
Kanungo, 1987,1988. 
Muczyk and Reimann, 1987; Blake and 
Mouton, 1978; Blake and Mouton, 1985; 
Likert, 1961; Weissenberg and Kavanagh, 
1972. 
Hersey and Blanchard, 1982; Fiedler, 1967; Fiedler and Garcia, 1987; Vroom and Yetton, 1973; House and Baetz, 1979; 
Dansereau, Graen et al., 1975; Hammer and Turk, 1987. 
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subordinates (Conger and Kanungo, 1987; Conger and Kanungo, 1988).  The latter 
category – typically referred to as charismatic leadership – is probably the one which 
over the years has captured most interest (House and Singh, 1987; Bass, 1990) and 
which even today remains a topic of both academic research and popular discourse, 
the merits of which, however, are probably being blown out of proportion (Khurana, 
2002).   
Leader Behaviour: The Style Approach 
As only a few consistent findings have actually emerged from the research on trait 
leadership (Stogdill, 1974), the lack of generalisability led researchers to pursue a 
different approach to leadership based on the idea that successful or effective 
leadership is a function of a leader’s behaviour and approach, rather than some 
innate traits.  This approach emphasised the style of leadership and focused on both 
an understanding of how successful leaders behave and on how such behaviour 
affects the actions of their followers or subordinates.  Understanding such behaviour 
would enable others to emulate such styles and achieve equally effective results. 
The research seems to approach leadership style from two perspectives.  The first of 
these viewed leaders’ behaviour as either participative or autocratic in nature, 
although later research noted that each end of the continuum actually involves two 
separate dimensions, thereby leading to the proposition of four possible patterns of 
leader behaviour (Muczyk and Reimann, 1987).  Labelled as either directive 
autocrat, permissive autocrat, directive democrat or permissive democrat (Muczyk & 
Reimann, 1987) leadership style was seen to vary according to the extent to which 
leaders permitted subordinates to take part in decisions, and the extent to which 
leaders directed the activities of their subordinates.  Muczyk & Reimann (1987) 
noted that all styles had their inherent advantages and disadvantages and the 
relative success of each was heavily dependent on conditions prevailing in the 
organisation and/or its stage of development.  Therefore, they argued, no style of 
leadership was considered the best under all conditions and the most effective style 
would be the one that matches the needs of the organisation at a particular point in 
time.   
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The second perspective of leadership style again viewed behaviour along a 
continuum but this time focusing on either the leader’s disposition towards 
colleagues and subordinates, or towards a task.  Research at the University of 
Michigan (Likert, 1961) and at the Ohio State University by Stogdill and his 
associates (Cialdini, 1988) found that leaders were either production-oriented with a 
focus on getting the job done (also referred to as ‘initiating structure’), or person-
oriented, in which case they were primarily concerned with establishing good 
relations with their subordinates (hence the alternative term ‘consideration’).  Further 
work in this area led other researchers to expand on these two dimensions and to 
consider a wider array of leader styles depending on the degree to which leaders 
emphasised each of the two dimensions.  The ‘managerial grid’ developed by Blake 
& Mouton is probably the most cited outcome of such research.  These researchers 
suggested that although the two dimensions are largely independent (Weissenberg 
and Kavanagh, 1972) and a leader may show signs of being more oriented to one 
dimension rather than to another, the two are not mutually exclusive.  Leaders, they 
suggest, often exhibit a mix of both orientations and the extent to which leaders are 
high or low on consideration and initiating structure will lead to different behaviours 
and styles; five primary styles were ultimately suggested (Blake and Mouton, 1978; 
Blake and Mouton, 1985).   
Unlike a trait, therefore, a style is not so much something a person possesses as it is 
a way of relating to other people in the circumstances in which they find themselves 
(Hollander, 1978: 28, emphasis added).  In fact, the importance of this difference lies 
in the recognition that just as leaders affect the behaviours of subordinates, so too 
are their actions influenced by the reactions of their subordinates.  Furthermore, it 
recognises that such actions and reactions can also be shaped by circumstance 
which, when applied to the domain of organisational management, refers to the 
environment in which organisations operate (Hammer and Turk, 1987; Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978). 
This reasoning led to a different but complementary line of thinking referred to as 
situational leadership (Hersey and Blanchard, 1982) which, in itself, can probably be 
considered as a transitional point to the contingency approach to leadership. 
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Contextual Leadership:  The Contingency Approach 
This approach emphasises that effective leaders are those people who choose to 
adopt those relevant characteristics, styles and behaviour that are most appropriate 
to a particular situation.  As such, successful leaders are those people who are able 
to first understand what trait or style is best suited for the opportunity or problem they 
are facing, and can then be flexible enough to apply these styles differently, in 
different contexts.  Various theories have been proposed and although they all reflect 
the contextual importance of leadership, they are based on different definitions or 
foci of the context. 
Hersey and Blanchard’s (1982) situational leadership theory focuses on the context 
from the perspective of subordinate maturity.  They suggest that subordinates need 
more, or less, directive actions by their leader depending upon where they stand in 
terms of their (task) maturity.  They concluded that when subordinates’ maturity is 
low, leaders are more effective through directive action.  As subordinates master 
their jobs, leaders should be less directive and show more ‘consideration’.  When 
subordinates reach full maturity, the need for both decreases.  An effective 
situational leader is therefore one who changes his style depending on the person he 
is working with and the situation (Blanchard, Zigarmi et al., 1986: 27).  Blanchard et. 
al. (1986) suggest four basic styles of leadership – directing, coaching, supporting 
and delegating. 
The importance of the prevailing situation in relation to effective leadership is again a 
central tenet of Fiedler’s contingency theory (Fiedler, 1967), but in this case, 
underlying the situational aspect are two foci.  Fiedler (1967) suggests that effective 
leadership is a function of (a) two basic styles of leadership (task-oriented or 
relationship-oriented) each reflecting different degrees of a leader’s esteem (liking) 
for the least preferred co-worker (LPC), and (b) the application of these two different 
styles depending upon the leader’s degree of control over the prevailing situation.  
Fiedler’s theory concludes that task-oriented leaders (low LPC) are more effective 
than person-oriented leaders (high LPC) when situational control is either very high 
or very low.  On the other hand, high LPC leaders are more effective than low LPC 
leaders when situational control is moderate.  Fiedler’s contingency theory received 
a lot of attention and has been examined and tested by other researchers (Ashour, 
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1973; Berkowitz, 1978; Strube and Garcia, 1981; Chemers, Hays et al., 1985; Peter, 
Hartke et al., 1985) who have also attempted to investigate further contingency 
variables.  
A theory that emerged from such attention is cognitive resource theory espoused by 
Fiedler and Garcia (Fiedler and Garcia, 1987).  This theory suggests that leaders’ 
cognitive abilities (such as intelligence and problem-solving skills) play a determining 
role in their success (Baron and Greenberg, 1989) but that the relationship between 
leader intelligence and success is mediated by the extent to which leaders are 
directive and by the levels of stress prevailing at a particular point in time.  Fiedler 
and Garcia (1987) suggest that leaders’ intelligence and cognitive abilities will affect 
the performance of subordinates, only when directive action is coupled with low 
stress. 
Another theory of leadership that bears relevance to the contextual importance 
common to the contingency approach is normative theory developed by Vroom and 
Yetton (Vroom and Yetton, 1973).  Riding on the principle that leaders who make 
good decisions are likely to be more effective in the long run than leaders who make 
bad ones, Vroom & Yetton (1973) researched the relationship between leadership 
and decision-making to understand whether certain decision-making styles are more 
conducive to effective leadership than others.  Like all other contingency-based 
theories, they concluded that the best method of decision-making (they identified five 
distinct methods ranging from total autocratic to total participative) was contingent 
upon the situation.  Particularly, they suggested that the choice of method should 
depend upon the quality of the decision and the importance of its acceptance.  By 
‘quality’ of decision, they referred to the extent to which a decision will affect 
important group processes such as communication or output, while ‘acceptance’ was 
a function of the importance of the degree of commitment needed by subordinates 
for its implementation.  For example, while participative decision-making goes a long 
way to show a leader’s consideration for subordinates, helping to drive improved 
group atmosphere, morale (Vroom, 1976) and presumably performance, it is unlikely 
to be an effective style in times of crisis that require a more directive style to match 
the need for quick decision-making.  Vroom and Yetton’s theory has also received a 
lot of attention and while some studies designed to test or extend its validity suggest 
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the need for some adjustments in the theory (Heilman, Hornstein et al., 1984; 
Crouch and Yetton, 1987) the results of other studies have been encouraging 
(Vroom and Jago, 1978; Field, 1982). 
Just as decision-making is seen as a key element of effective leadership, so too is 
the ability to establish clear and achievable goals.  This is the focus of the path-goal 
theory developed by House and Baetz (House and Baetz, 1979).  According to this 
theory, subordinates perform better when they view their leader as helping them 
achieve their goals.  More specifically, House and Baetz (1979) suggest that the 
actions taken by a leader to clarify the nature of subordinates’ tasks and to clear the 
‘path’ from obstacles that may impede the achievement of their assigned goal, are 
likely to improve job satisfaction, motivation and their performance.  As such, they 
suggest that leaders can be instrumental (directive), supportive, participative or 
achievement-oriented in their style.  While these styles are not mutually exclusive, 
they should be used interchangeably depending on the aspects of different work 
environments and the different characteristics of subordinates.  For example, tasks 
which are unstructured and non-routine may best be approached by an instrumental 
leadership style.  On the other hand, this style may be ineffective and indeed 
counterproductive, if applied in the management of professional staff who typically 
are highly skilled, who know how tasks should be carried out, and who, therefore, 
are likely to welcome a supportive, rather than directive, style of leadership. 
A final consideration of the contingency approach is the vertical dyad linkage 
approach developed by Dansereau, Graen and Haga (Dansereau, Graen et al., 
1975).  This theory is probably the one that gives most attention to the human and 
emotive aspect of the leader by recognising that leaders will invariably establish 
different personal relationships with different people.  Dansereau et al. (1975) 
suggest that effective leadership is therefore a function of the quality of the 
relationship and exchanges that develop between leaders and followers given 
different situations and over time.  Differences in such relationships will influence 
things such as performance and job satisfaction (Graen and Scandura, 1987).  In 
general, it is argued that leaders holding negative views of their subordinates will be 
less effective in stimulating their motivation, commitment and performance than 
those who hold positive views on subordinates and who offer their help/support.  
 Page 170 
Leaders should therefore seek to establish positive relationships with their 
subordinates; something which can be achieved through adequate training 
(Scandura and Graen, 1984). 
Other Approaches to Leadership? 
Besides the three approaches to leadership just described, it is possible to identify 
some different trends in the literature that seem to depart from the tradition of 
viewing leadership solely from the perspective of either traits, styles or context.  
What these ‘new’ perspectives have in common is that they seem to acknowledge 
the importance of all three approaches but accentuate their validity by adopting a 
more holistic approach that tries to contemporarily juggle all three forms while 
sensitising their application to modern day realities. 
For example, research has been carried out to compare and/or distinguish between 
leadership and management (Kotter, 1990a, 1990b; Rees, Turner et al., 1996).  This 
stream of the literature considers how the characteristics and behaviours of different 
people, in different positions and facing different circumstances, can shape different 
types of leaders, of which, the research suggests, there are essentially two – 
transactional leaders and transformational leaders (Burns, 1978).  In general terms, 
transactional leadership is used to connote the skills and ability inherent in those 
persons who are required to handle the more mundane, operational and day-to-day 
transactions of daily life (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 1999: 5), while 
transformational leaders are those people who are distinguished by the ability to 
bring about change, innovation and entrepreneurship (Daft, 1992: 468).  It is 
interesting to note that earlier thinking on the topic created a marked division 
between the two types of leadership, branding the latter (the real leaders) as more 
important to the former (the managers).  Indeed, a common definition in the literature 
to distinguish the two, identifies managers as (merely) those people who do things 
right and leaders as those people who do the right thing.  More recent literature 
would suggest that a mixture of both transformational leadership and transactional 
management is required to ensure successful organisational performance.  As such, 
each perspective has led to other avenues of research that either examine how 
managers can become better transactional leaders, or that consider the activities 
that must be followed by leaders to successfully achieve transformation, such as the 
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process of visioning, the mobilisation of commitment and the institutionalisation of 
change (Tichy and Devanna, 1984).  Indeed, these streams of research constitute 
different bodies of knowledge in themselves.   
Another dimension of the literature seems to consider the practice of leadership.  In 
this case, the focus lies not so much on leader characteristics or style, but rather on 
what effective leaders actually ‘do’ (Kotter, 1990b; Kotter, 2000).  For example, it is 
suggested that leaders are at their best when they engage in the following five 
practices: when they challenge the process  (the status quo); inspire a shared vision; 
enable others to act; when they model the way (they have detailed plans); and when 
they encourage the heart (Kouzes and Pozner, 1987: 8).  Similarly, they are seen to 
be people who bring heart to their work; who engage in meaningful relationships and 
conversations with their colleagues and subordinates; who evoke creativity in 
people; and who are visibly committed to achieving results (Kiefer, 1998).  Closely 
related to the treatise of what effective leaders do is also a consideration of what 
they bring to the act in terms of character and competence, although a fine line 
exists between this and the definition of traits.  Thus, it is suggested that effective 
leaders have a great deal of self-knowledge; a strongly defined sense of purpose; a 
capacity to generate and sustain trust; and a bias towards action (Bennis, 1994).  It 
is probably correct to state that the most extensive area of research pertaining to the 
study on the practice of leadership is that relating to the leader’s ability to inspire a 
vision; i.e. ‘visioning’ (Kakabadse, Nortier et al., 1998; Kotter, 1997; Gioia and 
Chittipeddi, 1991). 
It should also be noted that over the years the study and practice of leadership has 
been iterative rather than linear or sequential in approach, and has often redirected 
itself back and forth to earlier concepts on the subject.  For example, Khurana (2002) 
notes that a long-standing decline in corporate profits in the 1980s, coupled with the 
rise of so-called populist capitalism, led investors and companies in the late 1980s 
and the 1990s to frantically search for and replace the stable ‘organisation man’ of 
the managerial capitalist era with a new breed of corporate leaders, the focus of 
which were charismatic, energy-infused CEOs considered by many as saviours of 
the new era.  However, while some of these leaders truly worked wonders in their 
respective fields, others have been equally capable of producing incredible disasters.  
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For example, it has been claimed in the popular press that the recent scandals of 
companies of the likes of Enron, Tyco and Worldcom were as much a result of poor 
governance and oversight by ineffective Boards, as they were the ability of their 
leaders to ‘charm’ such Boards into entrusting them with far too much freedom and 
flexibility in managing their companies.  These leaders and their actions have been 
quickly condemned, but some critics may try to use such outcomes to admonish 
charismatic leadership, rather than unfettered leaders.  Khurana argues that such 
unfortunate events should not lead people to discount the potential of charismatic or 
other trait-based leadership.  Instead, it should instil in them a willingness to 
recognise the weakness of aspects of a particular theory and improve upon it; in this 
case, to move from blind faith in a person, to a more mature belief in leaders that is 
based on both faith and reason (Khurana, 2002: 66).   
Moving back and forth from theories of leadership does not only help to improve 
aspects of such theories.  It also leads to the development of new considerations of 
leadership and encourages researchers to approach leadership from multiple foci.  
Take the example mentioned above.  Khurana’s appeal to introduce an element of 
reason to the study of charismatic leadership would prompt some of the more ardent 
researchers not to shed the theories of trait leadership but rather to consider other 
traits or conditions that are required as safeguards against a repetition of mistakes of 
the past.  Considering issues of corporate governance by strengthening a company’s 
board of directors can be one such condition or response (Sonnenfeld, 2002) to the 
potential blinding effects of strong charismatic leadership.  Ironically, the ability to 
find meaning in negative events and to learn from even the most trying 
circumstances can also be one of the most reliable indicators and predictors of true 
leadership (Bennis and Thomas, 2002).  Indeed, such ability has been considered as 
a trait in itself and one that is increasingly more demanded of modern leaders.  This 
trait is ‘wisdom’.  It is perceived to be fundamental to the very concept of leadership 
and to transcend all approaches to leadership as “no one given set of characteristics 
attributed to a leader, or a set of circumstances out of which a leader-follower 
relationship is born, can, in itself, give rise to the phenomenon of leadership without 
the presence of the willingness to aspire to wisdom – that openness to “truth-as-a-
process” which is Socratic teaching itself” (Korac-Kakabadse, Kakabadse et al., 
2000: 1).  Likewise, other studies have similarly shed the traditional approach to 
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leadership and, in addition to viewing leadership through the concept of wisdom, 
have considered leadership through other ‘lenses’ such as power (Pinto, 2000), trust 
(Culbert and McDonough, 1986; Christensen and Laegreid, 1999), and the adoption 
and management of values (Senge, 1992; Savage, 1996).   
Finally, while some researchers believe that leadership is the pivotal factor needed 
to enhance human resources (Bennis and Nanus, 1985: 8) and that there is no 
alternative for it, as it cannot be created or promoted, taught or learned (Drucker, 
1989: 156), others have given consideration to the possibility that some factors may 
actually substitute for a leader’s influence, rendering it superfluous.  These factors 
may include knowledge, competence and commitment on the part of subordinates, 
and/or highly structured tasks or work environments, technology, work norms and 
group peer pressure (Kerr and Jermier, 1978; Sheridan, Vredenburgh et al., 1984).  
Equally effective may be a functional, problem-centred approach to strategy 
implementation, also referred to as pragmatic leadership (Mumford and Van Doorn, 
2001).  Acknowledging that ‘traditional’ leadership is not always necessary and that 
steady success can be achieved equally by good management (Kakabadse and 
Kakabadse, 1999: 3), some authors believe that leadership has been ‘romanticized’ 
and given more importance than it deserves (Meindl and Ehrlich, 1987), thereby 
suggesting that the search for substitutes should be intensified.   
Leadership in the Context of the DBA Research 
The fact that leadership was identified as one of the top two most important factors 
that can decisively influence success or failure in policy implementation, is evidence 
enough of the high regard that this issue is given by those involved in the 
management of Maltese public policy.  It is also highly indicative of a situation 
wherein at least politicians, public officers and consultants seem to yearn for better, 
more effective leadership.  But what is it, exactly, that they are looking for or aim to 
achieve?  Reference to the definitions of leadership that were used in Project 3 can 
shed some light on this issue. 
In the context of successful policy implementation, leadership was defined as “the 
ability to develop and command a following, characterised by clarity of vision and a 
legitimate mandate” (Table 11), while in the context of failure, the ‘lack’ of leadership 
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was defined as “the inability to develop and command a following for a particular 
policy, because of one’s ineptness, an unclear or changing vision, and/or wavering 
commitment” (Table 10).  These definitions materialised from the findings of Projects 
1 and 2 and although emerging from specific case studies, Project 3 interviewees 
were asked to consider the universal application of such properties or dimensions of 
leadership in the context of the Maltese public policy arena.  The notion that 
leadership is perceived to be “the ability to develop and command a following” 
seems attuned to the principles of charismatic leadership and is probably a view that 
persons familiar with Maltese history and the way of life of its people can come to 
understand and accept more readily than others.  Indeed, maybe because having 
been shaped by centuries of foreign rule by successive dominating powers35, the 
Maltese people have traditionally sought and embraced strong leaders to guide them 
in their quest for political, social and also religious emancipation.  This is a trend that 
prevails today as evidenced, for example, in the political sphere, where almost 
everything that is said and done by a political party is attributed to its leader, and 
where elections have been won and lost on the personal strength or weakness of the 
party leader.  Even in the administration of Government, the Public Service Reform 
Commission36 had noted that the effectiveness of the Civil Service depended upon 
its leadership.  Particularly, it stated that “the quality of leadership that [the Head of 
the Civil Service] provides is critical: his greatest challenge [lying] in cultivating a 
sense of collegiality among the leaders of the public service” (Public Service Reform 
Commission, 1989: 71).  Whether charismatic leadership is truly what the public 
service in Malta requires is a matter for debate and investigation and cannot be 
answered here.  However, the issue points to an important consideration with regard 
to tackling the perceived need for leadership: that before attempting to address the 
problem, decision-makers must pause to understand the problem, and the cause 
contributing to the perceived absence of leadership.  The first proposition for 
improving policy implementation through improved leadership is, therefore: 
                                            
35 Refer to Appendix 1 for further details. 
36 The Public Service Reform Commission (PSRC) was appointed by the Prime Minister in 1988 “to examine the 
organisation of the Public Service, and to recommend means by which the Service can efficiently respond to 
the changing needs for effective government” (Public Service Reform Commission, 1989). 
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L1:  Diagnose the Leadership Gap.  
The importance of this initiative recognises that the key to effective leadership lies, 
first and foremost, in matching the type and/or style of leadership which subordinates 
feel they require most, rather than the one which leaders either think they’re best at 
or that subordinates require (Blanchard, Zigarmi et al., 1986).  An initiative that aims 
to understand where leadership is failing should, inter alia, question how politicians 
and public officers view leadership, and should also consider both the value system 
(Savage, 1996) characterising the public service today, as well as the present 
challenges of the policy context in Malta and those of the foreseeable future.  
Moving beyond the type or style of leadership that may be required, one must also 
consider the scope or breadth of leadership.   
An operations review of the Maltese Public Service conducted in 1988 noted an 
absence of middle management and a dearth of leadership in public service ranks 
(Tabone, 1988: 27).  A similar report prepared a decade later again concluded that 
there was still an absence of competence and of effective leadership in a 
considerable number of senior positions, as well as an absence of champions in 
strategic positions (Management Efficiency Unit, 1998: 2).  The interviews held over 
the recent past for the purpose of this research study continue to echo these 
conclusions.  Collectively, these comments lead to at least two observations. 
The first is that the people involved in the management of policy continue to limit 
their view of leadership solely to the perspective of the individual.  Said differently, it 
seems that they are waiting for one or a few super-leaders who can herald a new era 
of leadership and who can mastermind the development and implementation of the 
government’s agenda and its policies, almost single-handedly and from their 
positions at the apex of the Service.  Nothing can be this surreal.  Secondly, it also 
seems that politicians and public officers are not adequately recognising and 
distinguishing between the different roles that can be played by different leaders i.e., 
that not every leader has to be ‘superman’ and fall within the transformational 
category discussed earlier.  Equally important are a cadre of effective transactional 
leaders at every level of the organisation. 
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In a way, the view that leadership is only about the individual is hardly surprising.  
This concept is probably reflective of the romanticism associated with this subject 
(Meindl and Ehrlich, 1987) and is indicative of the emphasis by which the subject is 
probably presented to students and practitioners of management.  To a greater 
degree, it is also manifested in the populist literature that reduces the achievements 
of whole organisations to the single chief at the “top” (Mintzberg, 1996) and that 
places a significant emphasis on aspects pertaining to the leaders’ characteristics, 
behaviours, styles and practices.  This view needs to be corrected.  Decision makers 
must recognise that the potency of leadership is more likely to arise as the collective 
strength of a number of leaders working at various levels of an organisation, rather 
than from the traits, behaviours and/or practices of a single person at the top.  Thus, 
it is recommended that; 
L2: Developing effective leadership requires the 
establishment of a network37 of effective leaders. 
This proposition recognises that leadership exists at all levels of the organisation 
(Cleland, 1994, as cited in Turner, Grude et al., 1996: 108).  It is also based on the 
belief that leadership can be ‘institutionalised’ (Nadler and Tushman, 1990).  By 
institutionalising leadership, I do not mean substituting for leadership or mechanising 
it, but rather taking measures to (a) demystify the concept and correct the perception 
that leadership pertains solely to some type of individual or elite group; (b) devolve 
leadership to rank and file so that everyone can ‘run with’ his/her own responsibilities 
and inspire others to do the same; and (c) promote and reward exemplary leadership 
so that, over time, it makes its way through the value system of the organisation and 
becomes part of ‘who we are’ and ‘how we do things around here’. 
This leads the discussion back to the second observation mentioned earlier; that 
there are different types of leaders who can be equally effective, albeit playing 
different roles.  While acknowledging the merits of the argument that “leadership is 
different from management, and the primary force behind successful change of any 
                                            
37 In this context, the term ‘network’ should be interpreted in its most literal sense.  The choice and use of the 
word ‘network’ is simply intended to connote and emphasise the idea that leadership should be approached as 
a shared activity and exercised in a pluralist manner.  Its use is not intended to reflect the meaning ascribed to 
it when used in the context of political science and sociology. 
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significance is the former, not the latter” (Kotter, 1999a), this research would suggest 
that both transformational and transactional leaders are required for the successful 
implementation of public policy in Malta and that, following from the argument 
presented above, these should ideally be found throughout an organisation, rather 
than concentrated in a few positions or places.  Thus, it is believed that: 
L2a: A network of effective leaders ideally requires a mix 
of transformational and transactional leaders. 
Unfortunately, the availability of transformational leaders in the Maltese public 
service now, and in the past, has been virtually non-existent or at least not evident 
(which in itself is evidence of the former).  The reason for this would need to be 
explored but might be attributed to factors such as more exciting and rewarding 
challenges in the private sector that lure potential leaders away from the public 
service.  Whatever the reason, Malta’s experience has shown that transformational 
leaders in government are more likely to arise from the political class whose mission, 
after all, is transformational in nature, in that they seek power to then use this to 
replace the old with the new.  Indeed, the leadership experienced in the Local 
Councils initiative (Project 2) was a rare example of transformational leadership at 
work, which, in the main, was attributed to the political figure.  However, it should be 
recognised that there is little, if anything, that can be done to ensure that persons 
occupying political positions possess the type of transformational leadership required 
to successfully drive policy.  Politicians are elected to their positions and some (if not 
many!) are so elected on the basis of their popularity and appeal, rather than a 
proven track record in organisational leadership and policy management.  At least 
from the latter aspect, some tend to disappoint.  I also believe that by virtue of its 
own nature, there is probably little that can be done to influence the emergence of 
transformational leadership throughout the ranks of the public service, except to 
consider what conditions in the environment can be introduced, modified or removed 
to give ‘latent’ transformational leaders the ‘space’ required to contribute better to the 
Service and to make an impact on the implementation of policy.  For example, 
experience has shown that past decisions to migrate some government departments 
from the main stream public service to agency status provided these organisations 
with an opportunity to bring about radical change and innovation that would never 
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have happened otherwise.  Essentially, these organisations were still made up of the 
same people fulfilling the same core functions, but by changing their legislative 
context and procedural dimensions, the persons exercising leadership in these 
organisations could pursue strategies and manage in ways that were not possible 
before.  The capability to do so was there, but it couldn’t happen.  Therefore, while it 
would be advantageous to have a body of active transformational leaders throughout 
government, those best positioned to engage in transformational leadership are 
likely to be the politicians and top civil servants who may have the predisposition, 
and also access to the resources and power required to induce or support radical 
change and innovation.   
Without discounting the potential benefits that may arise from transformational 
leadership, a more manageable and, maybe, realistic approach to improving the 
odds of successful policy implementation is one that, at least in the short to medium 
term, places greater focus on the development of transactional leaders.   
At face value, dealing with transactional leadership should be ‘easier’ than dealing 
with transformational leadership, at least from one aspect.  Unlike some of the 
elected persons occupying the latter role, who may be expert impressionists but who 
may lack the organisational expertise required to deliver on their promises, the 
persons occupying the former role in the Civil Service are meant to be appointed to 
their position on the basis of some proven track record.  Therefore, one would think 
that given a certain aptitude and predisposition, and given also the right conditions 
and support, these people could come to excel as transactional leaders.  
Unfortunately, there are obstacles to be faced even here.  [In Malta] Parties in 
government have frequently used senior offices in the public service, including 
directorships in public corporations, to reward activists and/or close family members, 
while less important posts have been used to gratify constituents (Pirotta, 2001: 
250).  Therefore, the result of such appointments may be similar to that of elections, 
in that, like some of their counterparts in the political sphere of government, some 
persons occupying significant positions in the Civil Service may excel in appeal and 
popularity, but may also be equally incompetent leaders.  There is not much that can 
be done with these persons given that, once appointed, they are hard to remove.  
But something ought to be done with those who are capable and willing.  After all, an 
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objective of spreading transactional leadership throughout the Service is to identify 
and ‘exploit’ the best element of its human resources to further the successful 
implementation of policy.   
But can leadership propagate through a managed process?  As mentioned earlier, 
those subscribing to Drucker’s (1989) view object to the notion that leadership can 
be taught or that management can create leaders.  However, even Drucker does 
suggest that management can [both] create the conditions under which potential 
leadership qualities become effective, and it can also stifle potential leadership 
(Drucker, 1989: 156).  In this respect, it is argued that successful organisations don’t 
wait for leaders to appear; they actively seek out people with leadership potential 
and expose them to career experiences to develop that potential (Dahmen and 
Hammond, 2002: 25).  This view is supported by the findings of this research, which 
also indicate that the conditions for stimulating leadership can be brought to bear by 
either management (the institution) and/or the individual himself.  This is also akin to 
the view held in the literature that leadership is essentially about a relationship 
between people who are influencing each other and who affect, or can be affected 
by, the context within which they operate.  Therefore, the discussion that follows will 
present the measures (or conditions) that have been proposed to influence 
leadership and policy implementation from both an individual and an institutional 
point of view. 
One of the reasons contributing to the failure of the financial management reform 
policy (Project 1) was the perceived ineptness of the leadership (Interviewees 65, 70, 
74).  In contrast, the resourcefulness and comprehensive skills base of the team 
leading the local councils initiative (Project 2) were perceived to have contributed to 
its successful implementation (Interviewees 142, 143, 144).  These and other factors 
relating to the quality of the leadership would suggest that a foremost determining 
factor of its effectiveness is competence, and that this can be viewed from the 
perspectives of knowledge/skills and personal traits.  The type of knowledge or traits 
that may be required differs from one situation to another, and various suggestions 
are made in the literature.  What is more important in terms of the DBA research is to 
identify what measures, if any, can be taken to ensure the availability of competent 
leadership.   
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One’s knowledge and skills can be acquired or enhanced through formal training and 
education.  The PSRC had identified this as an important measure to improve the 
competency of the leadership of the Civil Service and had in fact recommended the 
establishment of the Staff Development Organisation to pursue this objective (Public 
Service Reform Commission, 1989, 1990).  This is an institutional measure that, in 
fact, was followed.  But another factor that can positively contribute to one’s 
knowledge and leadership qualities is experience (Interviewees 145, 146).  In this 
respect, it is suggested that the Service must provide better opportunities for its staff.  
First, it must be willing to risk by assigning policies, or aspects of them, to 
inexperienced or less experienced persons.  If policies are always managed by the 
same people, the objective of devolving competent leadership throughout the various 
Ministries will not be reached.  Worse still, it may lead to cloning38 and stagnation in 
creativity (Interviewees 65 and 71).  Second, it must give persons in leadership 
positions enough time to mature and learn from such exposure.  This is inhibited by 
frequent turnovers in leadership, which is also disruptive to the stability of an 
organisation.  Of course, willing to risk does not mean not managing that risk.  
Besides being provided with safe opportunities to learn, practice and even teach new 
skills and behaviours (Miller, 2000), leaders ‘in formation’ need to be directed, 
coached and supported (Blanchard, Zigarmi et al., 1986).  Naturally, institutional 
efforts to improve the qualities of its potential leaders must be matched by the 
individuals’ cooperation in terms of their willingness and predisposition to learn 
(Interviewee 67) and presumably a readiness to be flexible and open to new 
challenges.   
This links to the other perspective of competent leadership; that is, personal traits.  
Flexibility and a predisposition to learn underscore the philosophy of the 
developmental school of leadership, in which wisdom and maturity occupy centre 
stage (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 1999: 9).  In the context of policy 
implementation, a ‘wise’ leader is probably one who recognises his strengths and 
weaknesses, who is sensitive to the elements of the environment in which he is 
required to operate, and who is both willing and capable of modifying his behaviour 
                                            
38  Defined as the perpetuation of management behaviours and practices that may potentially stifle innovation 
(Source:  DBA Project 1). 
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to match the ambiguities of that context.  On the other hand, the ‘mature’ leader is 
one who is capable of inviting, receiving and handling feedback well (Korac-
Kakabadse, Korac-Kakabadse et al., 1996: 38) and who fosters a learning 
environment by being accessible, by encouraging information sharing and by 
admitting mistakes (Edmonson, Bohmer et al., 2001).  From a trait perspective, 
competence is also characterised as the ability to provide clarity of vision 
(Interviewees 144,146,147,149).  The rationale is that competent leaders are ones 
who know what is required and who are able to explicitly communicate that message 
to provide others with a clear direction (Interviewees 68,70).  According to the ‘born 
to lead’ philosophy, individuals either have such traits or they don’t and there is 
nothing others can do about it.  But maybe there is.  For example, exposing would-
be leaders to different experiences should provide them with better opportunities for 
getting ‘wiser’.  This can also develop better if greater efforts are made to direct 
these individuals into those experiences that will progressively impart to them greater 
degrees of maturity.  Going back to an earlier point, the Service must also recognise 
that potential leaders can arise from different ranks.  Therefore, efforts to develop 
competent leadership throughout the organisation must be substantiated by a will to 
search for and acknowledge would-be leaders throughout the various levels of the 
hierarchy, rather than by maintaining an aloofness from the rank and file (Interviewee 
67).  Considering the above, it is proposed that: 
L3:  Successful policy implementation requires 
Competent Leadership. 
L3a:  Competence is a function of knowledge/skills 
and personal traits. 
Another aspect of leadership that is considered to influence the outcome of policy 
implementation is commitment39.  The findings of the research would suggest that 
                                            
39 In the context presented here, the use of the term ‘Commitment’ refers to a leader’s personal commitment to a 
policy initiative.  It should be noted that Commitment has also been viewed from a broader, organisational 
perspective.  In this respect, it is considered as a critical factor that independently influences policy 
implementation.  Furthermore, besides influencing Leadership, Commitment can also be influenced by 
Leadership.  A discussion of both Commitment as an independent factor and of its relationship with 
Leadership in the latter respect is presented later in this report. 
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committed leadership is a function of (but also affects) confidence and motivation, 
values and integrity. 
An enthusiastic attitude (Interviewees 145,146) and visible motivation (Interviewees 
65,70) are perceived as evidence of a leader’s strong commitment to a policy 
programme (Interviewee 70,148,149).  They are indicative of a confident leader, but 
also inspire confidence and enthusiasm in others (Interviewees 146,147).  
Committed leaders inspire confidence and motivation when they show high personal 
interest in a policy (Interviewee 147); when they persist to see it through even in 
times of difficulty (Interviewee 147); when they are willing to risk and assume 
responsibility for their actions and the outcomes of the implementation programme 
(Interviewees 145,149); and, maybe above all, when they adopt an optimistic 
disposition (Interviewee 145).  Some of these factors are behavioural and dependent 
on an individual’s character.  However, from an institutional perspective, it is 
suggested that there are a number of things that can be done to influence this and 
successful implementation.  Firstly, recognising that a leader’s confidence derives 
from his past experience (Bowman, 1999: 560), policies should, to the extent 
possible, be entrusted to leaders who have positive experience in managing similar 
policies in similar contexts.  Secondly, policies should be entrusted to persons who 
typically adopt an optimistic attitude even in the face of difficulties.  Thirdly, an 
attempt should be made to increase leaders’ commitment by affording them 
adequate resources in sufficient quantities (Interviewees 142,143,146,148,149); by 
rewarding performance within a framework of accountability (Interviewees 
65,66,67,72,74); and by involving their participation in decision-making to 
encourage/sustain ownership (Interviewees 65, 66,67,68,70,71). 
Committed leadership has also been described from the perspective of values and 
integrity.  While it is recognised that a leader’s commitment to a policy initiative can 
be significantly influenced by the value he ascribes to the policy40, leaders who do 
not subscribe to the ideology of a particular policy but who nonetheless act with 
integrity in its execution are still seen to exercise effective leadership.  Leading with 
integrity, or principled leadership, means acting ethically, with tact and diplomacy 
                                            
40 This is discussed later under ‘leader affinity’. 
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(London, 1999).  It also means maintaining a consistent focus on what needs to be 
delivered (Interviewee 70).  It requires an apolitical attitude (Interviewee 147) and 
enough personal strength not to be swayed according to one’s own preferences or 
beliefs.  Government and the Public Service play an important role in safeguarding 
and promoting such integrity.  In this respect, it is suggested that leaders can be at 
their best when roles are clearly defined and delineated (Interviewees 142,147,149).  
This minimises the potential for (partisan) political interference and promotes 
objectivity in the implementation of policy (Interviewee 146).  Government and/or the 
Public Service can also promote integrity by maintaining a strong and consistent 
view of a policy even if opportunities arise to gain political mileage from a change in 
policy direction.  Therefore: 
L4:  Successful policy implementation requires 
Committed Leadership. 
L4a:  Committed Leadership is a function of 
confidence/motivation and values/integrity. 
Policies also stand a better chance of being successfully implemented when the 
leadership is properly empowered to carry them to fruition.  There are two elements 
contributing to empowerment and each one influences the other.   
The first element is power or, more specifically in the context of policy 
implementation, the willingness and ability to share power.  From an individual’s 
perspective, power sharing is influenced first by his/her willingness to accept 
responsibility and control for some policy, and then by his/her readiness to shed part 
of that control by delegating aspects of that responsibility to others (Interviewees 
65,66,67,70).  Not everyone can, or is ready to do so.  Accepting and sharing power 
requires leaders to be both accountable and submissive to the chain of command 
and to be ready to enforce their responsibility and hold others accountable to it, even 
at the risk of jeopardising personal relationships (Interviewee 66).  It also requires a 
shift in paradigm that acknowledges that true power arises from the ability to use 
information that has been shared, rather than from withholding knowledge and 
information (Interviewee 149).  From an institutional perspective, power sharing 
should mean sharing ownership and responsibility for a policy, rather than dumping it 
 Page 184 
onto some other entity/individual or leaving it ‘homeless’.  In fact, decisions 
pertaining to the location of a policy initiative are critical to its successful outcome 
(Interviewees 146,147,149), especially when considering the [typical] lack of 
coordination between the activities of government departments, including those 
located in the same ministerial portfolio (Warrington, 1992).  Proper role delineation 
(Interviewee 74), as opposed to role fragmentation (Interviewees 65,66,70) can be 
as effective in empowering leaders as can formal power ascribed to them by the 
organisation through authority, status or influence (Pinto, 2000).  Irrespective of the 
origins of power, the research suggests that the effectiveness of the leadership in 
successfully implementing policy will be dependent upon the use of legitimate or 
mandated power (Interviewees 68, 149).  While legitimisation enables a new 
paradigm to take hold (Brooks and Bate, 1994: 188), the use of ‘illegitimate’ power 
will lead to resistance and opposition and crush opportunities for successful policy 
implementation.  Effective leadership is [therefore] the wise use of power (Bennis 
and Nanus, 1985: 17). 
Empowerment is also dependent on the presence of trustful relationships.  Indeed, 
power will not be entrusted to leaders, and leaders will not share it with others, if the 
donors fear that this could be used against them.  From a leadership perspective, 
empowerment requires trustworthy leaders and leaders who can inspire and build 
trust in others.  This is important because “with trust and trusting relationships, 
imperfect plans can be made to work [but] without trust and trusting relationships, 
even the most perfectly conceived plans can fail” (Culbert and McDonough, 1986: 
171).  What influences trust between two or more people depends on a number of 
variables (Herzog, 2001) and the literature proposes a number of steps or measures 
to address this (Shockley-Zalabak, Ellis et al., 2000; Cufaude, 1999; Webb, 2000).  
However, five characteristics that seem to be universally required of leaders and 
their followers to engage in trustful relationships include integrity, competence, 
consistency, loyalty and openness (Butler and Cantrell, 1984).  Leaders must also 
build trust by “walking the talk” (Simons, 2002); that is, they must practice what they 
preach.  Some of the findings of this research echo these propositions (Interviewees 
66,70) but also point to other factors which, given the realities of the Maltese polity 
are also of utmost importance.  First, it must be recognised and accepted that trust is 
more likely to emanate from relationships between persons who are ‘in the same 
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political camp’ and who are therefore less likely to fear acts of policy sabotage 
(Interviewee 65).  Secondly, it arises when there is a considerable element of 
respect between colleagues (Interviewee 147) and a high level of confidence in each 
other’s skills (Interviewee 149).  Of course, this is highly dependent on the attitudes 
and dispositions of the individuals involved.  However, such attitudes can be 
influenced or shaped by things that persons experience in their environment.  
Consequently it is suggested that, from an institutional perspective, trust can be 
engendered through fair and equitable management practices (Interviewee 67), 
participation in decision-making (Interviewee 66), and a context characterised by a 
calm political climate (Interviewee 65).  Therefore: 
L5:  Successful policy implementation requires 
Empowered Leadership. 
L5a:  Empowered Leadership is a function of 
trust and power sharing. 
A final condition or measure of leadership that is seen to influence policy 
implementation is the leader’s affinity with the policy and its (political) context.  There 
are two dimensions to this.  The first relates to the leader’s personal interests in the 
policy itself, while the second considers the leader’s personal interests from a 
political perspective.  In a nutshell, it is about perceived losses or gains.  While the 
discussion on competence, commitment and empowerment centred on an 
understanding of what leaders bring to a policy implementation initiative, the focus of 
a discussion on leader affinity considers more what leaders seek to gain from such 
initiatives.   
For example, in the Local Councils’ initiative (Project 2), it was noted that all the key 
players (or policy leaders) strongly believed that the policy was the right measure to 
address the culture of centralised, authoritarian power in government41.  They 
ardently believed in the philosophical principles of the policy and considered its 
implementation as the only measure for the devolution and democratisation of 
government.  Successfully implementing this policy would therefore create a 
                                            
41  Source: Interviews. 
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situation that they truly desired, providing them with the opportunity to gain 
something in return.   This gain was neither something physical, nor a personal 
material reward, but rather a possible sense of vindication in the principles they held 
dear.  Their belief in the policy engendered their commitment, but it also inspired 
others to commit to it.  Indeed, the research suggests that leaders who show intrinsic 
belief in a policy are considered to be more committed to it, and to be better able to 
elicit commitment from others, than leaders who do not believe in the merits of the 
policy [Interviewees 142,143,144,145,146,147].  The opposite happened in the case 
of the Financial Management Reform programme (Project 1).  The policy leaders 
from the administrative point of view did not believe in the merits of the policy42.  
They felt that the finances of government should continue to be managed as they 
had been managed in the past and that changes in the system, albeit following in the 
steps of other jurisdictions where they had been tried and tested, were not 
appropriate for the country.  They ardently believed that implementing such a policy 
at that particular point in time, would be more harmful than beneficial for the 
management of Government’s finances.  In this case, the perceived outcome to 
them of implementing this policy was a potential loss of control for the Ministry of 
Finance.  These examples echo the view that the way in which leaders identify with 
the policies they manage or generate will influence their performance (Kakabadse 
and Dainty, 1987) and, consequently, the success or otherwise of an implementation 
initiative. 
In a similar vein, the findings of both Projects 1 and 2 would suggest that 
considerable attention must also be given to a leader’s political interests.  These can 
be viewed from two perspectives.  The first relates to aspects such as interpersonal 
alliances, organisational networks and informal coalitions at work (small ‘p’ politics).  
The second relates to the formal meaning of politics, as represented by a leader’s 
membership in, or association with, a defined Political Party and/or ideology.   
Starting with the latter perspective, the research would suggest that persons who are 
charged to lead a particular policy but who do not share the same political belief as 
the Party in Government may, at times, either act to hinder the successful 
                                            
42  Source: Interviews. 
 Page 187 
implementation of an initiative or, at best, relent to promote and champion it.  
Therefore, it seems reasonable to suggest that Government should attempt to match 
people with policies.  Unfortunately, this solution may not be as simple as it sounds.  
The current organisation of the Maltese Civil Service is strictly functional in its 
composition, with Ministries eager to create virtual boundaries around their portfolio 
of responsibilities to protect their interests from possible ‘inroads’ by other Ministries.  
In this respect, Ministries have been likened to silos43.  Furthermore, the Civil Service 
organisation is very hierarchical in nature, with authority and command over 
resources being position-oriented.  Consequently, the responsibility for policies 
typically falls within the ambit of functional leaders enjoying senior positions in a 
Department or Ministry.  Thus, to avoid having a policy led by a person who happens 
not to share the same political belief, the only option is to either remove this person 
from office, or to transfer him/her to other posts in the Civil Service, every time there 
is a change in Government.  Although this happens in some countries, such as the 
United States of America, it can be a significant problem in the Maltese context.  
Given the country’s small size and economy, it would be difficult for senior people to 
easily find postings in the private sector following their removal from their positions in 
the Service.  It would also be difficult to find sufficiently competent people to enter 
the Service, given the lack of available human resources in general.  Transferring 
them to other posts within the Service is also not recommended.  Besides shifting 
the problem, rather than solving it, persons who are subject to transfers on political 
grounds will simply become more bitter and pose a bigger opposing force (and 
maybe threat) to the Government of the day.  Therefore, the problem must be 
addressed differently.  A proposed solution that may merit consideration is a 
departure from the current manner of organising and managing policy, to one that 
adopts a project management approach. 
Just as persons may champion or hinder a policy initiative on the basis of perceived 
(partisan) Political gains, their influence on policy implementation may also reflect 
their perceptions of how they stand to lose or gain in their relation to organisational 
coalitions.  In this respect, the research seems to suggest that policy leaders can be 
                                            
43  Source:  Interviews (Project 2). 
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explicitly or implicitly motivated to behave in ways that will further their position in the 
political system of their organisation, whether with the objective of amassing further 
power, or simply to avoid ‘rocking the boat’ and upsetting personal relationships.  
The best leaders for a policy initiative are therefore those whose interests align with 
the perceived outcomes of the implementation process.  Once again examples can 
be drawn from the case studies.  In the Local Councils’ initiative, the political leader 
was probably encouraged by interests that were congruent with those of his Political 
party, while the administrative leader was probably seeking recognition that would 
lead to improvements to his position in the Service, or his status and position with 
colleagues.  Similarly, the consultant who acted as project manager probably 
perceived this initiative as an opportunity to amass greater resources and influence 
in his organisation and, hence, his standing and power relative to that of his peers.  
On the other hand, in the Financial Management Reform programme (Project 1), the 
presence of dissimilar stakeholder interests and also a perceived threat to such 
interests, ensured that personal and/or organisational goals could not be aligned, 
thereby hindering the successful implementation of the policy. 
Although the above discussion on leader affinity bears elements of resemblance to 
some of the issues raised in the previous discussion on committed leadership 
(particularly that on beliefs/values) and empowerment (particularly that on power), 
the findings of this research suggest that leader affinity and its dimensions merit to 
be treated separately.  However, it is pertinent to note that in this case, such claims 
are less a reflection of explicit statements made by interviewees, and more a subject 
of analysis and interpretation by the author.  Considering the above, it is felt that: 
L6:  Successful policy implementation requires Leader 
Affinity with Policy and Political Context. 
To conclude, this research supports the view that successful policy implementation 
can be positively influenced by effective leadership, and that (building on L2a): 
L2b: Developing a network of leaders requires a mix of 
competence, commitment, empowerment and personal affinity. 
A summary of the perceived requisites for effective leadership in the context of 
successful policy implementation is presented in Figure 24. 
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Figure 24:  Requisites of Effective Leadership for Successful Policy Implementation 
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3.2 A Focus on Commitment 
In the foregoing discussion, reference was made to the importance of commitment in 
relation to effective leadership.  In that context, the use of the term ‘Commitment’ 
referred to a leader’s personal commitment to a policy initiative.  However, 
commitment has also been viewed from a broader perspective, extending the 
concept from the individual, to a group (peers, subordinates, employees or other 
stakeholders) and/or institutional level.  In this respect, it is considered as a critical 
factor that independently influences policy implementation.  The following discussion 
considers commitment as viewed from this perspective.  As such, it will be 
recognised that, to a significant degree, the organisational commitment that is sought 
should complement and resonate with the requirements of effective leadership.  For 
example, the leader should have power, the organisation should assign it; the leader 
should have an affinity for the policy, so too should the organisation have an appetite 
for it; a leader needs to be able to command resources, the organisation must be 
committed to providing them etc. 
 Page 190 
Commitment has been a very popular research topic for decades (Liou and Nyhan, 
1994b).  While research activity around this subject probably peaked in the 1980s, 
some of the more prominent studies that are still widely cited today date to the late 
1950s and early 1960s.  Over the years, this subject has drawn the attention of 
academics from a variety of different fields and interests; including psychology, 
sociology, management, industrial relations, and organisational behaviour.  
Commitment is equally a subject of interest to management practitioners in both the 
private and public sectors.   
One possible reason for this attention is the belief that commitment is generally 
recognised as an important determinant of performance at both an organisational 
and personal level (Suliman and Iles, 2000).  In fact, most of the research on 
commitment seems to be directed towards an exploration, or understanding, of its 
means-end application.  For example, researchers have been studying how 
commitment can influence the way people act at work; how employees relate with 
their colleagues or how they view their employer; or how a person’s commitment to 
his work may affect his personal life.  In this respect, researchers have been 
studying how higher or lower levels of commitment can influence organisational 
matters such as job performance (Porter, Steers et al., 1974; Becker and Eveleth, 
1995; Becker, Billings et al., 1996; Siders, George et al., 2001), absenteeism (Nijhof, 
de Jong et al., 1998; Savery, Travaglione et al., 1998), staff turnover (Williams and 
Hazer, 1986; Farrell and Petersen, 1984), customer service and competitiveness 
(Caruana and Calleja, 1998), as well as personal matters such as job satisfaction 
(Bateman and Strasser, 1984) and work-related stress (King and Sethi, 1997). 
Besides studies related to performance, research on commitment has also been 
approached from a number of other different angles.  Researchers have devoted 
considerable effort to defining commitment (see Porter, Steers et al., 1974; Ferris, 
1981), on categorising it into various forms and types (see Meyer and Allen, 1991; 
Mathieu and Zajac, 1990), to exploring the sources and motives of commitment, as 
well as its outcomes and effects (see Becker and Eveleth, 1995, 1996), and to 
developing methods and measures for assessing different forms and levels of 
commitment in organisations (see Fenton-O'Creevy, Winfrow et al., 1997; McGee 
and Ford, 1987; Porter, Steers et al., 1974; Hrebiniak and Alutto, 1972).  
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Notwithstanding this, it is possible to group the research pertaining to this body of 
knowledge under four major headings, or themes – Employee Commitment, 
Organisational Commitment, Managerial Commitment, and the Escalation of 
Commitment.  In addition, some of the research in more recent years has focused on 
exploring matters relating to Goal Commitment, and to Commitment to, or of, 
Customers.  Figure 25 summarises some of the more prominent and cited works 
from this body of knowledge, using the order of classification proposed above.  Using 
the findings of these studies and those derived from Projects 1 and 2 of this 
research, a number of measures can be proposed to build commitment to a policy 
initiative and to improve the odds of successful policy implementation.  These are 
discussed below. 
Understanding Commitment 
Commitment has been defined in many different ways.  Ferris (1981) suggests that 
the strength of an individual’s identification with, and involvement in, a particular 
organisation is what defines organisational commitment.  Similarly, employee 
commitment has been defined as the psychological attachment of workers to their 
workplaces (Allen and Meyer, 1990a) involving aspects such as a sense of job 
involvement, loyalty and a belief in the values of the organisation (O'Reilly, 1989).  In 
contrast, Salancik, 1977 suggests that commitment should be construed as being 
something that is less about feelings of belonging and more about action.  To him, 
commitment is a binding act to deliver.  It is about people who subscribe to some 
actions and become bound to such actions so as not to let themselves, or others, 
down.  However, the most compelling definition of commitment is probably that 
presented by Klein and Izzo, 1996.  They describe commitment as ‘corporate soul’ 
or, the ability and experience of coming fully alive at work.  Their definition of 
commitment can probably be described as a compromise between the former two 
positions.  It is based on the ability to achieve individual and corporate value 
congruence, coupled with a desire and expectation to deliver on established and 
agreed goals. 
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Figure 25 
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The latter definition of commitment bears a lot of relevance to the public sector.  
Unlike organisations in the private sector that are ultimately guided by a single 
overriding objective – the maximisation of wealth – public sector organisations are 
often faced with multiple and sometimes competing policies and objectives.  
Consequently, multiple and different stakeholder interests abound, possibly 
contributing to evidence that would suggest that government managers are generally 
less involved, less loyal and display weaker identification with the aims of their 
agencies than business executives (Buchanan, 1974a: 345).  As such, the ability to 
align different individual or group interests and expectations with those of an 
underlying policy can be a critical step towards the laying of sound foundations upon 
which to successfully launch a new initiative.  In the context of a policy 
implementation initiative such alignment in values should start, in the first instance, 
with the person or team earmarked to project manage the delivery of a particular 
policy.  For example, the Local Councils case study examined in Project 2 suggested 
that a critical dimension of the commitment portrayed by the individuals entrusted to 
implement this initiative was their strong sense of belief in the value and importance 
of the policy itself [Interviewees 142,143,144,145,146,147].  Their belief, and value 
alignment, meant that they did not feel the need to question the policy or its purpose; 
that they could associate with it better; that they had something in common that 
could quickly bring them together as a team; and, most importantly, that they felt 
they could ‘own’ the initiative.  Senge (1992) points out that when people are in touch 
with their personal values and can align their work behaviour with these values, they 
are naturally committed to their work because they are doing what they want to do, 
and they can do so to an extent that they persevere even in the face of frustration 
because they are doing what they feel they must do.  Following this logic, it seems 
reasonable to assume that a policy implementation initiative stands a better chance 
of getting off to a good start if the persons involved in its implementation are 
convinced of the merits of that policy and its potential outcomes.  Therefore, the first 
proposition for improving the odds of successful policy implementation is: 
C1: Do not seek to convert; seek converts. 
Policies should ideally be entrusted to people who believe in the qualities of such 
policies, so that they can easily internalise them, come to own them, establish them 
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as their mission and, following Klein & Izzo’s metaphor, give them soul.  If these 
people are already ‘converted’ to the merits of the policy initiative, than it is likely that 
they can more easily envision its implementation, lead it with greater fervour and 
effectiveness and, through such passion, inspire others to ‘convert’ to it.   
Although empirical studies support the importance of affective commitment in public 
organisations (Romzek, 1990; Romzek, 1989; Romzek, 1985), and research 
suggests that public employee motives and commitment are primarily based on their 
identification with and involvement in their public organisations (Liou and Nyhan, 
1994: 111), it is also possible that persons commit to a policy initiative and ‘own’ it, 
even when they do not personally believe in, or subscribe to, its purpose or intrinsic 
value.  In other words, they commit to the policy not because of some personal 
feeling or emotional attachment to the policy, but for other reasons altogether.  This 
line of thinking led researchers to consider the existence of different ‘types’ of 
commitment.   
The type of commitment based on matters of feeling, of emotional attachment, of 
values, and/or of identification with the goals of an initiative, or of the organisation 
itself, is classified in the literature as affective or attitudinal commitment (Luchak and 
Gellatly, 2001) and is based on work initiated by Porter et al.,1974 (Suliman A, 
2000).  In contrast to this is a rationally-based, or calculated type of commitment 
(Luchak and Gellatly, 2001), which originated with Becker’s (1960) side-bet theory 
and has also been referred to as the behavioural perspective (Meyer and Allen, 
1991).  According to this view, persons are committed to an organisation because 
they foresee the benefits accruing from such behaviour as outweighing the costs of 
non-compliance.  In particular, it is based on employees’ consideration of the costs 
associated with leaving, or staying with, their organisation.  As such, it is also 
referred to as continuance commitment (Mathieu, Bruvold et al., 2000).  A third and 
different type of commitment identified by Meyer & Allen (1991) is normative 
commitment, which refers to employees’ feelings of obligation to remain with their 
organisation.  It has been defined by Weiner (1982) as the “totality of internalised 
normative pressures to act in a way which meets organisational goals and interests” 
(Weiner, 1982, cited in Suliman A, 2000).  Finally, the most recent approach to 
conceptualising organisational commitment is the multidimensional approach which 
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assumes that commitment does not develop simply through emotional attachment, 
perceived costs, or moral obligation, but through the interplay of all three 
components (Suliman A, 2000).   
The existence of different types of commitment does not diminish the merit of 
Proposition C1.  People need not be converts to a policy initiative only if they are 
emotionally attached to it.  They can be equally committed to it because they place 
equal importance on some perceived costs, moral obligation or to a mix of these 
reasons.  However, it must be noted that research has consistently demonstrated 
that affective, continuance and normative commitment are conceptually and 
empirically distinct (Suliman A, 2000), and that different types of commitment have 
different relationships to organisational behaviour (Iles, Mabey et al., 1990).  For 
example, studies have shown that affective commitment is expected to be higher in 
situations where employees believe the firm to be motivated in its actions out of a 
genuine concern for themselves or their customers (Meyer and Allen, 1997), and in 
situations where employees perceive role clarity at work, influence over decision-
making and opportunities to experience accomplishment (Luchak and Gellatly, 
2001).  In contrast, calculative type commitment is likely to increase when aspects 
such as job security are at risk.  As such, affective, calculative or normative factors 
influence people’s commitment in different ways and may do so differently in 
different situations.  They also result from different stimuli and lead to different 
behaviours and outcomes (see Figure 25) 44.  Does this mean that certain types of 
commitment are better or more important than others?  Or that successful policy 
implementation is more likely if supported by one type of commitment rather than 
another?  Nothing in the literature seems to support this.  However, it does mean 
that certain types of commitment are likely to be more effective than others in certain 
situations.  Therefore, it seems important to recognise these differences when 
attempting to rally people’s commitment, starting, in the first instance, with those 
identified to lead the implementation of a policy initiative.  Thus; 
                                            
44   A more detailed discussion of the stimuli/sources/antecedents of commitment follows later. 
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C1A: Select policy (project) leaders whose motives for committing 
to a policy initiative are best suited for the situation at hand and 
the type of environment receiving the policy. 
This recommendation builds on Proposition 1 by recognising that different situations 
call for persons with different motives, skills and competencies.  As such, it 
acknowledges the logic of situational leadership theory and recognises that in 
selecting project leaders for a policy initiative, due consideration should be given to 
the fact that “effectiveness of leadership is determined by being able to recognise the 
appropriateness of actions relevant to the circumstances of the situation” 
(Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 1999: 2).  For example, a policy that is aimed at 
introducing some new social benefit is more likely to be committed to, and effectively 
led, by a person who intrinsically values the merits of increased social welfare rather 
than by a person who shares no affinity to the principles of the welfare state and 
perceives such policies as merely a strain on the public purse.  Similarly, a person 
whose position or status in an organisation can be materially influenced by the 
success or failure of a particular policy is more likely to commit to the policy than 
someone whose career prospects are limited, and whose position can neither be 
improved nor threatened by the outcome of the implementation of such policy.  
Unfortunately, the norm is to automatically entrust policies to the same persons 
either because they happen to occupy certain positions in the hierarchy, or because 
decision-makers are so aloof from operations that they do not know of other people 
in the organisation who may be better suited to lead such an initiative.  Time and 
effort spent in selecting the right champion for a policy initiative is time and effort 
saved during implementation. 
Of course, successful policy implementation is not solely dependent upon the level of 
commitment of the person or team leading the initiative.  Equally important is the 
ability to muster a sufficient level of commitment from the persons who must initiate 
and operate the new policy.  Indeed, a lot of the literature is dedicated towards an 
examination of employee commitment.  However, the results of Projects 1 and 2 of 
this research would suggest that, although employee commitment is an important 
consideration for policy implementation, the greatest difficulty experienced in Malta is 
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the ability to leverage political and management commitment to a policy programme 
[Interviewees 142,143,145,146,147].  By their own admission45, politicians and 
senior civil servants recognise that all too often, it is their lack of political and 
administrative will that seems to hinder successful policy implementation efforts.  A 
number of reasons can account for this, and these have been highlighted in Projects 
1 and 2.  It is now important to gain an understanding of measures that can be taken 
to overcome this problem.  Reference to the findings of Projects 1 and 2 of this 
research, as well as the studies in the literature can contribute in this regard. 
Driving Commitment 
A significant element of the literature on commitment considers the sources or 
antecedents of commitment (see Figure 25).  One way of approaching these is to 
classify them into two broad categories; person-related i.e., those concerning factors 
relating to the individual, and organisation-related i.e., those concerning factors 
relating to the establishment (Cohen, 1992). 
One dimension of the literature that examines person-related sources of commitment 
focuses on factors relating to personal characteristics and demographics such as 
age, education and gender.  The research in this area is somewhat contradictory 
(Reichers, 1985).  For example, some studies suggest that given equitable work 
conditions women are more attached as employees than are men (Galizzi, 2001), 
and that women exhibit higher levels of continuance commitment than men (Wahn, 
1998).  In contrast, other studies report findings that support a negative relationship 
between gender ideology and organisational commitment (Gray, 1989; Bruning and 
Snyder, 1983; Aven, Parker et al., 1993).  Similarly, some research suggests that 
organisational commitment is positively related to employees’ level of education 
(Newton McClurg, 1999; Luthans, Baack et al., 1987), their age (Allen and Meyer, 
1993) and the presence of children (Gray, 1989), while others suggest that such 
factors have minimal or no effect on commitment (Sager, 1989; Mottaz, 1988); 
Korabik and Rosin, 1995; Wahn, 1998).   
                                            
45   See results of survey. 
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The importance, or otherwise, of these personal factors on commitment was not an 
issue that featured in the case studies of Projects 1 and 2 of the DBA research.  
Other factors that have also been the subject of research but which did not emerge 
in the case studies as important factors influencing commitment include tenure 
(Metcalfe and Dick, 2000; Luthans, Baack et al., 1987; Luthans, McCaul et al., 
1985), career factors (Jans, 1989) and occupation (Vandenberg and Scarpello, 
1994; Meyer, Allen et al., 1993; Norris and Niebuhr, 1984), job meaningfulness and 
characteristics (Colbert and Kwon, 2000; Pearson and Chong, 1997; Wetzel and 
Gallagher, 1990;Hunt, Chonko et al., 1985), job satisfaction (Williams and Hazer, 
1986; Curry, Wakefield et al., 1986; Bateman and Strasser, 1984), and the use of 
intrinsic and extrinsic rewards (Young, Worchel et al., 1998; Cullen, Johnson et al., 
1995; Putti, Aryee et al., 1989; Goffee and Scase, 1986), including performance 
appraisals (Pettijohn and Pettijohn, 2000; Metcalfe and Dick, 2000; Martin, 1995) 
and financial incentives (Luchak and Gellatly, 2001; Stum, 1999; Li-Ping Tang and 
Kim, 1999; Wood, 1996). 
On the other hand, some factors including trust, position in an organisation, 
leadership, ownership, accountability, and goal congruence, are considered in the 
literature and were also highlighted as being important elements by the DBA case 
studies46.  The emergence of these factors and not others from the DBA research 
would suggest that, at least in a Maltese context, these factors are possibly 
considered to be more important or influential, thereby deserving greater attention. 
Some research proposes that trust generates commitment (Hosmer, 1994; Liou, 
1994) and that one dimension of the nature of managerial commitment is trust 
(Lamsa and Savolainen, 2000).  Although the findings of the DBA research do not 
suggest a direct cause-effect relationship between trust and commitment, they do 
support the view that trust has an influence on commitment and the outcome of a 
policy implementation initiative.  Different political ideologies, fear of political 
sabotage, divided allegiances, and low respect and confidence between politicians 
and civil servants were identified as factors inhibiting the formation of trustful 
relationships and of colleagues’ loyalty to one another and to their organisations 
                                            
46  See Figures 9 and 14 relating to Projects 1 and 2 respectively. 
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(DBA Projects 1 and 2).  Because of this, people do not cooperate with one another 
and alienate themselves from each other and the organisation/policies they are 
meant to serve.  While it must be recognised that trust is an emotive factor and 
difficult to manage in a rational manner, some measures can nonetheless be taken 
to create an environment within which trustful relationships can develop (some 
proposals have already been made during the discussion on empowered 
leadership).   
The influence of position in an organisation on commitment is argued both ways in 
the literature.  Some empirical studies suggest that persons occupying higher 
positions in an organisation tend to be more committed than lower level employees 
(Morrow, McElroy et al., 1988).  Others (Wahn, 1998; Bruning and Snyder, 1983) 
consider position to be unrelated to commitment.  The DBA research supports the 
view that a relationship exists between position and commitment, albeit with a 
different twist than that presented in the literature.  Rather than suggesting that 
persons in higher positions are more committed to a policy initiative, the research 
would suggest that commitment to a policy initiative is influenced by decisions 
regarding the ‘locus of responsibility’ for that policy.  There are two dimensions to be 
considered in this respect and both must co-exist simultaneously to stimulate 
commitment and to ensure successful policy implementation.  One dimension is 
personal and concerns decisions regarding the individual who is to assume 
responsibility and authority for the policy initiative, rather than his position.  The other 
dimension is institutional and concerns decisions regarding both the organisation 
that is to ‘house’ the policy implementation initiative, and the position of the person 
within that organisation who is to ‘host’ the initiative. 
Issues pertaining to the personal dimension of ‘location’ are closely linked to 
decisions regarding leadership; specifically, who should lead a particular policy 
initiative?  The success of the Local Councils project examined in Project 2 was 
attributed, in part, to decisions concerning its location in terms of the right balance in 
the type and form of leadership achieved.  For example, responsibility for the policy 
initiative was equally shared between the political and administrative arms of 
Government thereby addressing (whether consciously or not) the contextual need to 
balance power between both domains.  The persons chosen to lead each domain 
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were also considerably competent in their respective spheres.  They were 
resourceful and managed to secure the support and commitment of various 
government entities and their respective resources, and they also demonstrated 
excellent personal capabilities in terms of clarity of vision, knowledge, creativity and 
determination.  Furthermore, there was also a match between the motivations of the 
respective leaders; motivations that were perceived to have been influenced by a 
mutual sense of belief in the principles of the policy (affective commitment).  This 
provided an opportunity for the better alignment of goals and greater cooperation.  
Taken collectively, these factors enabled the leaders to influence the approach and 
manner in which events unfolded, so as to foster the type of commitment they 
required to successfully see the policy through. 
However, besides the personal prerequisites of a skilled and competent leader, the 
research also suggests that policy implementers must command power to mobilise 
events and resources, as and when required.  While this may well be related to the 
leader’s personality or to contextual factors, the source of power in the example of 
policy reviewed emanated from an organisational consideration of where 
responsibility for the policy should reside.  Power can emanate from various sources 
(Morgan, 1997: 171).  From a modernist perspective, strategic contingencies theory 
explains how uncertainty predicts which social actors will have power in an 
organisation (Hatch, 1997: 287), while resource dependence theory suggests that 
power is conferred upon individuals who command control of critical or scarce 
resources(Hatch, 1997: 288).  Referring to the model proposed by Graham (1989), 
Pinto (2000) suggests the consideration of ‘authority’, ‘status’ and ‘influence’ as 
sources of power.  Authority accrues from the position that a person occupies in an 
organisation; status accrues from the level and type of assignment or responsibility 
assigned to a person; while influence is the ability of persons to manipulate others 
and is usually highly individualised (Pinto, 2000: 86-76).  
The type of power that was brought to bear in the Local Councils initiative can be 
described as a hybrid of these three forms, which, in itself represents an 
amalgamation of the personal and institutional dimensions mentioned earlier. 
Power primarily emanated from formal authority.  Total ownership of the policy was 
located in the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM).  Choosing to locate the policy 
 Page 201 
within this particular portfolio was perceived as the clearest indication of the 
government’s seriousness with respect to this policy.   The reason behind this choice 
was at least twofold47.  First, it created pressure at a political level, ensuring that 
Ministers and their staff gave the policy the attention it deserved.  Secondly, and 
possibly more importantly, it committed the coordination of activities, at both intra 
and inter-Ministerial level.  Such type of coordination was essential because the 
policy cut across various Ministerial domains and because it was recognised that 
coordination between Ministries in Malta is often lacking both because of poor skills 
and capabilities, and also because of piques between politicians48 which are almost 
inevitable given the country’s particular political context.  Indeed, it is suggested that 
had the policy been entrusted to another portfolio ‘it would not have happened’43. 
This perception is not a reflection of the personal skills and expertise of the persons 
working in the Office of the Prime Minister, but is rather a reflection of the command 
and control role that this particular ministry is perceived to occupy and its ability to 
‘open doors’. 
Besides the formal authority arising from the organisational choice of location (i.e., 
OPM) another element of importance was the power that was reflected on the 
programme because it was assigned to persons holding very senior positions in 
government.  Political responsibility for managing, monitoring and controlling its 
implementation was entrusted to the Personal Assistant to the Prime Minister who 
was heavily involved in the development of Government policy and who was 
regarded by all as being the Prime Minister’s mouthpiece and executive arm49.  From 
a Public Service viewpoint, administrative responsibility for the initiative was 
entrusted to the Director General in the Office of the Prime Minister who could 
influence the allocation of resources across Government.  The source of power of 
these two individuals derived from the position they held in government and the 
status they enjoyed by virtue of those positions.  The formality of those positions 
gave their authority legitimacy, more so when it was recognised that the persons 
                                            
47  Source: Interviews. 
48 Source:  Interviews. 
49  Source:  Interviews. 
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involved had direct access to the Prime Minister and had his full support and 
backing. 
However, power and the consequent command over resources and events is not, in 
itself, the solution.  The research suggests that the success of the policy was 
significantly influenced by the fact that the decisions and activities that were taken in 
support of the implementation programme were perceived to be legitimate and 
devoid of the indiscriminate use of power.  This was instrumental to foster greater 
commitment and cooperation from those concerned. 
So what type of power should be used when implementing policy, and how can such 
power be legitimised?  The decisions taken to mobilise power in the example of 
successful policy implementation researched may provide the answer to this 
question.   
Policy makers should consider the organisational location of power.  They should 
identify the stakeholders who can influence, or be influenced by, the policy decision 
and its implementation, and then assign responsibility for the policy within the realm 
of that entity that can somehow control such influence.   
Having found a ‘house’ for the initiative, the policy then needs a ‘host’.  Policy 
makers must therefore consider decisions of championship.  They need to decide 
who within the selected organisation is best suited to spearhead the implementation.  
This decision should be based on at least three considerations.  It should first 
consider a person’s motives, skills and capabilities, the importance of which has 
already been discussed (see Proposition C1A).  Then, it should consider their 
perception of what others think about the person.  In this regard, policy makers 
should realise that as soon as a policy is entrusted to a person, the policy assumes 
the identity of the person in question.  If the latter is perceived as being a target-
oriented, results-driven person, the policy already stands a better chance of 
succeeding.  His/her decisions and direction will be perceived as being legitimate on 
the basis of people’s perceptions of his/her past successes and behaviours.  Of 
course, the inverse applies.  Thirdly, sponsor responsibility for the policy should be 
entrusted to the person occupying the highest level of formal authority.  While 
specific aspects of the implementation may be delegated down the hierarchy, overall 
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accountability for the initiative must remain with the most authoritative person so that 
a clear sponsor exists in everyone’s mind.  Finally, policy makers must create a 
supportive environment for that policy.  They must provide the policy champion(s) 
with direct and immediate access to the highest levels of power (sponsors) required, 
as the need to have to resort to obtaining multiple endorsements is likely to weaken 
their perceived authority.  Furthermore, policy makers must afford the policy 
champion(s) with the right type of resources and then, to do so in amounts that are 
sufficient to generate critical mass.  They must also provide the policy champion(s) 
with cross-organisational authority and the ability to mobilise and deploy resources 
across traditional organisational boundaries.  In summary, the following is proposed: 
C2: Consider decisions of Location 
C2a: Select the right ‘address’ for the policy initiative. 
C2b: Ensure that the ‘host’ has (or is given) the requisite 
(legitimate) power and resources to champion the initiative. 
The DBA research also suggests that people are more likely to commit to a policy 
programme if it carries a high profile.  A policy can gain a high profile for a variety of 
reasons.  Location is one of them.  It could also gain high profile if the policy 
occupies a prominent position in the Government’s agenda; if it influences a large or 
important segment of society thereby generating considerable discourse on the 
subject; or if it is an issue of political contention thereby attracting popular attention 
and debate.  Irrespective of the reason, it is argued that a policy of high profile will be 
associated with greater risk in terms of the political fall-out that could accrue if it is 
not implemented correctly.  Because of this, the case studies suggest that politicians 
experience a heightened will to see a policy through in an effective and successful 
manner, thereby subjecting civil servants to greater degrees of accountability.  
Feeling the pressure, civil servants dedicate more attention to the policy, either as a 
measure to avoid failure and the repercussions associated with it, or to excel in their 
delivery in an attempt to position themselves favourably with their political masters.  
Does this mean that low profile policies are doomed?  Not necessarily, but raising 
their profile should influence political and administrative reactions in the manner just 
described, thereby improving the policies’ likelihood of success.   
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Leadership is deemed to play an important role in driving the visibility of a policy.  
The intrinsic importance of leadership to commitment has already been discussed.  
However, the DBA research also suggests that there is an extrinsic dimension to 
leadership that is equally important.  This dimension considers the visibility of the 
leadership itself and has been described as the ‘physical’ element of commitment50.  
In one of the case studies, this was exemplified by the Prime Minister’s personal 
involvement in the implementation process.  It was argued that, “in the Maltese 
context, the biggest political will is shown when the Prime Minister takes an initiative 
under his responsibility”51.  The lesson is, that whether through the personal 
involvement of a prominent political figure, or a high-ranking civil servant, or some 
form of ‘Steering Committee’, policies need to be championed by someone of high 
profile who can accentuate their visibility.  The ability to personify a policy provides 
symbolic, if not real leadership.  It gives meaning to a policy, it projects a message of 
confidence and it drives commitment to it.   
The visibility of a policy is also a function of effective communication.  Research has 
shown that organisations can strengthen employee commitment by increasing 
awareness of the organisation’s strategic goals (Enriquez, McBribe et al., 2001).  
One way to achieve this is through the deployment of internal marketing strategies 
(Unzicker, Clow et al., 2000; Caruana and Calleja, 1998).  Another more powerful 
way is through effective visioning (Domm, 2001).  Besides delivering a message, the 
process of visioning itself garners commitment (Kakabadse, Nortier et al., 1998:139), 
providing people with something more important than direction; something to hold 
onto and to point to what must be changed (Pascarella, 1998:13).  As such, policies 
need to be communicated as visions.  After all, a policy is a vision of the future.   
C3: Building Commitment requires Visibility 
C3a: Visibility can be garnered through visible leadership, 
communication and visioning. 
                                            
50   Source:  Interviews 
51   Source:  Interviews 
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Commitment to a policy implementation programme must also reach as many 
stakeholders as possible.  There are two dimensions to reach (‘breadth’ and 
‘appeal’) and two perspectives to account for (the recipients or ‘audience’ of a policy 
and the persons involved in its implementation).  Breadth refers to the number of 
people targeted by, and involved in, the policy initiative.  Appeal refers to the ability 
of policy makers to formulate a policy with characteristics that meet the interests of 
the audience to which it is targeted, and to create and present a vision of it that 
encourages take-up and a following by the persons required to implement it. 
The DBA research suggests that the wider the audience, the more widespread is the 
policy, and the more difficult it is for specific lobby groups to rally strong opposition to 
it.  Although seemingly Macchiavellian in approach, the suggestion is not really 
intended as such.  The point to be made is that key to a successful policy 
implementation programme is the ability to identify and properly manage all affected 
stakeholders.  In this regard, interviewees argued that implementation programmes 
often fail either because stakeholders are not adequately defined, or because it is 
only the interests of one or a few select groups that are accounted for.  Similarly, it 
was suggested that policy failure might also arise if responsibility for its 
implementation is concentrated in only one person or a few individuals.  The failure 
of the Financial Management Reform policy examined in Project 1 was attributed, in 
part, to this shortcoming.  Responsibility for the policy was entrusted to senior 
management at the Ministry of Finance but, because they felt threatened by aspects 
of the policy, they did not act upon it or allow it to be acted upon by other officers of 
their organisation.  Had the policy involved senior managers from other Ministries 
and Departments who were equally affected by the policy, but who might have had 
more to gain from it than to lose, responsibility would have been spread and enough 
pressure might have been leveraged to generate a momentum for the policy. 
However, to achieve a broader reach, a policy must be constructed in ways that 
appeal to different people who are likely to have different interests.  This is probably 
the most difficult task to accomplish, as it requires policy makers to either align the 
policy’s goals with the interests of different stakeholders or, influence stakeholders to 
shed their customs and preferences in favour of the outcomes sought to be achieved 
by the policy.  From an ‘audience’ perspective, this requires policy makers to build 
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into a policy features or characteristics that will deliver, in whole or in part, some 
output or outcome desired by these stakeholders.  From the perspective of the policy 
implementers, it requires policy makers to understand and account for the 
motivations of these stakeholders and the motives (affective, behavioural, normative 
or multidimensional) that will lead to their commitment.  Indeed, it has long been 
recognised that a strategy for winning employee commitment is not a management 
approach that relies on directive power and an expectation of compliance by 
employees, but rather a philosophy of leadership that emphasises the sharing of 
objectives (Sherwin, 1972).  As such, it is suggested that true commitment can only 
be achieved if there is agreement on what needs to be done, and if personal and 
organisational goals are aligned into a common goal (Belasco, 1998).  Achieving 
consensus on strategic decisions helps build commitment to such decisions (Dooley, 
Fryxell et al., 2000).  It is therefore proposed that: 
C4: Building Commitment requires Reach 
C4a: Reach is achieved by broadening a policy’s scope and 
improving its appeal, particularly through goal alignment. 
Recognising that a shared vision is a powerful way to build commitment (Turner, 
1999), it is important to understand how this can be achieved.  The DBA research 
suggests that ‘reach’ must be supplemented by the active participation of 
stakeholders.  There are two reasons for this.  The first is to further diffuse any 
potential opposition to a policy, while a second, more important reason, is to transfer 
responsibility for the policy to the people who are best positioned to make it work.  
The findings of the research would suggest that there are three dimensions to the 
concept of active participation.  These include the need for stakeholder participation 
in setting the agenda of the policy, employee participation in the planning and 
decision-making activities relating to the policy initiative, as well as management 
involvement in the implementation of policies entrusted to subordinates.   
The need for stakeholder participation is perceived to be important because it 
provides policy leaders with a direct understanding of their expectations.  This 
ensures that, to the extent possible, policies can be configured to deliver outcomes 
that match the desired goals and benefits, thereby garnering support and 
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commitment from stakeholders, rather than resistance and opposition.  Similarly, the 
participation of employees (the internal stakeholders) in the planning and 
implementation of policy helps to confer on them a sense of belonging to the 
organisation.  It shows management’s recognition that subordinates ‘on the ground’ 
are likely to be more in touch with the specific context within which the policy is to be 
implemented, and that their participation may facilitate the identification of potential 
stumbling blocks that management may have otherwise failed to notice or account 
for.  This should lead to improved commitment.  Equally important is the need for 
active management involvement.  This concept is different to participation.  While 
‘participation’ is meant to reflect the need for employees and stakeholders to 
contribute to the development and implementation of policy, ‘involvement’ reflects 
the need for management to interact with stakeholders, especially their subordinates.  
Unfortunately, there is a tendency in the civil service for management to keep itself 
aloof from employees, with officers not mixing outside their ‘class’.  This hinders 
management from understanding the capabilities of their subordinates and the 
operational limitations of the organisations they manage, and is also counter-
productive to the development of good personal relationships.  In contrast, active 
management involvement provides the right opportunity for management to impart 
the coaching and support required by employees so that they can grow in their 
position.  By getting personally involved in implementation and by actively interacting 
with subordinates, management can also identify potential would-be leaders so that 
they can slowly develop the network of committed leaders required for the effective 
implementation of policy. 
The relationship between participation and commitment is well reflected in the 
literature.  Some studies suggest that participation is the outcome of program 
commitment (Neubert and Cady, 2001; Mayer and Schoorman, 1992) but a 
considerable element of the literature also focuses on an examination of the inverse 
relationship.  For example, building on the work of Lawler (1992), Coetsee, 1999 
identifies involvement as an essential ingredient in building commitment and for 
gaining acceptance of a change program, echoing the views that people need to 
inform themselves to become committed to something and that no one can really 
make a commitment for someone else (Giovale, 1995).  Participation is important 
because through such processes, “people are encouraged to make incremental 
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choices and develop a sense of responsibility for their actions.  [Furthermore] When 
we choose of our own volition to do something, we feel responsible.  When the 
choice is volitional, explicit, public and irrevocable, the commitment is even more 
binding.  [This phenomenon is so strong that] systems that provide for participation 
[are] critical in developing or changing a culture.” (O'Reilly, 1989:20).  It is also 
important to note that contrary to some commonly held perceptions, participation 
does not only influence employee commitment.  Managers’ involvement in strategic 
planning activities have been found to be positively related with their feelings of 
organisational commitment (Oswald, Mossholder et al., 1994), suggesting that, in a 
public policy context, the formulation of policies should not be restricted to the upper 
echelons of the establishment but rather opened to include lower management 
levels.  A fifth proposition is, therefore, to; 
C5: Build Commitment through ACTIVE Participation 
Closely related to the above is the issue of ownership.  People may participate in 
setting the agenda for a policy, and may also commit to execute elements of it, but 
may nonetheless fall short in their efforts.  Real commitment to a policy is shown 
when intent is followed by concrete action.  The DBA research suggests that people 
will act on a policy initiative if there is ownership of that policy.  As stated earlier, 
people may commit to a policy and own it for affective reasons, but when emotional 
stimuli are missing, the research suggests that people may be compelled to own a 
policy initiative if they are held accountable for it.   
The principal connotation of accountability is linked to the stewardship of resources 
but in a secondary meaning of accountability, someone who is accountable can be 
called on, in a more general way, to explain actions rather than account for 
resources in a strictly material sense (Kirkwood, 1982:17).  Considerable efforts 
have been made by researchers to identify and propose different types of 
accountability relationships.  For example, Romzek, 2000 identifies four types of 
accountability (hierarchical, professional, legal and political) based on a 
consideration of internal or external sources of expectations and control, and the 
desire for low to high degrees of autonomy; while Stone, 1995 distinguishes five 
main conceptions of accountability (parliamentary control, managerialism, 
judicial/quasi-judicial review, constituency relations and markets).  However, studies 
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like these tend to focus on matters pertaining to the collective accountability of the 
establishment, or parts of it.  While the problems of ownership and accountability 
emerging from the DBA research seem to focus on the individual or the team 
responsible for, and managing, the policy, few studies on program accountability 
based on the efforts of the individual, were encountered during the literature review.    
According to the DBA findings, efforts to improve ownership of, and accountability 
for, policy initiatives should be primarily directed at the level of the individual.   
Capron and Kuiper, 1998 suggest that linking the success or failure of a policy 
initiative with an individual’s success or failure in his/her organisation, ensures 
project ownership.  This strategy is akin to that followed by the application of 
performance based appraisals and rewards systems (Pettijohn and Pettijohn, 2000; 
Metcalfe and Dick, 2000; Martin, 1995).  Keeping score of a person’s performance 
and making such performance visible (Belasco, 1998) can also compel ownership of, 
and commitment to a policy.  Other measures for improving accountability and 
ownership that have been identified from the DBA research, particularly from Project 
1, include clear delineation of roles and responsibilities, a real and visible will to 
institute disciplinary action when required, and political involvement in a policy 
process.  The latter does not mean direct participation in the implementation of a 
policy, as this would lead to a confusion in roles and the perception of ‘interference’ 
(Cachia Zammit, 1992) that would disengage, rather than motivate, commitment.    
Involvement means a commitment to monitor a policy and the progress registered; to 
be visibly seen to be responsible for understanding what is happening, for 
questioning what is happening and for pulling senior management along52.  
Furthermore, it is important to note that the DBA research suggests that ownership 
of a policy initiative must lie at multiple levels.  First, there must be both a political 
and an administrative commitment to the policy, with the research further suggesting 
that the political element must exist at two levels.  At one level it must emanate from 
the executive arm of Government (Ministers and Cabinet).  At another, it must also 
exist from a Party perspective.  In this latter respect, the commitment of the political 
machinery of the Party in office is seen as being necessary to raise the visibility of 
                                            
52  Source:  Interviews. 
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the policy through adequate propaganda and, more importantly, to generate a 
greater degree of accountability among its politicians to personally commit to it.  
Secondly, there is also the need for ownership to exist at both an individual and 
collective level.  With politicians vying for attention and resources in (competitive) 
ways that can be detrimental to colleagues, the principle of ministerial collective 
responsibility may often be hard to accomplish in practice.  In fact, the DBA research 
would suggest that a major element contributing to the success of the Local 
Council’s policy was this ability to muster collective responsibility for it.  Following on 
from participation, it is proposed that: 
C6: Building Commitment requires Ownership 
C6a: Ownership requires policy implementers to 
believe in the values of the policy, and/or to be held 
personally accountable for it. 
It is also argued that the success of programs and initiatives in positively affecting 
lasting change is not only dependent on gaining commitment to it, but also of 
retaining such commitment (Neubert and Cady, 2001; Nash, Childe et al., 2001).  
Commitment must endure the test of time.  It must be long-term and not short-lived.  
In other words, commitment should not just be present at kick-off and/or at the 
finishing line.  It must be present all throughout the process, and all the way through 
it must also be consistent.  There are two aspects to the latter notion.  Firstly, 
commitment cannot grow when things are going right, and wane when the odds take 
the upper hand.  Secondly, commitment must be focused on the planned process 
and outcome.  Policy leaders cannot change direction to avoid obstacles when 
problems arise.  They must tackle them.  Similarly, policy sponsors should not re-
orient the direction of a policy because of some political, and maybe short-term, gain.  
While policies should be adjusted if the situation so demands, their focus should 
remain consistent with the objectives they set out to achieve.  In the Local Councils 
initiative, commitment was sustained through formal project management structures, 
regular meetings and debriefing sessions, informal motivational seminars for 
participants, and continuous marketing and promotional campaigns aimed at 
maintaining both external support, and internal encouragement and determination.  
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Projecting an air of confidence at all times also helped to sustain momentum in the 
manner in which the policy was developing.  Therefore; 
C7: Commitment must be Durable 
Building commitment must also be an action-oriented activity.  The DBA research 
would suggest that policy implementation may fail either because decisions are 
postponed or they are not made, or, when taken, they are too late and ineffective.  
Policy implementers must therefore be assertive in their actions and must be seen to 
be confident in the outcomes of their decisions.  This research suggests that unlike 
the Financial Management Reform programme, the Local Councils’ policy 
programme distinguished itself from the norm by the fact that the policy-makers did 
not shy away from taking the difficult decisions that were critical to the programme, 
and when they did, they did so in a timely manner.  This served to accentuate the 
tangibility of the commitment, and to symbolically demonstrate a competent and 
confident leadership.  Therefore, besides surviving the test of time (Proposition C7); 
C8: Commitment must be sustained through 
Timely Actions and Decisions 
Caution must however be observed in following Propositions 7 and 8 above.  An 
issue of importance that was raised by the literature but which was not reflected in 
the DBA research is the concept of escalation of commitment.   
Escalating commitment (or escalation) refers to the tendency of decision makers to 
persist with failing courses of action (Brockner, 1992:39) and is found to occur at 
both an individual and group level (Bazerman, Giuliano Toni et al., 1984).  Among 
other studies, escalation has been explained by prospect theory which suggests that 
decisions made subsequent to related decisions will be framed in such a way as to 
reflect the success or failure of the previous decision (Whyte, 1986).  It has also 
been attributed to project and psychological traits, such as biased information 
processing, self-justification and risk propensity (Ross and Staw, 1986); the 
mediating effects of cultural norms and values (Geiger, Robertson et al., 1998); and, 
probably more central to the discussion around Proposition 6a, perceptions of 
personal responsibility for the initiative, especially when linked to negative 
consequences (Staw and Fox, 1977; Staw, 1981).   
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It is therefore important that commitment to a policy initiative is closely monitored so 
that escalation is avoided.  Various counter-measures have been proposed in the 
literature.  A number of these include recognising, in the first instance, the possible 
causes of over-commitment (Staw and Ross, 1987), encouraging open 
communication between teams and organisational departments (Devaney, 1991), 
and consciously framing a decision problem in a variety of ways to tease out any 
faults in the decision making process (Whyte, 1986).  Identifying a person or team to 
play the ‘devil’s advocate’ and separating initial and subsequent responsibility for a 
decision (Devaney, 1991) have also been identified as potential measures, although 
their effectiveness has also been questioned by other studies (Barton, Duchon et al., 
1989; Schwenk, 1988).  Nonetheless: 
C9: Commitment must be monitored against 
Escalation 
Finally, building commitment requires a supportive environment.  The DBA research 
suggests three strategies in this regard.  The first is to create a demand for the policy 
to be implemented.  It is suggested that a policy should not be implemented before 
the necessary spadework has been done to muster support for it, at least at a 
conceptual level.  Various measures can be taken, including political propaganda, 
the launch of educational and awareness campaigns, public debates, the publication 
of policies as Green and White Papers etc.  Ultimately, the objective is to get the 
audience that is targeted to receive the policy to reflect about it, talk about it, 
question it, add to it by proposing ideas, and hopefully, end up demanding it.  This 
leads to the second strategy, which concerns the development of the necessary 
pressure to instigate change.  Every policy will somehow influence existing ones, 
stirring resistance from quarters that are comfortable with the status quo.  This 
research suggests that the best way to overcome such resistance is to bombard it 
with enough pressure from all angles to an extent that it becomes easier for 
stakeholders to embrace the new policy, than it is for them to continue to hold dear 
to an existing one.  Finally, it is important that policies are not implemented in a 
vacuum, with no or little regard to what is happening in other areas of government.  It 
is vital that policies are supportive of one another.  The often-held idea that policies 
should be implemented independently from one another, so that failure in one does 
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not taint the potential success of another, should be turned on its head.  If managed 
properly, the ‘bundling’ of policies should help to channel resources in a synergistic 
and complimentary manner, and strengthen inter-organisational dependencies by 
broadening commitment throughout the different spheres of Government activity.  
‘Bundling policies’ can help to focus efforts, and can prove to be a powerful strategy, 
especially when one considers that “experience has convinced former Governors 
that to really make a difference in one or two areas and adequately manage the rest 
is [already] an ambitious agenda” (Legislative Research Commission, 1995: 7). 
The need for a supportive environment is also manifested in the literature, although 
presented from a different perspective.  Rather than focusing on preparing the 
external environment, as implied from the findings of the DBA research, the literature 
focuses on the need to develop an internal supportive environment.  It is suggested 
that employee commitment to a program or the organisation itself can be positively 
influenced when employees perceive a heightened level of support by their 
management and the organisation at large (Metcalfe and Dick, 2000; Newton 
McClurg, 1999; Shore and Wayne, 1993; Odom, Boxx et al., 1990; O'Reilly, 1989).  
Perceived organisational support is seen to increase employee’s affective 
attachment to the organisation and the expectation that greater effort toward meeting 
organisational goals will be rewarded (Hutchison, Sowa et al., 1986).  It may be 
influenced by the choice of management styles (Zeffane, 1994; Nijhof, de Jong et al., 
1998) and perceived organisational justice (Naumann, Bennett et al., 1998).  A 
conducive internal environment is also characterised by an ethical work climate 
(Schwepker, 2001; Schwepker, 1999; Hosmer, 1994) and corporate ethical values 
(Hunt, Wood et al., 1989), and work/life balance (Sager, 1989; Talley, 1998).  It is 
therefore proposed that: 
C10: To build commitment, policy makers must ensure an 
internal and external supportive environment. 
A summary of the various drivers of commitment deriving from the research and the 
literature review is presented in Figure 26. 
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Figure 26: The Building-Blocks of Commitment in the context of Successful Policy 
Implementation 
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Source: Compiled by Author 
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4.0 Summary of Recommendations 
A number of recommendations have been proposed to address successful policy 
implementation through improved leadership and commitment.  Each of the 
propositions made, as well as the key objective(s) they aim to address and the 
action(s) deemed necessary for their implementation, are summarised below. 
Successful Policy Implementation requires Effective Leadership 
Proposition: L1: Diagnose the Leadership Gap 
Key 
Objective(s) 
To understand the problem contributing to the perceived absence 
of leadership. 
To understand what leadership the Civil Service is yearning for. 
Required 
Action(s) 
Conduct a survey among politicians, civil servants and consultants 
working with the public service to define their understanding of the 
problem of a lack of leadership and to solicit their proposals, if any, 
for overcoming such issues.   
 
Proposition: L2: Developing effective leadership requires the establishment 
of a network of effective leaders. 
L2a: A network of effective leaders ideally requires a mix of 
transformational and transactional leaders. 
Key 
Objective(s) 
To address the (mistaken) view that the potency of leadership 
arises from one individual rather than from the collective strength 
of a number of leaders. 
To address the ‘dearth of leadership in the Civil Service’. 
To correct the perception that there is only one type of leader and 
that only this type can effectively influence the successful 
implementation of policy. 
Required 
Action(s) 
Promote a view that attempts to institutionalise leadership by 
demystifying the concept; gradually devolving leadership to rank 
and file; and promoting and rewarding exemplary leadership. 
Distinguish between transformational and transactional leadership. 
Select persons whose traits indicate a potential for 
transformational leadership.  Introduce, modify or remove 
conditions in the environment that do not give potential and ‘latent’ 
transformational leaders enough ‘space’ to operate. 
Develop transactional leaders; endow them with resources to lead. 
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Proposition: L3: Successful policy implementation requires Competent 
Leadership 
L3a: Competence is a function of knowledge/skills and personal 
traits. 
Key 
Objective(s) 
To match the competence needs of a policy with the knowledge, 
skills and traits required of the policy leader. 
Required 
Action(s) 
Select policy leaders who (i) are knowledgeable and skilled in the 
area of policy they are meant to lead, and (ii) whose traits match 
the dynamics of the context within which they are to operate. 
Enhance the knowledge and skills of potential leaders through 
formal training and education programmes. 
Expose leaders to new experiences; provide them with ever 
escalating challenges; and give them sufficient time to mature and 
learn from their exposure. 
 
 
Proposition: L4: Successful policy implementation requires Committed 
Leadership. 
L4a: Committed Leadership is a function of confidence/motivation 
and values/integrity. 
Key 
Objective(s) 
To ensure ownership of the policy initiative, perseverance in the 
face of difficulty and the willingness to risk and assume 
responsibility for one’s actions. 
To inspire confidence, motivation and commitment to a policy 
initiative from others. 
Required 
Action(s) 
Select as leaders people with (i) a positive, optimistic and 
confident attitude; (ii) a proven ability of effective policy 
management and (iii) a reputation of integrity. 
Clearly delineate roles and responsibilities; endow policy leaders 
with adequate resources in sufficient quantities; reward 
performance within a framework of accountability. 
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Proposition: L5: Successful policy implementation requires Empowered 
Leadership. 
L5a: Empowered Leadership is a function of trust and power 
sharing. 
Key 
Objective(s) 
To ensure that policy leaders can mobilise the momentum and 
support required to drive a policy to fruition. 
Required 
Action(s) 
Select as leaders people who (i) are willing to accept responsibility; 
(ii) are not averse to sharing authority; (iii) do not shy from holding 
others accountable; and (iv) are willing to share information and 
resources. 
Carefully consider issues of ‘location’ for a policy, to ensure that 
coordination and cooperation is forthcoming.   
Mandate leaders with the authority to exercise power.  Ensure that 
leaders do not abuse of their power. 
Select leaders who are considered trustworthy and who can 
inspire and build trust in others.   
Engender trust through fair and equitable management practices; 
participation in decision-making and integrity in dealing with 
sensitive (political) situations. 
 
 
Proposition: L6:  Successful policy implementation requires Leader Affinity with 
Policy and Political Context. 
Key 
Objective(s) 
To recognise and match leaders’ personal interests in the 
implementation of a policy initiative and the motives behind such 
policy. 
Required 
Action(s) 
Consider whether leaders stand to gain or lose from the 
implementation of a policy. 
Select leaders who can gain from the intrinsic merits of a policy 
and/or from the extrinsic rewards arising from a political 
perspective. 
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Build and Maintain Commitment for Successful Policy Implementation 
Proposition: C1: Do not seek to convert; seek converts. 
C1a: Select policy (project) leaders whose motives for committing 
to a policy initiative are best suited for the situation at hand 
and the type of environment receiving the policy. 
Key 
Objective(s) 
To ensure alignment between the interests of a policy initiative and 
those of the persons managing it, so that the policy is adequately 
‘rooted’ in the persons most likely to commit to it. 
Required 
Action(s) 
Decide what type of commitment (affective, normative or 
calculative) is best suited for the situation at hand. 
Understand the motives of potential policy leaders in committing to 
a policy; implement a survey (eg, OCQ) to measure the type and 
level of commitment in the organisation. 
Select policy leaders whose motives are most likely to engender 
the highest degree of commitment, given the type and nature of 
policy that they are to be entrusted with. 
 
 
Proposition: C2: Consider decisions of Location 
C2a: Select the right ‘address’ for the policy initiative.   
C2b: Ensure that the ‘host’ has (or is given) the requisite 
(legitimate) power and resources to champion the initiative. 
Key 
Objective(s) 
To address issues of power and politics that can influence the 
extent to which people commit to a policy initiative. 
Required 
Action(s) 
Decide on the organisation to host the policy.  Select the 
organisation that can mobilise resources to support the policy and 
which has the command and control ability to stimulate/influence 
cooperation from others. 
Select a policy leader who is skilled and competent to carry the 
policy through, and who also commands power to mobilise events 
and resources.  The source of power may be a function of 
authority, status or influence but in any case must be legitimate 
and used wisely. 
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Proposition: C3: Building Commitment requires Visibility 
C3a: Visibility can be garnered through visible leadership, 
communication and visioning. 
Key 
Objective(s) 
To give a policy a high profile, forcing stakeholders to commit to its 
successful implementation so as not to avoid the repercussions of 
failure. 
Required 
Action(s) 
Identify a prominent sponsor to personify the policy and to provide 
it with visible, physical leadership. 
Give the policy a prominent position in the Government’s agenda. 
Communicate the policy incessantly.  Internally, communicate the 
policy through a process of visioning and through the deployment 
of effective marketing strategies.  Externally, make use of the 
propaganda machinery of the Political Party in Office. 
 
Proposition: C4: Building Commitment requires Reach  
C4a: Reach is achieved by broadening a policy’s scope and 
improving its appeal, particularly through goal alignment. 
Key 
Objective(s) 
To identify and properly manage all affected stakeholders. 
To diffuse the potential of specific lobby groups to rally strong 
opposition to a policy. 
Required 
Action(s) 
Understand how different stakeholders will be influenced by a 
policy initiative.  Identify their expectations and motivations. 
To the extent possible, ensure that policies are constructed in a 
manner that accounts for or balances the interests of as many 
stakeholders as possible. 
 
Proposition: C5: Build Commitment through ACTIVE Participation 
Key 
Objective(s) 
To further diffuse any potential opposition to a policy. 
To transfer responsibility for the policy to the people who are best 
positioned to make it work. 
Required 
Action(s) 
Encourage stakeholders to participate in setting the agenda of the 
policy. 
Engage employees to participate in the planning and decision-
making activities relating to the policy initiative. 
Get management directly involved in the implementation of policies 
entrusted to subordinates. 
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Proposition: C6: Building Commitment requires Ownership 
C6a: Ownership requires policy implementers to believe in the 
values of the policy, and/or to be held personally 
accountable for it. 
Key 
Objective(s) 
To ensure that intent to commit is followed by concrete effective 
action. 
Required 
Action(s) 
Select people who are convinced of and value, the merits/ 
outcomes of a policy initiative.  They will hold themselves 
accountable for their performance. 
Select a suitable framework of accountability to induce ownership 
where personal will is lacking.  Ensure that it directly links the 
success or failure of a policy initiative with rewards or penalties to 
the individual. 
 
 
Proposition: C7: Commitment must be Durable. 
Key 
Objective(s) 
To ensure lasting commitment and consistency over time. 
Required 
Action(s) 
Maintain a high profile for the policy.  Keep a focus on the main 
objective of the policy. 
Monitor, evaluate and control outcomes.  Take timely corrective 
action to keep the policy ‘on track’. 
 
 
Proposition: C8: Commitment must be sustained through Timely Actions and 
Decisions. 
Key 
Objective(s) 
To keep commitment alive and moving. 
Required 
Action(s) 
Time-line decisions.  Maintain constant oversight and identify 
milestones for formal progress review. 
Adopt a proactive approach to problem-solving and decision-
making.  Do not shift or avoid problems: solve them.  Commit to 
taking tough decisions. 
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Proposition: C9: Commitment must be monitored against Escalation 
Key 
Objective(s) 
To ensure that decision makers do not commit to and persist with, 
failing courses of action. 
Required 
Action(s) 
Institutionalise an effective framework of governance. 
Challenge assumptions and approaches; evaluate the costs and 
benefits of alternative effective courses of action. 
 
 
Proposition: C10: To build commitment, policy makers must ensure an internal 
and external supportive environment. 
Key 
Objective(s) 
To establish an enabling context that encourages people to 
commit to a policy initiative. 
Required 
Action(s) 
Develop a receptive internal and external environment – remove 
obstacles to implementation; communicate relentlessly; bundle 
policies with common themes to encourage cooperation and 
synergistic operations; flag issues; and invite stakeholders to 
comment. 
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Summary of Part 4 
This part of the thesis presented the findings and conclusions of the final stage of the 
research activity. 
Specifically, this stage of the research set out to answer the second part of the 
research question and to achieve two objectives: (1) to establish which of the factors 
elicited in Projects 1 and 2 are considered by stakeholders to be the most critical to 
success and failure in the implementation of public policy in Malta; and (2) to develop 
proposals around these factors, with the purpose of identifying suitable measures for 
improving the likelihood of success in future policy implementation initiatives. 
The methodology followed for the identification of the critical factors was 
quantitatively driven and based on a survey of 136 persons (representing a 62% 
response rate from a census of 219 Politicians, Senior Civil Servants and 
Consultants working with the Government of Malta).  Following a rank-ordering 
process of the factors elicited from Projects 1 and 2, and the application of a 
goodness-of-fit test to establish the statistical validity of the survey results, 
‘commitment’ and ‘leadership’ were identified as the only two factors that were 
considered by interviewees to be the most critical influences on both failure and 
success.  Focusing primarily on these factors, the study proceeded to answer the 
second part of the research question by developing propositions for addressing 
these critical factors.  This was achieved on the basis of a review of the data 
collected in Projects 1 and 2; a review of the literature relating to the identified critical 
factors and their application in the context of the implementation of policy; as well as 
due consideration to the researcher’s own experience in the implementation of public 
policy in Malta.  Six propositions for effective policy leadership, and ten propositions 
for building and maintaining commitment to a policy initiative were recommended. 
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Overview of Part 5 
This part of the thesis concludes the discussion on the entire research and is divided 
into three Chapters. 
Chapter 1 summarises the research findings, propositions and limitations of the 
study, and draws a number of conclusions relating to each of the three Projects.   
Chapter 2 addresses the management issue that initially gave rise to this research.  
Building on the research evidence, it proposes a conceptual management framework 
for improving the likelihood of successful policy implementation in Malta. 
Chapter 3 concludes the research by considering the contributions made to both 
knowledge and practice.  
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1.0 Discussion of Findings and Conclusions 
1.1 Projects 1 and 2 
1.1.1 Summary of Key Findings 
A detailed explanation of both the findings of Projects 1 and 2, and of how they were 
derived can be found in Parts 2 and 3.   
Table 19 below summarises only the key data in relation to each of the two projects.  
The findings can be presented and discussed together because the two projects 
addressed the same aspect of the research question and followed the same 
methodology in relation to both data collection and analysis.  While the Table 
highlights the key results obtained, a proper understanding of the findings can only 
be obtained from the detailed explanations mentioned above.  These should be read 
before considering the conclusions drawn in the next section. 
Table 19 – Summary of Key Data (Projects 1 and 2) 
 Project 1 – Failure Project 2 – Success 
 Documentary 
Sources 
Interviews Documentary 
Sources 
Interviews 
Size of Investigation 69 records 8 103 records 8 
No of Factors Derived 14 26 13 27 
Consolidated Factors 26 21 
Properties 96 169 
Output Cognitive Maps (App. 6); 
Road Map to Failure (Fig.11)
Cognitive Maps (App .10); 
Road Map to Success (F16)
 
Source: Project 1 and Project 2 data. 
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1.1.2 Conclusions 
After considering the findings of the first two projects, as well as the observations 
derived from the literature review (p. 10), the following initial53 conclusions can be 
drawn in relation to the first part of the research question54:    
1. Policy implementation is influenced by a large number of factors. 
It is fair to state that despite the knowledge gained from the literature review prior to 
starting this research, the study was still undertaken with the expectation that only a 
few significant factors would be identified as influencing policy implementation in 
Malta.  The reason for this is not naiveté, but rather the author’s experience over the 
years of hearing politicians, civil servants and consultants pointing fault or praise for 
failure or success to the same issues.   
The results obtained from the research correct this misconception.  Similar to other 
comparable studies such as those by Alexander (1985) and Morris and Hough 
(1987), a significantly large number of factors were identified as influencing failure 
and success.  A number of the factors elicited from this research also seem to be 
similar to those of these studies, although the certainty of this cannot be established 
because the meaning behind the ‘titles’ used to describe the factors highlighted in 
the said studies is not discussed by the authors.  Assuming that the meaning behind 
such factors is identical, this result would suggest that the factors influencing policy 
implementation are not context specific.  However, this is at best a hypothesis, and 
would have to be confirmed or refuted through a comparative study across different 
jurisdictions. 
More importantly, the results from this research suggest that information obtained 
from informal discussions can be considerably different from that given by the same 
persons when they are subject to more rigorous interviewing.  The significance of 
this observation is three-fold.  First, it recognises that what people say and what they 
                                            
53 Further observations/conclusions are drawn from the findings of Project 3 that may have a bearing on the 
conclusions listed here. 
54 This was “what issues (or factors) curtail the effective implementation of a given public policy…” 
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actually mean may be two different things altogether.  Detailed probing is therefore 
required to ensure that issues are properly uncovered.  Second, it suggests that 
those involved in the implementation of policy need to shed preconceived ideas of 
what does, or does not, influence implementation and broaden their sensitivity and 
perspective to other potential factors.  Third, it amplifies the importance of engaging 
in sound research and preparation before attempting to implement policy, 
recognising that each one may need to be undertaken differently because of different 
influencing factors. 
2. Different stakeholders share different and similar views of the factors 
influencing policy implementation. 
That different persons identify different or similar factors influencing policy 
implementation is neither a surprise nor, in itself, an important finding.  However, 
what is noteworthy is the need and ability to draw similarities and differences within 
and between the different categories of stakeholders.  This is something that was not 
encountered in the literature and is considered to be important for at least two 
reasons. 
First, it provides greater insights to what factors are considered to be more important 
by each stakeholder category, and to how they each view the issues surrounding 
policy implementation differently.  This understanding should allow policy managers 
(implementers) to address the concerns of the different stakeholders in different 
ways, thereby encouraging their support and commitment to the policy management 
process or, at least, abating their resistance to it.   
Second, it can guide policy implementers in determining an order of priority for 
addressing the identified issues.  For example, while it is not possible to conclude 
that the factors common to all three stakeholder categories in this research are 
considered by each one to be the most important factors influencing policy 
implementation, it is reasonable to assume that their expectations can be better 
managed if the factors common to all three are addressed first, followed by those 
issues common to two stakeholder groups and lastly those specific to each category.   
The need to draw similarities and differences in the issues perceived to influence 
policy implementation is an important conclusion and should not be overlooked. 
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3. Different stakeholders attribute different meanings to the same factors. 
Another important conclusion is the recognition that differences arise in the 
interpretations given to the same factors.  Although it may seem obvious that 
different people perceive issues differently, once again the literature falls short of 
identifying and explaining the meaning behind factors considered to influence the 
implementation of policy.   
It is argued that it is not enough to identify, say, ‘commitment’ as an important factor.  
Equally or more important is the need to determine what it is about commitment that 
makes it such an important consideration in the implementation of policy.  For 
example, in Project 2, twenty-two (22) different properties were identified to explain 
commitment.  This means that while different interviewees where generally talking 
about the same issue, they were defining it and interpreting it from different 
perspectives.  A solution that properly addresses the issue of commitment must 
address it from all these perspectives.   
Practitioners are advised to shed their clichéd views of the issues influencing policy 
and search for particular answers to specific problems, while researchers are 
encouraged to delve deeper into the symbolic and contextual significance of such 
issues. 
4. There is a hierarchy of influence among the perceived factors. 
Although a priority ranking of factors was neither an objective of the study, nor 
possible given the chosen research design and the results obtained, a laddering 
effect could nonetheless be determined among factors, indicating a pecking order or 
hierarchy of influence on failure and/or success.   
This was arrived at by examining the perceived causal relationships between factors 
as presented by the documentary data and by interviewees.  It was noted that some 
factors were super-ordinate and/or sub-ordinate to other factors, either because they 
were perceived to trigger or amplify their occurrence, or because their own 
occurrence resulted from the activity or inactivity of some other factor.  These 
relationships are illustrated in Figures 9 and 14 (relating to Projects 1 and 2 
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respectively), while the hierarchical ordering are presented as ‘road maps’ of failure 
or success in Figures 11 and 16 respectively. 
This is a very important consideration.  Unlike the literature that seems to suggest 
that all factors carry equal ‘weight’ in influencing success or failure, the findings of 
this research suggest that certain factors can be more problematic (in the case of 
failure) or solution-prone (in the case of success) than others, because of what can 
be termed their ‘compounding’ effect.  Recognising this relationship and effect 
should help to channel effort in the policy implementation process to where it is most 
required. 
5. Factors can be classified into three categories to facilitate their management. 
Without wanting to run the risk of oversimplifying the complexity of matters 
surrounding the implementation of policy, it is possible to reduce or group the 
identified factors into three broad categories.   
Borrowing on the conclusions drawn earlier from the literature review, most factors 
can either be classified as ‘people-oriented’ or ‘process-oriented’ (previously referred 
to as technical-oriented).  This is because the factors falling within these categories 
are either (i) intangible and intrinsically relate to some personal, social, psychological 
or behavioural dimension of the individual(s) involved in the policy implementation 
process, or (ii) are extrinsic to the individual and related to matters of procedure, 
process or approach.  The third category relates to what can be termed as 
‘contextual-factors’.  These factors define the environment within which a policy is 
being implemented.  Their durability over time will vary according to circumstances 
but they are likely to change in time as the elements comprising the environment or 
the policy itself change. 
The utility of such a classification is that it provides policy implementers with a rough 
template to guide their actions and activities.  First, it separates the factors into 
dependent (people-oriented and process oriented) and independent (contextual) 
variables, so that attention can be directed on the former category.  Secondly, it 
separates the dependent variables by recognising differences between those factors 
that can be planned and controlled by policy implementers (process-oriented), from 
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those factors which can be influenced by them, but that cannot be rationally planned 
or controlled (people-oriented). 
While it is recognised that this classification is nowhere as detailed as that by Morris 
and Hough (1987), it is possibly more useful to practitioners as it is simpler to bear in 
mind and to apply.   
6. Addressing failure is not a prescription for success.  Equally, achieving 
success requires recognition of the factors that may lead to failure. 
Alexander (1985: 97) states that: 
“successful implementation in part involves preventing various implementation problems from 
occurring in the first place…[it] also involves doing the things that help promote success rather 
than just preventing problems from occurring”. 
This research supports these claims.  It recognises that a distinction must be made 
between: 
(i) those factors that are considered to influence only policy failure (eg., cloning) or 
only policy success (eg., demand) – that is, factors that are ‘unique’ to either 
one or the other situation, and whose absence or presence in one situation is 
not considered to bear any influence on the outcome of the other; 
(ii) those factors that were specifically identified to have played a part in influencing 
both failure and success, either because of their absence or presence (for 
example, a lack of commitment influenced failure, while strong commitment 
influenced success) or because of the way in which different properties of the 
same factor acted to influence failure or success (for example, the frequent 
turnover in leadership was an influence in the case of failure, while clarity of 
vision of the leadership was an important determinant of success); and 
(iii) those factors that were explicit to the outcome of failure, but only implicit to 
success – for example, a central factor to failure in Project 1 was the sheer 
absence of accountability.  Accountability was not identified as an issue in 
success, but this does not mean that it is not important.  Said differently, 
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accountability was not raised as an important factor of success, not because it 
isn’t, but because it was not a problem in the policy investigated.   
Therefore, in relation to the above; 
(i) addressing factors specific to failure may decrease the possibility of failure but 
will not necessarily influence success; 
(ii) different aspects of the same factor that can influence both failure and success 
must be addressed differently; and 
(iii) working to ensure success must also consider the factors that if unaccounted for 
or taken for granted may ultimately drag a policy to failure. 
7. Modelling Failure and Success. 
Similar to the work by other authors (discussed in the literature review), this research 
identifies a number of factors that are perceived to influence successful policy 
implementation.  In addition, it separately identifies those factors that are perceived 
to influence failure and also explores the meaning and relationships behind the 
elicited factors.  With this information, it was considered possible to develop a 
theoretical model of policy failure and of policy success that illustrates the apparent 
inter-play between the elicited factors and how they are perceived to relate to one 
another in shaping the implementation process.  The development of these models 
was heavily influenced and guided by the methodology for theory development 
proposed by David Whetten (2002). 
Whetten (2002), quoting Campbell (1990: 65), states that the development of a 
theory (or model) requires the collection of assertions, both verbal and symbolic, that 
identifies WHAT variables are important for what reasons, that specifies HOW they 
are inter-related and WHY, and that identifies the CONDITIONS under which they 
should be related or not related.  Based on this assertion, he identifies four steps for 
the construction of theory.  This logic and process was applied to the data and 
findings of this research and the resultant models of successful and failed policy 
implementation illustrated in Figures 27 and 28 are proposed.   
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Figure 27 – Model of Successful Policy Implementation 
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Figure 28 – Model of Failure in Policy Implementation 
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The success and failure factors derived from the research constitute the subject of 
the two models.  These factors are either delimited by a rectangular box or by an 
oval shape, depending upon their respective roles.  Factors in rectangular boxes are 
‘mediators’.  They mediate the relationship between the constructs (or factors) on 
either of their side (Whetten, 2002), thus acting as intermediaries or brokers in the 
model’s sequence of events.  Factors in oval shapes are ‘moderators’.  When 
present, they act to influence or change the relationship between two other 
constructs (Whetten, 2002).  Their influence is represented by the yellow-coloured 
arrows.  The other arrows in the models indicate direction and a type of relationship 
between two factors.  White-coloured arrows indicate a cause-effect relationship 
between factors, while red-coloured arrows indicate a means-end relationship.  For 
example, in the model on success, the ‘Approach’ to policy implementation is 
perceived to be effective because of ‘Stakeholder Involvement’, while an effective 
‘Approach’ to policy implementation is required in order to generate ‘Commitment’.  
In the first case, the initial factor controls the final factor, much like a stimulus in 
classical conditioning.  In the second case, it is the final factor that determines the 
initial factor, analogous to the role of reinforcement in operant conditioning 
(Whetten, 2002).  The models also distinguish between process-oriented and 
people-oriented factors, and the contextual factors (and assumptions) defining their 
scope.  The significance of these differences has already been discussed, but an 
example may serve to amplify this further.   
In the model of success, both ‘Stakeholder Involvement’ and ‘Trust’ contribute to 
success by influencing an ‘Effective Approach’ and a sufficient ‘Will/Disposition’ in 
people for them to embrace the policy objectives and to work towards their 
successful implementation.  However, while ‘Stakeholder Involvement’ and ‘Effective 
Approach’ are factors that are within the full control of the policy implementer 
(because the extent to which stakeholders are involved is determined by the extent 
of participation allowed or prohibited), ‘Trust’ and ‘Will’ are not.  Policy implementers 
may influence the level of trust in one another and other stakeholders through their 
actions, but their ‘Will’ or ‘Disposition’ to the implementation initiative is ultimately a 
personal orientation and one that can never be externally planned or controlled.   
 Page 255 
The classification of process-oriented and people-oriented factors is not intended to 
create a divide between the two.  Indeed, one class of factors may influence the 
occurrence of the other.  For example, in the model of success, it is logical to 
presume (and this also arises from the data) that decisions that generate a greater 
degree of ‘Stakeholder Involvement’ are bound to influence the type and level of 
‘Trust’ among the actors and stakeholders to a policy implementation initiative.  
Therefore, while directly influencing the ‘Approach’ to implementation, it also 
indirectly influences people’s ‘Will/Disposition’.  In fact, the data from the research 
would suggest that the factors classified as process-oriented and people-oriented 
are positively related; that is, a positive stimulus to one factor would reinforce the 
emergence or occurrence of another factor, and vice-versa55.  This relationship 
applies equally to the model on failure and, in each case, should serve to sensitise 
policy implementers to direct equal, but different, attention to both classes of factors.  
Recognising the intrinsic difference between the two classes of factors should help 
policy implementers identify and adopt those ‘levers’ that are most suited for eliciting 
some desired action or response, according to prevailing contextual conditions. 
Sticking to the same example of success for explanatory purposes, the proposed 
model suggests that ‘Commitment’ is justified by ‘(Effective) Approach’ and 
‘Will/Disposition’ through a means-end relationship.  In turn, it too is linked to 
success through a means-end relationship with ‘Cooperation’.  Lying at the centre of 
the figure, ‘Commitment’ is considered to be the core construct or factor of the 
model and the ‘hub’ of all activity.  Said differently, successful policy implementation 
is dependent upon the ‘Cooperation’ of all persons involved in the implementation of 
an initiative.  But in order to achieve this, there must be a solid ‘Commitment’ to the 
initiative, which in turn requires people’s unconditional ‘Will and Disposition’ to see it 
through, and an ‘Effective Approach’ and sound strategy to make it happen.  More 
importantly, however, are the moderating effects of three other factors on ‘Effective 
Approach’ and ‘Will/Disposition’.  These factors are ‘Location of Political 
Responsibility’, ‘(Enabling) Leadership’ and ‘Project Management Dynamic’.  By 
                                            
55  In the model, this relationship is illustrated by a double-edged arrow. 
 Page 256 
suggesting this type of relationship, the model proposes that the right type of 
commitment only occurred because  
(i) from a process-perspective, the decisions taken regarding the choice of 
‘Location of Political Responsibility’ provided the required legitimacy, power, 
resource control needs and institutional leadership to the approach followed;  
(ii) from a people-perspective, the chosen ‘Project Management Dynamic’ provided 
a comprehensive pooling of skills, focused expertise, a critical mass and an 
alignment of goals, all of which encouraged ownership of the policy initiative 
and positively shaped people’s attitudes to it; and 
(iii) from both a process and people-perspective, the qualities of the ‘Leadership’ 
shown acted to provide vision, authority and control to the initiative, and to 
foster a team approach that encouraged take up and a collaborative 
environment. 
Interpretation of the proposed model of failure should follow the same logic as that 
described for success.  Of course, the elements of the discussion are different 
because (i) the factors that constitute the subject of the model are different, (ii) the 
types of mediating relationships between the factors are different (and there are no 
perceived moderating relationships), and (iii) the factors perceived critical to the 
whole process (i.e., what constitutes the ‘hub’ of the model) are also different. 
It is important to note that both Figures 27 and 28 should be construed as 
interpretative models that attempt to represent a composite explanation of people’s 
understanding and perception of what led to success and failure in a particular 
context and at a particular time.  While generalisations from the model are 
somewhat possible if delimited to the Maltese socio-political context that 
characterised the two examples of policy implementation, it is important to note that 
the models are not intended, and cannot be used, as prescriptive models of success 
or failure.  Instead, they represent a theoretical perspective of possible explanations 
of success and failure and are intended to stimulate further thought, discussion and 
research in this area. 
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1.2 Project 3 
1.2.1 Summary of Key Findings 
Project 3 had two objectives (i) to prioritise the factors elicited in Projects 1 and 2 
and identify those factors considered by stakeholders to be the most critical or 
influential on policy implementation in Malta and (ii) to develop proposals 
(measures) to address these factors, thereby answering the second part of the 
research question.   
Through the application of a survey of Politicians, Civil Servants and Consultants 
involved in the implementation of policy in Malta, a rank-order of the factors of failure 
and success was determined.  A Goodness-of-Fit test was applied to the results 
achieved in order to support or reject the observation that differences existed in the 
perceived importance of the factors.  The test confirmed this observation and 
highlighted a significant difference between the test scores achieved by the factors 
‘Leadership’ and ‘Commitment’ and those achieved by the other factors, for both 
failure and success.  Leadership and Commitment could therefore be identified to be 
the most important or critical factors considered by stakeholders to influence the 
outcome of policy implementation in Malta.   
After re-visiting the Project 1 and 2 data on these factors, as well as an in-depth 
review of the literature pertaining to these subjects, a number of recommendations 
were drawn as proposed measures for addressing the perceived leadership and 
commitment gaps curtailing the effective implementation of policy.   
The survey findings and the proposed measures are detailed in Part 4. 
1.2.2 Conclusions 
In themselves, the propositions on leadership and commitment discussed in Part 4 
constitute the conclusions of the third and final part of this research.  They identify 
the various drivers considered important to stimulate commitment (Figure 26), and 
also define the perceived requisites for effective leadership in policy implementation 
(Figure 24).  However, a further final consideration must be drawn in relation to 
policy leadership.   
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It was noted from the literature review that the focus of the various leadership ‘tools’ 
available seems to lie on helping persons to develop a profile of their own leadership 
qualities or that of others; for example, one’s leadership traits, the preferred style of 
leadership/management, and one’s inclinations as a task-oriented or people-
oriented person.  However, they do not provide a means for assessing, or matching, 
the particular qualities required of a leader, given a particular policy and context.   
This research inductively identified a number of requisites (or qualities) that are 
considered critical for the effective leadership of policy implementation initiatives.  
Using this information, a ‘tool’ (Figure 29) has been developed to guide policy 
sponsors in their decisions regarding the selection of policy leaders.  The tool is 
intended to measure the qualities of potential leadership candidates against the 
eight attributes of effective leadership proposed by the research, with the objective 
of identifying the candidate(s) whose particular qualities in relation to these 
requisites are most suited for a particular policy and situation.   
Figure 29 – Policy Leadership Selection Tool 
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The Selection Tool 
1. The application of the tool is based on the operational logic of radar charts.   
2. Each variable of the chart corresponds to one of the eight attributes determined 
by this research as requisites of effective policy leadership.  The attributes are 
presented in coloured pairs so as to highlight the super-ordinate variable to 
which they belong.   
3. Each variable can carry a score of 3, 6 or 9.  The higher the score, the higher 
the measurement of the variable (the methodology for scoring the variables and 
the meaning of each score is defined later). 
4. The score obtained for each variable is marked on the relevant coordinate point 
on the corresponding axis. 
5. The coordinate points are joined to one another to form a radar web.  The web 
provides a clear picture of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the 
candidate whose leadership qualities are being assessed. 
Applying the Test 
1. Defining the Context 
In preparing to select a leader(s) for a policy implementation initiative, it is important 
to frame that selection within the context in which the leader(s) would be expected to 
operate.  To that end, a summary description should be developed of the Policy and 
its context.  This should include an outline of its purposes and intended outcomes; 
the political and organisational Environment in which the leader(s) will be expected 
to operate; and the nature and needs of the various groups of Stakeholders who will 
be affected by the policy initiative.  Defining the context will enable the person 
selecting the leadership candidate to consider, in a balanced manner, the 
individual’s qualities (attributes) in relation to the specific features and 
characteristics of a given situation in time.  An example of such definition is included 
in Appendix 22. 
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2. Defining the Test Statements 
A number of questions or statements that reflect the eight attributes of the tool are 
required to serve as benchmarks against which the leadership qualities of a 
potential candidate are assessed.  The following are suggested56: 
o TRUST – The leadership candidate is trustworthy and enjoys the trust of the 
stakeholders.  His actions and reputation can inspire and build trust in others. 
o POWER-SHARING – The leadership candidate will be willing to accept 
responsibility and control for the policy and champion it; will be prepared to 
share and delegate ownership with stakeholders; and will ensure accountability 
for such authority.  The influence group has reason to share power, and will be 
willing to do so with this leadership candidate. 
o POLICY AFFINITY – The leadership candidate has a personal interest in, 
and/or believes in, the particular policy initiative, its objective and desired 
outcomes; and/or will be willing to personally support it. 
o P(p)OLITICAL AFFINITY – The leadership candidate cares for the (reference) 
group and can establish the requisite coalitions and networks to garner support 
and momentum for this initiative. 
o KNOWLEDGE/SKILLS – The leadership candidate possesses the requisite 
knowledge and skills, acquired formally and/or through experience, that will 
enable him/her to adequately consider the strategic, operational and technical 
requirements and implications of this policy initiative.   
o PERSONAL TRAITS – The leadership candidate possesses the wisdom and 
maturity to operate in this environment, can communicate effectively with 
stakeholders and can provide clarity of vision to his/her co-workers and 
followers. 
                                            
56 These statements have been coined to reflect the properties of the data arising from this research and, 
consequently, those aspects of the qualities of leadership that are considered to be most important in the 
Maltese public policy context. 
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o CONFIDENCE/MOTIVATION – The leadership candidate has confidence in his 
abilities and is motivated to succeed.  He/she can act to inspire confidence in 
others and motivate them to achieve the policy’s goal(s). 
o INTEGRITY/VALUES – The personal values of the leadership candidate are 
congruent with the policy purposes; his/her ethics are respected by others; and 
he/she can be expected to provide principled leadership. 
3. Scoring the Attributes 
Each of the eight statements must be scored so that the relative worth of the 
leadership qualities can be established.  A three-point scoring system is used.  
Statements are either given a score of 3, 6 or 9. 
o A statement is given a score of 9, if the person rating the candidate feels very 
confident that the statement is true and reflects his/her evidence-based 
judgement of the qualities of the candidate against that particular attribute. 
A ‘nine score’ indicates that, at least going into the policy initiative, the 
indications are that the leader will be able to succeed in the specific policy 
context.  As the policy initiative proceeds, any perceived deterioration in the 
attributes can be assessed with a view to improving them.  Weaknesses in the 
attributes indicate where training and exposure are required. 
o A statement is scored 6, if the person rating the candidate feels that the 
statement is only true in most of its aspects and, in those respects, reflects 
his/her evidence-based judgement of the qualities of the candidate against that 
particular attribute.  
A ‘six score’ means that there is a concern that the candidate has a sufficiently 
strong possession of the requisite attribute.  The six score is an 
acknowledgement that the attribute is present in some strength but that it exists 
in less than a full professional measure, or that there is some question that the 
environmental context will allow the strength of the attribute to be drawn upon in 
its full measure. 
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o A statement is scored 3, if the person rating the candidate feels that the 
statement, in most of its aspects, is NOT true. 
A ‘three score’ indicates that, in the context of this policy initiative, the attribute 
is held in low quantity.  Through training and exposure, it may be possible to 
raise the score, but it is unlikely that the score can be raised sufficiently in time 
to enable the person to successfully lead the specific project for which he or she 
is being assessed. 
It is possible that a person rating a candidate may feel that even a score of 3 should 
not be awarded to one or more of the attributes.  In such a situation, the candidate 
should be immediately disqualified, as persons occupying leadership positions 
should be expected to hold a basic level of ‘competence’ across all of the identified 
attributes. 
4. Preparing to Draw Conclusions 
The next step is to plot the attribute scores on the relevant axis of the radar chart 
and draw a ‘leadership web’ that graphically illustrates the perceived strengths and 
weaknesses of the leadership qualities of the candidate.  The attribute scores 
should also be summed up to establish a total score. 
To ensure that the qualities of the leadership candidate(s) are fairly scored, the test 
should be administered by someone who either (i) has direct experience of working 
with the candidate(s), and/or (ii) has previous experience of observing the 
candidate(s) at work, and/or (iii) has had the opportunity to judge his/her output and 
performance.  To reduce the potential of bias or subjectivity, it is also suggested that 
the candidate’s qualities are rated by more than one individual.  The results can be 
compared and, if considered necessary, a final score per attribute can be 
established at the median of the individual scores awarded.   
Furthermore, prior to rating a candidate(s), a ‘reference leadership web’ should also 
be drawn that reflects the minimum score levels per attribute required, given the 
particular policy and its context.  This practice will provide an adequate baseline 
against which to compare the actual results of candidate scores, and will guard 
decision-makers from making sub-optimal choices of leadership. 
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5. Interpreting the Results 
The objective of the leadership web and the total score is not to establish some 
minimum pass mark.  Reality is never that clean cut.  Instead, the objective is to 
provide a tool with which decisions can be made in a more informed and objective 
way. 
The ideal leader for any policy will be that candidate whose leadership web has the 
widest circle of influence (web pattern) represented by a score of nine on each of 
the eight attributes; i.e., a total score of seventy-two (72).  The reasons are obvious 
but such candidate(s) are likely impossible to be found57.   
Short of finding such candidates, the ideal leader for a particular policy will be that 
candidate whose leadership web has a circle of influence that either matches, or 
exceeds, the minimum web pattern established for this policy (hence the importance 
of drawing this first, and before rating the potential of a candidate).  He/she is ideal 
when his/her apparent leadership qualities are perceived to match, or exceed (as 
the case may be), the minimum required attribute levels considered critical for the 
particular policy dynamic.  This does not mean that the policy will be 
successfully implemented.  It should be remembered that leadership is only one 
factor (albeit considered critical) that influences the outcome of a policy initiative.  
However, given a specific context, and assuming all else equal, the candidate 
should be expected to provide effective leadership, thereby improving the likely 
outcome of a successful implementation. 
It should be noted that it is a match in the leadership web, and not the total score 
that is the determining factor of effective leadership qualities.  This is because, given 
the combination of scores possible, a candidate can achieve a total score that is 
equal to that of the reference leadership web, but that does not match the required 
distribution of scores along the 8 attributes that define the specific pattern (or circle 
of influence) of the reference web. 
                                            
57 Proponents of the ‘Born to Lead’ would contest this statement, arguing that effective leadership is person-
specific and not situation bound.  The arguments against the former position and in favour of the latter were 
discussed in Part 4. 
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What happens if no candidate is judged to have a leadership web that matches or 
exceeds the reference web?   
There are two options to consider.  The first is to consider scrapping the policy 
initiative or postponing it, until either a suitable leader is found, or existing leaders 
are given the training and exposure required for them to develop the qualities that 
match or exceed the policy requirements.  A second option is to shed traditional 
views of leadership and accept the act of leadership as a pluralist function.  Building 
on the proposition that effective leadership requires the establishment of a network 
of effective leaders58, a decision can be taken to have the policy initiative led by not 
one, but a number of the candidates considered.  The selected candidates should 
complement one another in their respective areas of weakness.  In other words, it is 
their composite leadership web that should match or exceed the reference web.   
There are a number of advantages to choosing this strategy.  First, it truly 
acknowledges that different people have different qualities to bring to bear on 
different situations, hence maximising the utilisation of human capital (a scarce 
resource everywhere, more so in Malta).  Second, it democratises the policy 
management process, drawing more people directly into implementation and helping 
to foster further support and ownership of initiatives.  Third, it exposes a greater 
number of people to broader and more onerous responsibilities, building their 
capacity to contribute further to the organisation and to their own personal growth.  
Fourth, it requires the sharing of tasks, which if managed properly, can help to break 
down organisational barriers, encourage cooperation and the development of a 
team-oriented philosophy.  Fifth, by distributing responsibility for a policy initiative, 
power and the command over resources are likewise shared and not concentrated 
in one person or entity, thereby abating the creation of fiefdoms or silos. 
                                            
58 Proposition L2 – Project 3. 
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1.3 Limitations of the Study 
Issues pertaining to the study’s validity and reliability have already been discussed 
in previous Chapters.  The only real concern regarding these matters probably 
pertains to the study’s external validity.   
It has already been acknowledged that the decision to base each of Projects 1 and 2 
on a single case study, using only examples of Maltese policy, limits the domain to 
which the study’s findings can be generalised.  First, it creates restrictions to the 
generalisability of findings beyond the Maltese context and, secondly, it questions 
the generalisability of the findings beyond the context of the chosen examples of 
policy.  Potential criticism in this respect must however consider the reasons behind 
the deliberate choices made.  First, the research was motivated by a management 
issue operating in a particular policy context.  Consequently, solutions to that issue 
had to be likewise based on the policy context in which the problem is located.  
Secondly, the examples of policy selected for the case studies followed a rigorous 
interviewing process that (i) targeted people who had sufficient experience with the 
implementation of Maltese policy to consider a wide array of policy examples, and 
(ii) required interviewees to select a representative example of success and failure 
on the basis of a number of pre-established criteria.  In these respects, it is felt that 
while it may not be possible to engage in statistical generalisations, analytical 
generalisations are not beyond the possibility of this research.  Furthermore, a 
certain degree of generalisation did take place in the third project, when the factors 
elicited from Projects 1 and 2 were used as the subject of the survey, so 
establishing a priority order of importance.  The response to the survey was 
significant and given the results achieved, it is fair to state that interviewees did not 
feel that the data they were faced with was extraneous to their experience in dealing 
with policy implementation.     
The problem of external validity remains a major barrier in doing case studies (Yin, 
1994: 36).  Nonetheless, case studies of the policy-making process have long been 
considered one of the more important methods of political science analysis (Lowi, 
1964: 677).  Would better theory arise from more surface case studies, or from 
fewer but deeper case studies?  The issue is well debated in the literature 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt, 1991; Dyer and Wilkins, 1991) and valid arguments 
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are presented by each side.  However, given the objective of this study, it is felt that 
choosing a single case study approach was an appropriate decision and one that fits 
well within the selected research paradigm.  This notwithstanding, due consideration 
was given to the need for rigour to ensure the study’s construct and internal validity, 
as well as its reliability.  This was deemed important to ensure that the study could 
be replicated in other case contexts and to facilitate the drawing of comparisons and 
generalisations from inter-case findings.  Indeed, a natural next step to this research 
would be to engage in a comparative study of the factors influencing policy 
implementation in other countries.  The study could be designed to compare policy 
implementation in Malta to that in other small island States, and/or to that in 
commonwealth countries, and/or even to other large States that have different 
politico-administrative contexts. 
Another limitation, or criticism that could be levied on the study, is that the selected 
examples of policy on which the case studies are based may be somewhat 
outdated, given that they related to policy decisions taking place in the early to mid-
1990s.  It has already been highlighted that the subject of the policies remains an 
issue of current interest today and new/revised policies are still being directed in the 
area of Financial Management Reform and Local Councils.  However, it could be 
argued that the contexts within which those policies operated in a decade ago are 
different to the contexts shaping their operations today.  Consequently, if the case 
studies were to be replicated today, using some current policy as the subject of 
research, new or different factors may be identified, and/or less/more importance 
may be attributed to the original list of factors.  This is possible and a longitudinal 
study would have served to address the concern.  However, it would have also 
created its own set of problems.  First, it would have required more of an action 
research approach, which for the reasons mentioned earlier, would not have been 
practical.  Secondly, it would have represented a very risky approach, in that the 
author’s association with his current employer could have terminated at any time 
and, with this, possibly his access to the required data.  A case study approach 
based on historic data was more reliable.  Despite the foregoing, it should also be 
noted that the Project 1 and 2 factors were considered by current policy managers in 
the Project 3 survey.  Their validity was not questioned and the factors may 
therefore be deemed to be significant in a current policy context. 
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2.0 Addressing the Management Issue 
Having identified the critical issues influencing policy implementation, and having 
proposed various separate measures to address these concerns, the final step, from 
a practitioner’s perspective, is to develop a framework that provides policy 
managers in Government with the opportunity to address implementation in a 
holistic and manageable way.  Building on the evidence from Project 2, it is believed 
that this can best be achieved if the Government adopts a project management 
approach to the management and implementation of policies. 
2.1 The Case for Project Management 
Ever since Government introduced its reform movement in the late 1980s, there has 
been a lot of discussion about project management being the new form of 
managerialism for a dynamic and proactive public service.  In reality, project 
management remains a concept that in Government in Malta is not understood and 
much less practised.  However, the research would suggest that if it were to be 
applied as a technique for the implementation of policies, it could be a viable tool for 
their successful delivery.  Besides acting as a catalyst for effective leadership and 
commitment to a policy initiative, good project management also brings into 
perspective many of the other factors that are perceived to influence 
implementation. 
The suitability of project management for the implementation of strategy is well 
recognised in the literature.  Bowman (1998: 157), for example, notes that: 
“the advantages of the technique in strategy implementation derive from the disciplines and 
procedures that have been developed, its multidisciplinary approach, and the measurability of 
output”. 
Turner and Muller (2002: 3) also suggest that: 
“project management is the process by which projects are successfully delivered, and their 
objectives successfully achieved [emphasis added]…[and that] projects are better suited for 
managing change than the functional organization”. 
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The importance of project management also emerged from the research and was 
particularly evident in the Project 2 case study.  The findings had suggested that 
project management can influence successful implementation in at least five ways 
(Figure 30).   
Figure 30:  The Influences of Project Management on Policy Implementation 
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By effectively adopting a project management approach to implementing the Local 
Councils policy, the political and administrative arms of Government were 
successfully combined without concentrating too much power in one entity.  Indeed, 
the first contribution that a project management approach had on the successful 
outcome of the implementation programme was the ability to channel the (internal) 
stakeholders’ interests in the same direction and generate a sense of goal 
alignment.  Political, administrative and expert resources were channelled to work in 
tandem and towards the achievement of a common goal.  Each contributing party 
held firm to its resources, but found it unthreatening to share these with the other 
parties.  Feelings of territorialism were thus avoided and problems were swiftly dealt 
with as they arose.   
The project management methodology was also instrumental in overcoming 
traditional mentalities concerning the control of power.  It was noted that the parties 
to the project team came to realise that their individual and collective interests were 
 Page 269 
best served when information was shared.  There was a recognition that their 
collective power in driving the policy came not from withholding information, but from 
understanding each other’s point of view so that the whole could be managed more 
comprehensively.  To facilitate this process of information sharing, meetings were 
held at regular and pre-determined intervals and followed a specific agenda.  The 
agenda was also purposely designed to generate discussion about the detail of the 
project as well as the progress achieved on all fronts.  Problems could therefore be 
minimised and often avoided. 
Typical of most policy implementation programmes, the one in question required the 
pooling of various skills and expertise; competencies that are almost never 
concentrated in one Ministry, and on many occasions are also scarce across 
Government.  The adoption of a project management approach alleviated this 
problem.  It allowed scarce resources to be brought together and focused on an 
initiative on a semi-permanent basis, without disrupting other day-to-day activities 
that must nonetheless be seen through and effectively managed.  The pooling of 
resources was also instrumental in influencing the transfer of skills and know-how 
that is so often limited to persons normally performing distinct line operational 
duties. 
Consequent to the aforesaid, the project management dynamic also served to 
generate a critical mass of resources working on a particular initiative.  Besides 
allocating the required skills, the parties to the project team also contributed 
resources (human, technical and financial) in sufficient quantities to leave an impact 
and to ensure that the policy could be holistically tackled in both breadth and depth.   
However, the most important success factor emerging from this organisation of 
activities was a special type of group or team dynamic.  It is interesting to note that 
during interviews, recollections on the policy in question were surfaced with a certain 
sense of nostalgia.  The sense of dedication to the team and the affinity to the 
project was something real and almost tangible.  It was influenced by various factors 
but was ultimately premised on a collective belief in the possible successful outcome 
of the initiative, recognition of the leadership capabilities and the commitment of all 
members of the project team in their respective camps. 
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This example of policy implementation suggests that managing policies as discrete 
‘projects’ provides an opportunity to: 
1. implement initiatives in an incremental and manageable way; 
2. assign different responsibilities to different people ‘in chunks’, thereby providing 
them with the exposure required to develop and enhance their leadership skills 
while simultaneously allowing for better risk management; 
3. draw management and subordinates to work closer together as a ‘team’, thereby 
encouraging participation, communication, and the development of trustful 
relationships; and 
4. solicit greater commitment from individual team members by assigning them 
ownership for specific deliverables. 
2.2 Developing a Project Management Capability in Government 
For the Government of Malta, the first step to implementing policies as projects is 
the development of a project management function.  This can be addressed at a line 
Ministry/Department level or as a centralised corporate activity.  As an initial step, 
the latter is suggested for two reasons. 
First, the Maltese Public Service lacks the number of professionally trained 
managers at line Department level that may be more widely available in larger 
Governments.  To try and introduce a new management framework at this level will 
be like sowing seeds in unploughed land.  There is little to feed on and the initiative 
will be unsustainable.  Secondly, the few professionally competent managers that 
exist are either focused on the delivery of critical day-to-day operational functions 
and services, or are otherwise deployed to fire-fight issues as they arise.  To re-
deploy these officers to develop a project management capacity would detract their 
efforts away from the delivery of critical services and would only serve ‘to rob Peter 
to pay Paul’.   
The Government may therefore stand to gain if it strengthens its policy governance 
by first establishing a central Policy Management Office.  The objective of this Office 
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would be two-fold: to oversee the roll-out of Government’s policy programme, and to 
provide support to line Ministries through the deployment of management specialists 
who are specifically schooled and trained in the strategic implementation of public 
policy.  This strategy would serve two purposes.  First, it would provide much 
needed assistance to line Ministries in a coordinated and organised fashion.  
Secondly, it would serve to start inculcating a policy management competence at 
line operational level through knowledge and skills-transfer.   
The Policy Management Office would have to be composed of management 
professionals specifically recruited for this function.  Understudies may be deployed 
to work alongside them, so as to facilitate skills transfer, to develop a team approach 
and to engender commitment.   
Recognising that (i) in itself, this would be a new policy initiative, and (ii) ‘location of 
political responsibility’ for a policy was identified as a determining factor influencing 
failure or success, the Office should be resident within a domain that provides it with 
the power to influence the assignment and deployment of resources, and the 
establishment of policy priorities.  Given the current context, a suitable location 
would be the Office of the Head of the Civil Service.  The Head of the Civil Service 
should personally sponsor the initiative.  These considerations will empower the 
Project Management Office, sending symbolic and real messages of Government’s 
confidence in its intent and its ability to change its modus operandi.   
The Project Management Office could be established as a completely new function 
(i.e., Office), or otherwise introduced as an expanded remit of an existing function.  
A possible candidate for the latter option is the Management Efficiency Unit (MEU).  
MEU is the Government’s in-house management consultancy firm.  It reports directly 
to the Head of the Civil Service and employs some thirty (30) multi-disciplinary 
professionals who are exclusively focused on providing public sector consulting 
services to all Ministries and Departments in Malta.  There are a number of 
advantages to following this strategy.  First, it capitalises on existing human capital 
and expertise, thereby expediting the set-up process and reducing the learning 
curve.  Second, it makes use of an existing function that is well known in 
Government and highly respected.  Third, it can ‘exploit’ the existing network of 
relationships and activities between MEU staff and public officers in Government 
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departments, thereby reducing potential resistance to this initiative.  Fourth, it is also 
advantageous to MEU, as it would move from the provision of advice, to more direct 
involvement with the implementation of policies and initiatives – i.e., to move from 
the ‘comfortable’ position of telling Government Departments ‘what to do’ and ‘how 
to do it’, to the actually ‘messy’ part of doing what needs to be done. 
The Project Management Office should initially be given a programme that is 
focused on a few, but high profile, policy initiatives.  By working visibly with line 
Ministries to deliver these initiatives and by providing direct and tangible support to 
ensure early, visible results, the Office will gradually rally support.   
As commitment is built and competencies start to develop at Ministry-level, 
operational champions can be identified and ‘satellite’ project management offices 
can be established to act as remote site-offices to the central Office.  The persons 
deployed to these offices will need to be schooled in policy management and trained 
in project implementation skills.  By time, the Government would have developed a 
network of policy leaders at Ministry level who will act to re-direct policy 
implementation efforts away from line managers, so that the latter can focus on their 
day-to-day activities, while they can focus on successfully delivering new policies 
and services in parallel.  Once implemented, responsibility for ‘maintaining’ the new 
policy can be transferred to line managers, so that the policy leaders can redirect 
their attention to new initiatives. 
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3.0 Research Contributions 
It is believed that this research makes a contribution to both theory and practice.  
The suggested contributions are summarised in Table 20 and discussed further 
below. 
3.1 Contributions to Theory 
3.1.1 Theoretical Knowledge 
1. In his concluding remarks, Alexander (1985) observed that successful 
implementation involves doing the things that help promote success, rather than 
just preventing problems from occurring.  The findings of this research suggest 
that failure and success are influenced by different factors, or by the same 
factors but acting in different ways.  This therefore confirms Alexander’s 
observation and suggests that the ability to manage or avoid failure is not a 
prescription for success.  A successful outcome requires due consideration of 
the factors that promote success. 
2. The most significant contribution that this study makes to theory emanates from 
the proposed models of policy failure and success.  These models provide a 
framework that suggest what factors influence policy failure and success and 
how.  Similar representations have not been encountered in the literature.  The 
value of their contribution is two-fold.  First, these models can serve as a 
reference or benchmark for exploring or comparing other policy implementation 
initiatives.  Second, they provide the basis for structuring and testing further 
hypotheses on both the substantive variables (the factors) that are being 
claimed to influence policy implementation, as well as the degree and bearing 
of their influence on failure and success in different policy contexts.  Although 
the models are not intended to be prescriptive of failure and success (because 
different contexts may influence the models differently), they provide a useful 
tool for framing and ‘navigating through’ the two phenomena. 
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Table 20 – Contributions to Theory and Practice 
 Extent of Contribution 
Domains of 
Contribution 
What has been confirmed What has been developed What has been found that is new 
Theoretical 
Knowledge 
o Avoiding failure is not a prescription for 
success. 
 o Theoretical models for framing success and 
failure. 
o Ascribed the meaning behind various 
factors as perceived by members of a 
particular polity and, particularly, unbundled 
the meaning of (policy) commitment. 
o Identified eight dimensions (or attributes) of 
effective leadership that are critical for the 
implementation of public policy. 
Empirical 
Evidence 
o Some of the factors identified in the 
literature to influence implementation 
were confirmed by the research. 
o Effective leadership is a function of 
both transactional and transformational 
qualities. 
o Effective leadership is a pluralist, not 
individualistic, function. 
o A distinction has been drawn between 
factors influencing failure and success. 
o Failure and success are heavily influenced 
by the absence or presence of commitment 
but, in a public sector context, this is more 
likely to be a function of the commitment of 
the leadership of the Service, rather than a 
matter of employee commitment, which 
occupies centre stage in the private sector. 
o The prioritisation of success and failure 
factors in a particular policy context. 
Methodological 
Approaches 
 o Triangulation of the data codification and 
cognitive mapping techniques, to achieve a 
consolidated set of failure/success factors. 
o Database to facilitate the recording and 
analysis of documentary evidence. 
 
Practice  o An understanding of what policy makers in 
Malta consider to be the most important 
factors in the implementation of policy. 
o The application of a project management 
framework for the management and 
implementation of policy. 
o A potential ‘road-map’ or how-to guide for 
driving successful policy implementation in 
Malta. 
o A model/tool for guiding the selection of 
policy leaders. 
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3. Using the general principles of data codification proposed by Strauss and 
Corbin (1998), and the application of cognitive (causal) mapping techniques 
(Eden, Ackermann et al., 1992), the study has been successful in ascribing 
some meaning to a number of clichéd concepts that are extensively used, but 
that are nonetheless elusive and poorly understood.  While the research does 
not claim to provide definitive explanations to such concepts (because they are 
contextually bound), it does make a contribution by unbundling the meanings 
attributed to them by the members of a particular polity.  These meanings are 
illustrated through the cognitive maps and ‘road-maps’ of failure and success 
discussed in Projects 1 and 2.  Of particular relevance is the unbundling of 
‘commitment’ in a public policy context.  As discussed earlier (p.176-201), while 
some aspects of the literature on commitment focus on categorising and 
defining this term, the application of such studies in a public sector context has 
not been substantial.  Furthermore, while studies in this field have successfully 
explored the sources/antecedents of commitment, there is little, if any, on what 
leaders and organisations can do to show and build commitment.  The research 
proposes a number of variables for a public policy context (see p.205-208). 
4. Leadership is defined and explained in the literature in numerous ways (see 
Figure 23, p.151).  According to the trait and style philosophies, effective 
leadership can either arise because of a person’s innate characteristics or 
because of his abilities to influence behaviour.  The contingency school argues 
that effective leadership is not contingent on one characteristic or the other, but 
rather on the specific conditions of a particular context.  This study would 
suggest that effective leadership requires an element of all three.  Using the 
data and findings arising from the research, an attempt was therefore made to 
match different aspects of the three schools by identifying those critical 
elements of leadership that, according to the data, constitute or define an 
effective leader(s) from the perspective of public policy implementation.  It is 
believed that the contribution to knowledge in this regard primarily arises from 
(i) the substantive identification of the attributes that are considered to shape 
effective policy leadership and (ii) the proposition of a framework that considers 
aspects of all three schools of thought, and not just the limited view of one of 
them.   Furthermore, it provides a conceptual framework for further research 
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that can be oriented at testing the generalisability of the proposed attributes to 
other policy contexts.  In general terms, the research also contributes to the 
study of leadership in a public sector setting, which in contrast to its counterpart 
study in the private sector is very limited. 
3.1.2 Empirical Evidence 
5. The factors elicited from Projects 1 and 2 are themselves a substantive 
contribution to both theory and practice.  From the former perspective, they 
provide empirical evidence of the variables considered to influence failure and 
success in a particular policy context.  As such, they add to current knowledge 
by confirming what is already known to influence policy implementation, and 
can also serve as a basis for further empirical research that would test their 
general application beyond the context and limitations of this study.  Similarly, 
they can be used to benchmark and compare factors derived from other 
research studies.  From a perspective of management practice, they can serve 
as a checklist of ‘what to watch out for’ and ‘what to avoid’, when managing the 
implementation of policy. 
6. The findings of the research confirm that leadership is most effective when 
there is a balance of transactional and transformational leadership.  It supports 
the claims made by other authors that the potency of leadership is greater when 
viewed and applied from this perspective. 
7. The findings of this research also confirm claims made in the literature that 
leadership should be considered and encouraged as being a pluralist activity 
and not an individual function.  A broader, more inclusive perspective of 
leadership that capitalises on the various leadership qualities of different people 
is claimed to contribute to more effective leadership. 
8. Besides adding to current knowledge by providing further evidence of the 
factors influencing policy implementation, this research also makes a further 
contribution by distinguishing between factors that were considered to influence 
failure and those perceived to influence success.  This distinction is not 
normally made. 
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9. While the literature on commitment emphasises that the most important 
dimensions of commitment that influence implementation are employee and 
organisational commitment, and not management or sponsor commitment, this 
research claims otherwise.  Given the findings obtained, it is suggested that in a 
public sector context, the implementation of policy is more likely to be 
influenced by the absence or presence of the commitment of the leadership 
(both political and administrative) rather than the commitment of other junior 
employees.  By highlighting this distinction, it is argued that the manner in which 
commitment needs to be addressed in a public policy context is different to that 
in a private sector setting.  In this respect, the study is suggestive of the need 
for greater research in this direction. 
10. A final empirical contribution is the prioritisation of success and failure factors.  
It is a contribution to theory because rather than just being a listing of factors, it 
provides researchers with a weighted consideration of the perceived importance 
of the factors.  Therefore, it (i) represents new information on the sensitivities 
considered to have a significant effect on the shaping of public policy in Malta, 
and (ii) provides an opportunity for the comparison of such sensitivities among 
different policy contexts, so that the similarities and differences in the 
implementation of policy across different polities and jurisdictions can be 
examined and understood better.  It is also a contribution to practice because it 
can help practitioners to focus their effort, time and resources on those factors 
considered by stakeholders to be the most important.  Given the fast pace of 
change and an ever-increasing and crowded agenda, it provides them with the 
opportunity to ‘manage by exception’ and to derive greater returns per unit of 
effort. 
3.1.3 Methodological Approaches 
11. The protocol that was developed to merge the findings of the documentary 
research to that arising from the interviews (defined in Project 2), may be 
viewed as a development of the data codification and cognitive mapping 
techniques used separately in each of the two stages of the data collection 
phase.  This methodological triangulation allowed two data sets to be 
 Page 278 
compared, contrasted and reduced, so that a final categorisation of the failure 
and success factors could be achieved. 
12. A custom-built database composed of three modules was designed and built in 
Microsoft Access ©.  This database facilitated the capture and analysis of the 
documentary data used in Projects 1 and 2, and also served to strengthen the 
reliability of the study by providing a chain of evidence for audit purposes.  The 
information resident in the database can also be used for replication studies or 
as additional data to other similar studies. 
3.2 Contribution to Practice 
13. The individual and collective cognitive maps arising from Projects 1 and 2 
provide an element of insight to the thought processes of some of the policy 
makers in Malta and to the mental images they hold of (i) what factors are 
important for policy implementation and, therefore, what they believe defines, 
leads to and constitutes failure and success, and (ii) how these factors are 
perceived to interact in influencing the outcome of a policy initiative.  This 
information is particularly of interest to the policy implementers operating in the 
Maltese public sector given that a better understanding of the beliefs, views and 
opinions of the decision-makers around them can help them to frame and 
manage the implementation of policy in ways that will garner support, and not 
opposition, from these stakeholders.  In broader terms, to the policy 
implementer operating outside this context, it also provides useful insights into 
how different people plan, implement and evaluate their policy programmes.  
From an academic perspective it would also be interesting to compare these 
mental models with those of policy makers from other different and similar 
political jurisdictions and contexts, to establish whether there exist different 
perceptions of (i) what constitutes or defines failure or success in the 
implementation of public policy, (ii) what factors drive such failure or success, 
and (iii) the manner in which such factors interact in driving one or the other 
policy outcome.   
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14. The findings of the research support the view in the literature that project 
management is not only a useful and practical technique for routine, operational 
activities, but can also be successfully applied to the management and 
implementation of policies.  The proposed framework of project management in 
the Maltese Government gives due consideration to the findings of this research 
and it is believed that if operationalised as suggested, it will make a deep and 
lasting contribution to the effective management of policies.   
15. The contribution to theory of the proposed models of success and failure has 
already been highlighted.  The models also make a practical contribution.  To 
the policy implementer operating in Malta, they can serve as practical ‘how to’ 
and ‘how not to’ guides to policy implementation.  Although not prescriptive in 
content, they can nonetheless act as ‘road maps’ of implementation. 
16. From the viewpoint of management practice, a significant contribution is the 
identification of the dimensions or attributes that are considered to define 
effective policy leadership in a public sector context.  While recognising that 
leadership effectiveness is influenced by a variety of factors contingent on 
contextual variables, the research proposes eight dimensions that, in a public 
sector context, are considered to influence policy leadership in specific and 
different ways.  These attributes point to areas of leadership that in a private 
sector context may at times be taken for granted, or are not emphasised 
enough, because of the different elements defining that context.  For example, 
the private sector stands a better chance of attracting competent leadership 
because of the processes by which leaders are acquired and/or scouted 
through organisations.  In the public sector, the development of competent 
leadership may be hindered by factors such as the inability to directly recruit 
people into leadership positions from outside the Civil Service, the emphasis on 
length of service (a different term for seniority), and/or the limitation/inability to 
either remove incompetent leaders from the positions they hold or to replace 
them altogether.  Similarly, the motives driving committed leadership are likely 
to be different and, hence, the outcome or degree of such commitment is bound 
to be different.  A further contribution is the proposed tool for selecting policy 
leaders that should provide a useful framework for policy sponsors to make 
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more objective decisions of selection and appointment.   The selection of policy 
leaders whose qualities match the particular requirements of a specific policy 
context should improve the likelihood of success.   
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Summary of Part 5 
This part of the thesis ends the discussion of the research.   
It draws a number of conclusions relating to various stages of the study and 
proposes some recommendations for guiding future policy implementation 
initiatives.  Of particular note is the presentation of two conceptual models for 
framing, or representing, success and failure in policy implementation, and the 
proposition of a tool for guiding the selection of policy leaders.  The adoption of 
project management for the management and implementation of policies is also 
proposed, and a framework for introducing this practice in the Government of Malta 
is recommended.  Finally, the major contributions made by this research to both 
theory and practice are presented and discussed.  Those considered to be of 
particular merit include (1) the theoretical models for framing success and failure – 
such representations were not encountered in the literature, (2) the success of 
ascribing some meaning (as perceived by members of a particular polity) to a 
number of clichéd concepts that are extensively used, but nonetheless elusive and 
poorly understood, (3) the identification of eight dimensions which, according to the 
data, define effective policy leadership, and (4) the proposition of a tool for guiding 
the selection of policy leaders. 
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